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Groups in conflict develop different and often contesting interpretations of the past, 
particularly if that history involves a violent injustice. How both perpetrator and 
victimised groups deal with their past history is critical to the successful resolution of 
protracted conflicts. When the harm is left unacknowledged and unaddressed, 
feelings of victimisation, humiliation, and shame emerge and frequently prolong the 
conflict between the transgressor and transgressed. The perpetrator's 
acknowledgment of responsibility for immoral acts is therefore an essential pre-
requisite in promoting reconciliation. Debates about historical injustices, however, 
focus on whether guilt and responsibility for past wrongs should be passed on from 
the original perpetrators to the generational descendants.  
 
Seventy years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and yet the 
memories of the war continue to negatively affect the relations between China and 
Japan. While Chinese victims and their descendants continue to seek apology and 
closure, the Japanese public are experiencing 'apology fatigue'—a feeling of 
frustration that no matter what they do, the victims will never be satisfied. This thesis 
seeks to examine the extent to which present-day Japanese are willing to accept some 
degree of inherited responsibility for the acts of aggression committed by their 
ancestors. Drawing on social identity, basic human needs and reconciliation theories, 
this research aims to identify the social psychological factors impeding Japanese 
acceptance of collective responsibility for its past. Using a mixed methods approach, 
this problem is examined and explored with a sample of 162 Japanese university 
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"We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, 
who have nothing to do with the war, be predestined to apologize."  
 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his message commemorating the 70th anniversary 
of the end of World War II, August 14, 2015 
 
1.1  Inherited Responsibility for Historical Injustices 
Groups in conflict develop different and often contesting interpretations of the past, 
particularly if that history involves a violent injustice. Polarized and divisive 
memories of past violence can perpetuate a sense of grievance among the victims 
and thereby increasing the risk of intolerance and revengeful act towards the former 
adversary (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Frijda, 1994). Competing victim vs. perpetrator 
narratives of the same historical event pose one of the most challenging obstacles to 
peaceful resolution of conflicts (Bilali & Ross, 2012). How both perpetrator and 
victimised groups deal with their past history of violent trauma is critical to the 
successful resolution of intractable conflict (Staub, 2006; Lederach, 1997; Brooks, 
1999; Minow, 2002). Whether the trauma is a result of genocide or of war, if it is left 
unacknowledged and unaddressed, feelings of victimization, shame and humiliation 
emerge which frequently prolong the conflict between the transgressor and the 
transgressed (Scheff, 1994; Lindner, 2006; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The perpetrator 
group's acknowledgement of responsibility for its immoral acts is therefore an 
essential pre-requisite in promoting reconciliation (Minow, 1998; Kelman, 2008). 
 
Debates about historical injustices, however, have focused on whether responsibility 
and guilt for past wrongs should be passed on from the original perpetrators to 
generational descendants. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's (2015) 
commemorative war message—"We must not let our children, grandchildren, and 
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even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with the war, be 
predestined to apologize"—illustrates that it is not common for descendants of 
perpetrator groups to accept 'inherited responsibility' for the pain and suffering 
inflicted on other groups. Against this backdrop, Kwak and Nobles (2013) 
nonetheless argue that that the descendants of perpetrators bear 'inherited 
responsibility' for past harm and should contribute in some way, to its remedy (Kwak 
& Nobles, 2013). These scholars insist that the issue of 'inherited responsibility' 
needs to be seriously addressed if there is to be a 'thick' reconciliation in East Asia. 
Miller’s (2007) theory also claims that intergenerational responsibility for historical 
wrongdoings is both an inherited and a national responsibility. Citizens of perpetrator 
nations cannot escape responsibility since historical injustices are perpetrated by 
peoples rather than by states even if the state issues the orders (Miller, 2007, 135-61). 
Abdel-Nour (2013) also supports this argument by stressing that it is the citizens' 
membership in a political community that forms the basis for such 'inheritance'.  
 
This thesis, therefore, assumes theoretically that the acceptance of inherited 
responsibility for a nation's misdeeds is an important component of intergroup 
reconciliation (Kwak & Nobles, 2013; Kelman, 2008b).  Other scholarship in social 
psychology also indicates that acknowledgement of collective responsibility and 
guilt contributes to reconciliation by promoting pro-social actions amongst members 
of the perpetrator group in order to redress the past (Wohl et al., 2013; Iyer et al., 
2003). The theory on inherited responsibility, however, stands in tension with 
scholarship on protracted conflicts which reveal that there are identity-driven needs 
and motivations that stand as barriers to the perpetrator group's acceptance of 
collective responsibility. Social identity theory posits that individuals are driven to 
protect the collective esteem of their primary social reference group (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). Because collective guilt arises from negative evaluation of the in-group's 
actions, in-group members often avoid accepting responsibility for their group's 
transgressions in order to defend their group's positive identity and reputation. The 
most critical threats to group identity occurs when its collective morality and 
reputation are questioned (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999). When 
confronted by accusations of their in-group's immoral past, individuals defend the 
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group's moral status by averting collective guilt and denying responsibility (Sullivan 
et al., 2012).  
 
It is a central assumption of this thesis that intergroup reconciliation will not be 
achieved until the perpetrator group [and their descendants] acknowledge 
responsibility for their past ill treatment of others. In light of this, this thesis seeks to 
examine the extent to which present-day Japanese accept some degree of inherited 
responsibility for the acts of aggression and injustice committed by their forebears. 
Why do some contemporary Japanese feel responsibility for their nation's past while 
others do not? The purpose of this mixed methods study is to examine empirically 
what conditions and which factors impede the perpetrator group's acceptance of 
collective responsibility for the transgressions of their ancestors. This problem was 
examined and explored with a sample of 162 Japanese university students who 
represent a generation of 'descendants' who were never involved in Japan's wartime 
past. Japanese lack of contrition for the past continues to stand as a major obstacle to 
the offering of forgiveness and reconciliation between Japan, China and South Korea 
both of whom experienced aggression, occupation and colonisation at the hands of 
Japan during the twentieth century. Drawing on scholarship on identity-driven 
intractable conflicts, this study examines the potential role of social psychological 
factors in impeding the perpetrator group's acceptance and acknowledgement of 
collective responsibility. 
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the background and context within which 
the question of inherited responsibility is addressed. This is followed by the 
presentation of the research problem, the purpose of the study and accompanying 
research questions. It will briefly outline the research approach and the definitions of 




1.2  Background: The Sino-Japanese 'History Problem'  
Nearly seventy years have passed since the end of the Second World War, and yet the 
'history problem' still deeply affects relations between China and Japan. While 
Chinese victims continue to seek apology and closure, the descendants of the 
Japanese who committed atrocities in China (and South Korea) seem to prefer a 
policy of deliberate amnesia. Japan's lack of contrition and ‘historical amnesia' 
represented by its political leaders' denial of the Nanjing Massacre, sanitization of 
history textbooks, and its Prime Ministers' controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
has generated considerable hostility from victim nations in East Asia. While China 
and Korea continue to demand Japan's sincere apology and contrition, the Japanese 
public are experiencing 'apology fatigue'—a feeling of frustration that no matter what 
they do, Chinese and Korean victims will never be satisfied. As the Japanese people's 
sense of remorse for their forebear's past diminishes with successive generations, the 
prospects for true reconciliation in East Asia become ever more bleak. 
 
Despite years of developing multi-layered networks to restore positive relationships, 
divisive interpretations of war history continue to obstruct the process of 
reconciliation between China and Japan. While bilateral economic and trade ties 
remain strong, large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in both China and Korea are 
a salutary reminder that war history has not been put to rest and will not be forgotten. 
In 2012, immediately after the outbreak of the Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial dispute, 
Kyodo News Agency reported that more than 80,000 Chinese citizens staged anti-
Japan rallies in over 50 cities to protest the purchase of the islands.1 These were the 
largest anti-Japan demonstrations in China since the two countries normalized 
diplomatic relations in 1972.
 
These Sino-Japan tensions raise a question mark over 
the solidity of negative peace in East Asia and challenge simplistic neoliberal 
assumptions that economic interdependence will always restrain conflicts and ensure 
                                                




durable peace. The escalation of tension between China and Japan over the past 
decade has more to do with the activation of deeper socio-cultural dynamics in 
defense of national values and identity than with the maintenance of functional 
economic relationships.  
Recent public opinion polling demonstrates that these dynamics are widespread and 
pervasive across a broad cross section of both the Chinese and Japanese public. 
Scholars like Gries (2005, 105) have argued that the recent rise of anti-Japanese 
public sentiment in China should not be viewed simply as an outcome of politically 
orchestrated nationalist tactics by the Chinese Communist Party to legitimize its rule. 
They stress that the historiographic divergence caused by conflicting war narratives 
have stimulated hostilities and mistrust in both countries.  
 
The recent joint survey by Genron NPO and China Daily (2016)2 showed that public 
perceptions between Chinese and Japanese are significantly worsening, with 91.6 
percent of the Japanese claiming that they have negative perceptions of China, and 
76.7 percent of the Chinese having negative perceptions of Japan. Polls reveal that 
70.5 percent of Chinese respondents reported that the greatest source of their 
negative perceptions of Japan was 'Japan's lack of proper apology and remorse over 
its history of invasion.' On the other hand, 41.7 percent of the Japanese answered that 
the major reason for their hostility toward China was because they are tired of 
hearing 'repeated anti-Japanese criticisms in the media.' These findings are consistent 
with the polls conducted more than ten years ago, suggesting that contentious 
historical interpretations of the war continue to feed mistrust between both countries. 
In a joint public opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun and the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science in September, 2002, 80 percent of Chinese cited the problem of 'Japan's lack 
of historical awareness' represented by 'the Japanese Prime Ministers' visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine' and 'the controversial revisions to Japanese history textbooks' to be 
a major source of mistrust. These data reinforce my assumption that one of the key 
drivers of mistrust and hostility among Chinese and Japanese is the perpetrator's lack 
of repentance and denial of the past. 
                                                
2 See http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/2016forum_en.pdf  
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1.3  Gap in Sino-Japanese Literature 
As friction between China and Japan has intensified over the years, academic 
literature and media have extensively analysed the conflict between the two Asian 
superpowers. They largely argue that the breakdown of the Sino-Japanese 
relationship can be explained in terms of 'great power transitions' and wider 
international relations, foreign policy and security theories. Realists argue that on-
going bilateral tensions highlight 'structural changes' in the post-Cold War 
geopolitical system, and that it is shifts in the balance of power which have caused 
the region to become extremely volatile (Takahara, 2004; Kokubun 2003; Green 
2001). Realist scholarship views the future of China and Japan with pessimism, 
expecting the 'simmering rivalry' between the two countries to become a major 
source of instability in the twenty-first century (Friedberg, 1993; Calder, 2006; 
Christensen, 1999). Some argue that China is a hegemon with a political ambition to 
demonstrate that it is not a second rank nation in the region (Christensen, 2006; 
Peou, 2010, 23). Similarly, other realists point to China’s aggressive actions in the 
East and South China Seas as hegemonic signals intended to displace the United 
States as the dominant power in Asia (Friedberg 2005, 18; Glosserman, 2003).  
 
Liberal and Neo-liberal Sino-Japanese scholarship offers a more optimistic vision of 
the future of East Asia. Liberal theorists argue that interstate trade and economic 
interdependence discourages states from entering into wars. Scholars like Keohane 
and Nye (2000), for example, argue that the growth of 'complex interdependencies' in 
the region should lead to improved diplomatic relations and security cooperation 
between the nations. Similarly, Tønnesson (2015, 2017) argues that the decades of 
‘negative peace’ in East Asia is an outcome of the region’s leaders shifting its 
national priority on economic growth which requires both internal and external 
stability.  However, is the region’s economic interdependence solid enough to sustain 
East Asia’s negative peace in the face of the recent resurgence of nationalism, and 
reactivation of unresolved historical animosities. When we observe the rising tension 
between China and Japan, there seems to be no strong evidence that growing 
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economic interdependence in Asia is bringing the two countries closer together—at 
least not in terms of public perception of the other.  
 
Although not a dominant voice in the discourse of international relations, there are 
other scholars who see issues of historical memory, identity and nationalism as the 
key sources of regional instability and potential conflict between China and Japan 
(Jager, 2007; Callahan 2004; He, 2007b; Suzuki 2007; Gries, 2005; Rose, 2005; 
Wang, 2012). Deep hostilities generated from clashing national identities embedded 
in divisive historical memories may explain why the potential for bilateral schism is 
proving more potent than the dynamics of integration and cooperation. Several works 
have identified the issue of rising nationalism as the principal factor responsible for 
the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations (He, 2007a; Heazle, 2007; Gries, 2005: 
Rozman, 2002).  
 
Although an understudied area, Japan’s identity change as a source of conflict in 
Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations has been explored by various scholars in recent 
years (Hagström & Gustafsson, 2015). One argument posits that the traumatic 
consequences of Japan’s invasion has left a deep scar on the Chinese psyche which is 
easily transferred across generations so that it is as potent today as it was in the 
1930s. Manifestations of this can be seen in China’s swift reactions to any possible 
revival of Japanese imperialism (Whiting, 1989; Whiting & Xin, 1990, 115-20). 
Scholars who have observed Sino-Japan tensions as identity-driven have analysed 
how the legitimacy-challenged Chinese Communist Party has used history education 
as a means for the glorification of the party, the consolidation of national identity, 
and the justification of the party’s rule after the Tiananmen incident (Rose, 1998; 
Zhao, 1998).  
 
A growing strain of thought among Chinese and Japanese specialists is that the 
Chinese Communist Party strategically and rationally uses the history of Japanese 
imperialist aggression for its own national political purpose (Whiting, 1989; Zhao, 
2000). These theorists argue that the history issue is manipulated to take advantage 
of Japan’s war guilt and draw out political concessions from Tokyo. Other scholars 
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note that the 'victimization' narratives of Japan’s wartime aggression are utilized by 
the CCP leaders in their 'patriotic education campaign' to arouse nationalist 
sentiments. Declining credibility in communism has led the Chinese government 
resort to the ideological framework of nationalism to boost its internal solidarity 
(Komori, 2003; Zhao, 1998, 288; Gries 2005, 109). After all, memories of Japanese 
imperialism are widespread and can be easily activated to boost patriotic nationalism 
in China (Suzuki, 2007). 
 
Recent studies examine the formation of China’s national identity and the role Japan 
plays as a 'negative other' in the construction of China’s victimhood narrative (He, 
2007b). He outlines Japan’s role in this process as follows, “A country that had 
invaded and humiliated China in the past, and whose historical amnesia was 
notorious, Japan became an easy target of China’s assertive nationalism….Those 
who now replaced the KMT as the worst villains in the history of war were the 
‘vicious Japanese imperialist aggressors’” (He 2007b, 57). While the top-down 
patriotic education campaign of the 1990s and 2000s is seen as the primary stimulus 
of popular nationalism in China, Suzuki (2007) and Gries (2005) both stress that 
elite-driven 'national humiliation' would not have been effective without a large and 
sympathetic audience. The scars and narratives of violent trauma and humiliation are 
not merely 'official history' in textbooks but are real stories heard from parents and 
grandparents that are entrenched deeply in the Chinese psyche (Suzuki, 2007).  
 
The enduring impact of the 'history problem' on Sino-Japanese relations has drawn 
much attention from both academics and the media in recent years. A vast amount of 
scholarly work has been devoted to the history of the textbook disputes in Japan 
(Hein & Selden, 2000; Nozaki, 2008: Rose 1998; Saaler 2005; Bukh, 2007; Kim, 
2008; Fukuoka, 2011). Other scholars have extensively researched the issue of 
Japanese revisionist interpretations of the war in the 1990s, and the conflicting 
understandings of the events of the war as depicted in war museums and memorials 
in both China and Japan (Jager & Mitter, 2007; Seaton, 2007; Gustafsson, 2011). The 
repeated visits of Japanese Prime Ministers to the contested Yasukuni Shrine have 
also been at the centre of international debate and are a source of tension between 
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Japan and China. Some scholars argue that the Yasukuni issue goes to the very heart 
of the debate about Japan’s war memory and responsibility and its perceived inability 
to reconcile with China and other Asian neighbours (Whiting, 1989; Breen, 2008; 
Nakano, 2014). Bukh and others have provided analyses of Japanese victim 
consciousness, especially atomic victimhood, which is one of the most prevalent 
tropes found in post-war Japan’s relation with its wartime past (Bukh, 2007; Orr, 
2001). Orr (2001) identified the constant presence of 'victimhood mentality' in 
Japanese elementary and junior high school textbooks and emphasized that Japan’s 
status of victimhood served to conceal its role as victimizer against other Asian 
countries during the war. 
 
Recent works on reconciliation in East Asia have mainly focused on content analyses 
of divisive historical narratives in Japan, China and South Korea (Kim & Schwartz, 
2010; Kim, 2016). These studies argue that historical memories are a major obstacle 
to reconciliation in the region and focus on the genealogies of these memories and 
how they get incorporated into each country's master narratives (Shin & Sneider, 
2011; Tsutsui, 2009; Seraphim 2006; Gluck, 2013; Fukuoka, 2015). East Asian 
reconciliation literature is normatively oriented to the ways in which China, Japan 
and Korea can harmonize incompatible memories of war, defeat and victory (Togo & 
Hasegawa, 2008; Shin et al., 2007; Kim, 2016). 
 
Territorial disputes, conflicting interpretations of history and a growing lack of 
mutual trust over the past years have caused Sino-Japan relations to sink to their 
lowest point since the two countries restored diplomatic ties in 1972. Although many 
East Asian scholars argue that 'the history issue' is the underlying cause of diplomatic 
tensions between China and Japan (Rose 2005, 2011; Dudden, 2008; Lind, 2008; 
Shin et al., 2007; Togo & Hasegawa, 2008), the existing literature does not shed 
much light on the factors generating contentious and disparate interpretations of the 
common painful history. Historical differences flow from different identity-related 
needs, the satisfaction of which will have a significant impact on the perpetrator 
nation's willingness to acknowledge and atone for its wartime atrocities.  
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In recent decades, the role of identity in international conflict management has 
received a great deal of attention. Conflict scholars argue that traditional methods of 
negotiation and interest-based bargaining, while appropriate for distributional 
conflicts are not appropriate strategies for handling protracted identity-based 
conflicts. These conflicts are not generated by competition over territories and 
resources but are instead driven by a group's needs for positive identity and 
recognition (Burton, 1990). When fundamental needs are unmet, humiliation is a 
likely result. This humiliation can then give rise to internalized and externalized 
aggression, making conflict transformation problematic (Scheff, 1994). Deep 
identity-driven conflicts cannot be resolved by political or diplomatic arrangements 
alone. On the contrary reconciliation processes need to address the social 
psychological needs of both victims and perpetrators (Fisher, 1990).  
 
In order for China and Japan to overcome the current obstacles to positive 
relationships, an analysis of the conflict through the social psychological lens of 
collective esteem and social identity may offer new perspectives on what is driving 
division and wider nationalist movements  in Japan and China. 
1.4  Research Problem  
Polling data (Genron NPO, 2016) 3  have demonstrated that one of the primary 
sources prolonging the conflict between China and Japan is Japanese lack of remorse 
and repentance for atrocities committed in its colonial and wartime past. The polls 
(Pew Research Center, 2016) 4  reveal that successive generations of Japanese 
descendants feel diminished responsibility for the actions of their forebears in Asia 
during World War II. Some might argue that this should enable a transcendence of 
                                                
3 See Genron NPO 2016 survey  
 http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5318.html 
 




the past in order to develop a peaceful future while others argue that an acceptance of 
'inherited responsibility' for past harms is critical to East Asian reconciliation 
processes. However, there is little empirical data on the extent to which the current 
Japanese generation is willing to accept such 'inherited responsibility' for the nation's 
wartime past and what internal and external factors account for willingness or 
unwillingness to move in this direction.  
1.5  Purpose and Research Questions 
Previous studies have shown that acceptance of collective responsibility by the 
perpetrator group is an important pre-requisite for intergroup reconciliation, 
especially when conflicts are protracted (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Kelman, 2008b). 
This study was guided by the key assumption that all social groups have fundamental 
needs for positive identity and recognition and that a failure to meet these needs can 
result in a prolongation of conflict between groups (Burton, 1987). An examination 
of identity-driven factors that may be impacting the Japanese acceptance of 
responsibility and contrition is an important counterpoint to the realist-driven 
literature on Sino-Japanese conflict and may offer some new insights on how to   
improve future Sino-Japan relations.  
 
The aim of this research is to identify key impediments to Japanese acceptance of 
collective responsibility for the nation’s wartime injustices. Because of the protracted 
nature of the Sino-Japan conflict, this research hypothesized that various identity-
related needs are potentially negative predictors of contemporary Japanese 
acceptance of war responsibility. To develop a complete understanding of these 
factors, the thesis employed mixed methods to integrate both quantitative and 
qualitative data. In the first phase, quantitative data was obtained from a survey of 
162 Japanese university students to test a range of internal and external predictors of 
Japanese collective responsibility. To understand the perceptions and experience of 
the participants at a more detailed level, fifteen survey participants who reported low 
levels of collective responsibility (mean ≤ 2 on a 1-7 scale) as well as ten who 
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reported high levels of collective responsibility (mean ≥ 6 on a 1-7 scale) were 
selected and interviewed in relatively open ended qualitative interviews. Using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods generated a comprehensive and nuanced insight 
into the behaviour of fourth generation descendants of the Japanese perpetrator 
group. 
 
Social identity theory assumes that to preserve a positive conception of group moral 
status in the face of shameful episodes in history, groups remember the past in ways 
that suppress or eliminate humiliating events altogether from their historical 
narratives. A sense of victimhood protects the group members’ self-esteem and 
prevents feelings of guilt for harmful acts against the other group (Bar-Tal et al., 
2009). This research is the first empirical study to examine the influence of identity-
related needs in the context of the Sino-Japanese conflict. Literature suggests that 
those who feel strong attachment and identification with their in-group will be likely 
to react self-protectively to threats to their group's collective esteem (Crocker, 
Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987). Drawing on social identity theory, this 
thesis explores with a purposive sample of Japanese descendants to deepen our 
understanding of the relationships that exist between the perpetrator group’s need for 
positive identity and moral status, competitive victimhood and acceptance of 
collective guilt and responsibility. 
 
To shed light on the potential impediments to Japanese descendants' acceptance of 
'inherited responsibility,' the following research questions were addressed: 
 
(1) To what extent are contemporary Japanese willing to accept inherited 
responsibility for the injustices committed by their forebears? How prevalent is 
‘apology fatigue’ amongst contemporary Japanese? 
 
(2) What are the social psychological factors impeding current Japanese acceptance 
of inherited responsibility for their nation's past misdeeds?  
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a) Do the Japanese descendants feel that their moral identity is threatened when 
confronted with criticisms from the victimized nations about the nation’s 
immoral past? To what extent do threats to Japanese moral status affect the 
descendants' acceptance of collective responsibility for their nation’s past 
transgressions? 
 
b) Do contemporary Japanese engage in competitive victimhood? To what 
extent does the salience of Japanese victimhood [during World War II] affect 
the descendants' willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation's 
past transgressions? 
 
c) Do contemporary Japanese identify with their nation (in-group 
identification)? To what extent does in-group identification affect Japanese 
descendants' willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation’s 
past transgressions? 
 
(3) What are the external factors that are impeding current Japanese acceptance of 
inherited responsibility for their nation's past misdeeds? 
 
a) How is the history of Japanese transgressions presented to contemporary 
Japanese? To what extent does the descendants' awareness of their nation's past 
transgressions affect their willingness to accept collective responsibility? 
 
b) To what extent does the descendants’ negative out-group attitude affect their 
willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation's past 
transgressions? 
 
c) To what extent does the descendants’ contact with the out-group affect their 





1.6  Defining Key Concepts 
This thesis will draw on socio-psychological concepts that are related to intergroup 
conflict and reconciliation. These concepts are explained in detail in the Literature 
and Theory Chapter. This section briefly defines the key concepts that are 
operationalised for the purpose of this research.  
 
Intractable or protracted conflicts:  
Today, the majority of prolonged communal and interstate conflicts around the world 
are perceived as identity-driven (Lederach 1997; Tint 2010). This has led to an 
increased interest among scholars in the nature of protracted, intractable conflicts, 
especially those which defy traditional conflict resolution strategies such as 
negotiation, arbitration or mediation (Azar 1983, 1990; Burton 1987, 1990; Bar-Tal 
2007; Kriesberg 1993, 1998, 2007; Coleman 2000, 2003; Fisher 1997; d'Estrée, 
2012). Azar (1983, 1990) defined these long-term hostile disputes as ‘protracted 
social conflicts’ stressing that their real source is not in material interests, power or 
territorial claims. John Burton (1987, 1990) described them as ‘deep-rooted conflicts’ 
to denote that the underlying source lies in the denial of fundamental human needs 
that touch on the group’s identity, security, recognition, participation and welfare. 
Because these conflicts are often based on deep-rooted identity needs, focusing on 
power politics to resolve them will only exacerbate or prolong the dispute (Burton, 
1987).  
 
Social identity: Social identity theory posits that individuals attain a sense of self-
esteem or self-worth not just from their identity as individuals, but also from their 
membership of social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). According to social 
categorization theory, how we identify with a group frames how we interpret an 
event (Turner et al., 1987). Individuals are motivated to maintain a positive moral 
evaluation of their social group. This need drives groups involved in prolonged, 
violent conflicts to compete over various psychological resources, including their 
victim status (Kelman, 2008a). In social psychology, the term in-group is defined as 
a social group with which an individual identifies and belongs psychologically. By 
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contrast, an out-group is defined as a social group with which individuals do not 
identify and to which they have no particular sense of belonging. 
 
Inherited responsibility: Kwak and Nobles (2013) argue that the descendants of 
perpetrators bear some responsibility for a past harm and should contribute, in some 
way, to its remedy (Kwak & Nobles, 2013, 5). Miller (2007)'s theory also claims that 
intergenerational responsibility for historical wrongdoings is an 'inherited' national 
responsibility that citizens must bear as historical injustices are perpetrated by 
peoples rather than by states (Miller, 2007, 135-61). In this thesis, inherited 
responsibility will be operationalised as collective responsibility that descendants 
bear for the injustices committed by their forebears. 
 
Collective responsibility: Collective responsibility is based on the perception that 
one's in-group is accountable for committing an unjustifiable, illegitimate harm to 
another group (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). The acceptance of collective 
responsibility implies a psychological willingness to share in the collective blame for 
the misdeeds of one's in-group—even if one did not personally take part in those 
misdeeds (Cehajic & Brown, 2008). Acceptance of collective moral responsibility 
should not only refer to those who committed or supported the atrocities but also to 
all members, including the descendants, of the present political community (Cehajic-
Clancy, 2012). Past research has demonstrated that perceiving the in-group as 
responsible for harming the out-group increases the feeling of collective guilt. 
Acknowledging in-group responsibility for national wrongdoing is a critical step that 
can lead to pro-social actions such as apology and/or reparation for the victims 
(Cehajic & Brown, 2010; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Hence, acceptance of 
collective responsibility is viewed as a critical pre-requisite for advancing intergroup 
reconciliation (Minow, 2002; Lederach, 1997; Kelman, 2008b). 
 
Collective guilt: When group memberships are salient, people feel emotions on 
account of their group's position or treatment, even if they have had little or no 
personal experience of the actual intergroup relationships themselves. Drawn from 
social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, 
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Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), this general hypothesis provides the basis for 
the first theorizing and research into collective guilt, the emotions that can be felt 
when it is perceived that one's group has mistreated an out-group (even if there was 
no direct involvement). Collective guilt arises mainly when group members perceive 
that they have some responsibility for their in-group's misdeeds (Branscombe, 
Slugoski, and Kappen, 2004; Leach et al., 2006; Lickel, Schmader & Barquissau, 
2004). Scholarship has shown that feelings of collective guilt should generate 
tendencies to repair the damage done to the out-group (Branscombe et al., 2004; 
Lickel et al., 2004). Feelings of guilt may be associated with empathetic 
consciousness and a capacity to think of oneself in the shoes of the victims.  
 
Moral identity threat:  Studies based on social identity theory have shown that 
individuals are driven to maintain a favourable evaluation of the social group with 
which they associate and that morality is the most important characteristic 
individuals use to evaluate the positive identity of their in-group. Any challenge to 
moral reputation, therefore, will problematize individual and group esteem, which 
will often generate defensive responses. Being accused of past transgressions   
threatens the group’s moral identity and drives individuals to react defensively in 
order to bolster the group’s moral status and defuse the reputational threat 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Noor et al., 2012).  
 
Competitive victimhood: This means that members of conflicting groups experience 
a strong desire to establish that their in-group was subjected to more injustice and 
suffering than other groups. A threat to   group identity, therefore, will motivate   
group members to engage in competitive victimhood, claiming that the in-group has 
suffered more than the harmed out-group (Noor et al., 2012). Studies have also 
shown that competitive victimhood reduces the perpetrator group’s sense of 
collective guilt and responsibility for the harm done to the out-group. 
 
In-group identification: In-group identification can be defined as the degree to which 
individuals define or see themselves as group members (Turner et al., 1987). In-
group identification can also be regarded as the significance that a group membership 
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holds for an individual (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In-group identification has also been 
described as pride in one's group (Smith & Tyler, 1997) or attraction to one's group 
(Jackson & Smith, 1999). Individuals who identify more strongly with their in-group 
(national identity) have been found to be more inclined to justify their in-group’s 
position and feel less collective guilt and responsibility than those who are low in 
identifying with their group (Doosje et al., 1998). In this thesis, the assessment of in-
group identification was made using the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).  
 
Prejudice or negative out-group attitude: Prejudice and stereotyping can overlap, and 
stem from various sources. Both phenomena involve a preconceived negative 
evaluation of a group and its members. Prejudice can also be described as an 
antipathy based upon faulty and inflexible generalizations one makes of a group 
(Allport, 1954, 9) and can become a determinant of intergroup conflict. Past research 
has demonstrated that negative out-group attitude can be a significant predictor of 
diminished collective guilt for in-group transgressions (Hewstone et al., 2004). 
 
Intergroup contact: Intergroup contact in this thesis specifically refers to interaction 
between the in-group and out-group[s] engaged in conflict (Allport, 1954). Past 
studies on intergroup contact have shown that successful contact with the out-group 
can provide individuals with enhanced knowledge about their own group, help them 
to take the perspective of the out-group, reduce feelings of anxiety, and combat 
prejudice. The intergroup contact hypothesis first proposed by Allport (1954), 
suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact are generated when contact occurs 
under four key conditions: equal status, intergroup cooperation, common goals, and 
support by social and institutional authorities. Various studies have been conducted 
which aim to understand the effects of different types of contact in mediating and 
moderating intergroup prejudice, with recent work demonstrating that intergroup 
contact yields the most effective positive outcomes when contact takes the form of 
cross-group friendships (Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; Davies et al., 
2011). This study will examine the relationship between high quality contact with the 
out-group and collective responsibility for out-group harm doing. 
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Collective memory: Collective memory can be defined as social representations or 
shared knowledge of the past that may not have been personally experienced but are 
collectively constructed, transmitted and remembered by members of the society 
through both formal and informal communications (Moscovici, 1988; Bar-Tal, 2007; 
Paez & Liu, 2011). At the institutional level, collective memory can be transmitted 
through official histories, textbooks, commemoration, monuments, rituals and 
museums, and at the popular level, through the mass media and interpersonal story-
telling and conversations (Paez & Liu, 2011; Olick & Levy, 1997). Collective 
memory contains the narratives, the symbols, the models, the myths, and the events 
that mould the identity of the group. Collective memory binds a group together, and 
the raw material for constructing such ethnic memory is history (Volkan, 2001; 
Billig, 1995, Halbwachs, 1950/1992). 
 
Descendants of the perpetrator group: As the purpose of this research is to examine 
present-day Japanese individuals' acceptance of inherited responsibility for the 
atrocities committed by their forebears, the term descendant refers to the present 
generation who share genealogy with the original perpetrators but had no direct 
involvement in the acts of transgression. 
 
1.7  Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 1 begins by providing an overview of the background and context of the 
problem that frames this research. This is followed by a presentation of the research 
problem, the statement of purpose of the study and accompanying research questions 
and hypotheses. This chapter also discusses the research approach employed in order 
to collect the necessary data, the significance of this research and the definitions of 
the key terminology used. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a systematic review of the relevant academic literature and 
theories that have guided the construction and design of this study. In terms of 
academic literature, the chapter introduces key social psychological theories and 
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concepts that explain why perpetrator and victimized groups become locked in 
intractable conflicts. The review of reconciliation literature also establishes the 
rationale for conducting research on social identity needs and their relationship with 
the perpetrator group's acceptance of collective responsibility. The latter half of the 
chapter presents a critical review of existent scholarship on collective guilt and 
responsibility and how perpetrator groups respond to reminders about their in-
group's historical transgressions. 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 provide contextual information for the selected cases in this study. 
Chapter 3 examines the factors underlying the victim nations’ rejection of the 
perpetrator’s apologies; why both China and South Korea are dissatisfied, and why 
China and Korea believe that Japan’s expressions of remorse are not 'genuine and 
sincere.' This chapter analyses the obstacles to reconciliation and discusses what 
makes Japan’s apologies unacceptable to its victims in East Asia. Chapter 4 also 
offers relevant background information and a contextual analysis of how Japan's 
identity crisis in the 1990s led the nation's conservative elites to promote historical 
narratives that deny Japan's involvement in wartime atrocities in order to protect  the 
nation's collective esteem. 
 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the methodology of this research study. 
It outlines the rationale for choosing a sequential mixed methods approach to address 
the research questions and analyse impediments to contemporary Japanese 
acceptance of collective responsibility for past Japanese transgressions. This chapter 
explains how the two-phase quantitative and qualitative study was designed and 
implemented. 
 
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 present the findings that emerged from this study. Chapter 6 
presents the main findings of the quantitative phase based on the multiple 
hierarchical regression analyses which examined to what extent social psychological 
factors such as the need for positive moral identity, in-group identification and 
competitive victimhood impede Japanese descendants' acceptance of collective 
responsibility for Japanese aggression in Asia. The association between three other 
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external factors such as awareness of in-group transgression, out-group prejudice, 
out-group contact and the outcome variable of collective responsibility was also 
assessed. Chapter 7 and 8 present the descriptive statistical data related to the six 
significant predictors of collective responsibility, together with qualitative findings 
with selected respondents who represented the perpetrator descendants' perspectives. 
As the aim of this research was to identify key impediments to Japanese acceptance 
of collective responsibility for Japanese wartime transgressions, the qualitative 
findings in Chapters 7 and 8 focused mainly on the perspectives of the survey 
respondents who reported low levels of collective responsibility (CRLow, n=15). 
These findings were then compared with the contrasting perspectives of survey 
respondents who indicated high levels of collective responsibility (CRHigh, n=10) in 
Chapter 9. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes, integrates and discusses the key findings of this 
research. It also examines the findings' implications in terms of both practice and 
future research. The chapter discusses the limitations of this present research together 
with actionable recommendations and concludes with a brief discussion on how the 
insights resulting from this research can contribute to the improvement of relations 






2. Literature and Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This thesis examines the social psychological obstacles to Sino-Japanese 
reconciliation with a very specific focus on why contemporary Japanese feel a 
diminished sense of remorse and responsibility for their nation’s wartime past. Most 
scholarship has analysed Sino-Japanese tensions from realist and neo-liberal 
perspectives. There has been little work examining the emotional and social 
psychological needs of the descendants of Japanese perpetrators and the protraction 
of the Sino-Japan conflict.  
 
This chapter, therefore, examines the literature on the dynamics of 
protracted/intractable conflicts, and identity-driven needs in order to diagnose and 
understand the social psychological factors inhibiting contemporary Japanese from 
acknowledging Japanese war crimes and expressing remorse to their Chinese 
victims’ descendants.  It also explores the importance of satisfying basic human 
needs and the perpetrator’s responsibility in creating ripe conditions for apology, 
closure, social healing and reconciliation. It does this through the optics of 'collective 
guilt' and 'collective responsibility.' These two concepts are closely related. The first 
referring to emotions and feelings individuals experience when they accept direct or 
indirect responsibility for their in-group's harmful behaviour. The second being the 
motivator of behaviour aimed at restoring positive relationships. As the aim of this 
thesis is to explore the factors influencing the perpetrator group's acceptance of 
responsibility, the scholarship on collective guilt provides the conceptual framework 




2.2  Intractable Conflicts and Basic Human Needs 
Because most prolonged communal and interstate conflicts are identity-driven 
(Lederach, 1997; Tint 2010) theorists and practitioners have focused attention on the 
roles of personal and social identity in both generating and resolving conflict. This is 
particularly so in relation to protracted, intractable conflicts, which defy traditional 
conflict resolution strategies such as negotiations, arbitration or mediation and are 
perceived to be complex, deep-rooted and persistent (Azar, 1983, 1990; Burton 1987, 
1990; Bar-Tal 2007; Kriesberg, 1993, 1998, 2007; Coleman, 2000, 2003; Fisher, 
1990, 1997; d'Estrée, 2012). Azar (1983, 1990) defined these long-term hostile 
disputes as ‘protracted social conflict’ and John Burton (1987, 1990) described them 
as ‘deep-rooted conflicts’ based on the non-satisfaction of basic human needs   for 
esteem, identity, security, recognition, participation and welfare. (Burton 1987). 
Kelman (1995, 2002) further argues that negotiations without prior and adequate 
attention to identity-related needs and issues can exacerbate conflicts and polarize 
the parties. Examples of these intractable conflicts include Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, 
Northern Ireland, India-Pakistan, Kashmir, the Horn of Africa and for the purpose of 
this thesis, the prolonging conflicts between Japan, China and Korea with most 
attention directed towards the Sino-Japan conflict.       
 
A positive sense of self (both personal and collective) is regarded by needs theorists 
like Oscar Nudler (1980) as a fundamental requirement for constructive human 
development. Scholars who have studied the development, maintenance, and 
transformation of intractable conflicts (Northrup, 1989; Kriesberg, 1993; Bar-Tal, 
2007) also contend that challenges to or the “spoiling” of group identity will generate 
aggressive or violent behaviour (Fisher, 1997). Intractable conflicts prolong when 
groups perceive that their needs are unsatisfied and their identity is threatened 
through the denial of recognition, security, equity, and political participation (Fisher 
1997, 5). Threats to group identity can cause or escalate conflict and when a conflict 
between parties involves challenges to core values the conflict will be difficult to 
resolve and may often become intractable. Framing intractable conflicts in terms of 
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group identity needs, therefore, is more likely to generate favourable outcomes than 
focusing on material interests alone. 
 
2.3  Social Identity Theory 
A positive sense of personal and social identity is critical to individual and collective 
well-being. Challenges to or a negative sense of self and collective identity, on the 
other hand is a critical factor in the escalation and rigidification of spontaneous and 
organized conflict (Northrup, 1989; Roccas & Elster, 2012). Henri Tajfel and John 
Turner’s social identity theory explores these elements in explaining intergroup 
conflict and, more broadly, intergroup behaviour. Individuals derive a sense of 
positive self-esteem not only from their individual identity but also from their 
membership in social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The theory explains how 
identity emerges from the processes of social categorization and comparison and how 
it influences intergroup relations. Self-categorization theory posits that an 
individual’s self-concept is created from many components or self-categories which 
become activated in specific situations (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reischer, & Wetherell, 
1987). We categorize objects in order to understand them, and we categorize people 
and ourselves in order to understand our locations in particular social environments.   
We identify with groups which we think we ought to belong to (reference groups) 
and those social groups to which we do belong. In this way we develop concepts of 
collective identity in-group versus out-group, “we” versus “them.”  
 
Group members enhance their self-worth and self-esteem through a positive identity 
with the social group they belong to. These groups maintain their positive 
distinctiveness by engaging in social comparisons which allow them to conceive 
their in-group as both different from and superior to other groups to which they do 
not belong (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The basic theoretical tenets of social identity 
theory therefore can be summarized as follows: 1) individuals strive to achieve or 
maintain positive social identity; 2) membership in a group contributes to an 
individual’s social identity; 3) evaluation of an individual’s own group is based on 
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social comparison with other groups; and 4) a positive social identity is based on 
favourable comparisons (Fisher, 1990, 29).  
 
Ethnocentrism, is, therefore, a process of in-group glorification driven by a group’s 
need to achieve a positive social identity by enhancing the qualities of the in-group 
and denigrating the qualities of the out-group (Fisher, 1990, 62). Social identity 
theory reveals that the mere perception of belonging to a group is sufficient to 
produce intergroup discrimination favouring the in-group (Fisher, 1990). Building on 
this notion, Abrams and Hogg (1988) elaborated the self-esteem hypothesis. This 
contends that there is a direct relationship between self-image and prejudiced views 
of the out-group—that successful out-group discrimination elevates self-esteem and 
that threatened self-esteem promotes intergroup discrimination (Abrams & Hogg, 
1988, 317). The simplest way of generating strong in-group identity therefore is by 
devaluing the out-group, creating an 'us' versus 'them' dynamic. When this is used as 
a basis for political mobilization it generates intense political emotion and, if not 
checked, the basis for political violence.  
 
2.4  Identity and Collective Memory  
History and memory have been found to be key components fuelling protracted 
conflict, especially when they are entrenched in past experiences of traumatic 
violence (Bar-Tal, 2000a, 2003). A number of studies on the politics of memory 
focus on the role of history in the formation of a group’s identity (Billig, 1995; 
Volpato & Licata, 2010; Liu & Hilton, 2005). Collective memory can be defined as 
social representations or shared knowledge of the past that may not have been 
personally experienced but are collectively constructed, transmitted and remembered 
by members of the society through both formal and informal communications 
(Moscovici, 1988; Bar-Tal, 2009; Paez & Liu, 2011). At the institutional level, 
collective memory can be transmitted through official histories, textbooks, 
commemoration, monuments, rituals and museums, and at the popular level, through 
the mass media and interpersonal story-telling and conversations (Paez & Liu, 2011; 
Olick & Levy, 1997). Collective memory contains the narratives, the symbols, the 
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models, the myths, and the events that mould the identity of the group. Collective 
memory binds a group together, and the raw material for constructing such ethnic 
memory is history (Volkan, 1997; Billig, 1995, Halbwachs 1950/1992). Ethnic, 
national, and religious identities are built on historical myths which define who a 
group member is, what it means to be a group member, and typically who the group’s 
allies and enemies are (Paez & Liu, 2011). These myths are usually based on some 
concept of truth, but are selective or exaggerated in their presentation of history. 
Regardless of their accuracy, historical memories serve to create the foundation of 
how people understand the origins, story, and characteristics of the group (Bar-Tal, 
2003; Bilali & Ross, 2012; Billig, 1995; Halbwachs 1950/1992). A group’s 
representation of history defines what it was, is, can and should be, and is an 
essential component in the construction of its identity, norms, and values (Liu & 
Hilton 2005, 537). A group’s collective remembering of its history not only 
determines how the group sees the present, but it also shapes the future by indicating 
how it should respond to new situations and threats (Bilali & Ross, 2012).  
 
The purpose of collective memory therefore is not to convey an objective history of 
the past, but rather to recount the past in such a way that it is functional and relevant 
to society’s current concerns, needs and future aspirations (Halbwachs, 1992). It 
creates a socially constructed narrative that has some basis in actual events, but is 
biased, selective, and distorted in ways that meet society’s present needs (Bar-Tal 
2009; Liu & Hilton 2005). These narratives become disseminated in society as 
cultural products and discourse through various institutional channels such as the 
media, literature, museums, films and textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998b; Wertsch, 2002; 
Hammack, 2008, 2011). Various scholars have examined the politics of history 
textbooks and how elites influence their content. Ever since the rise of the nation-
state, history textbooks have been used by states and their leaders as instruments to 
spread narratives that glorify the nation, consolidate national identity, and justify 




2.4.1  ‘Chosen Glory and Chosen Trauma’ 
 
Group identity is shaped by the actions of individual members and by significant   
struggles, challenges or achievements experienced through time. This is particularly 
true of experiences of suffering. If these are particularly traumatic, they can generate 
a sense of woundedness, humiliation and injustice that will be transmitted through 
successive generations (Staub & Bar-Tal 2003). A group’s collective memory, 
therefore, is constructed from its “chosen traumas” and “chosen glories” (Volkan, 
1997). Chosen traumas are those horrors of the past that cast shadows onto the 
future; and chosen glories are the idealized myths about a group’s glorious 
achievements that are passed onto succeeding generations via collective memory by 
parents and teachers and through participation in ritualistic ceremonies (Volkan, 
2001). Groups incorporate the memory of traumatic events into their collective 
identity, which through processes of socialization enables one generation to transfer 
enmity to the next. As collective memories become institutionalized and internalized, 
later generations share the anger and suffering of past generations although they 
themselves did not take part in the original historical trauma. Like chosen traumas, 
chosen glories become heavily mythologized over time (Volkan, 1997, 48) and serve 
to increase members’ self-esteem by being associated with the group’s glorious past 
(Volkan, 2001).  
 
2.4.2  How memory protracts a conflict 
 
Collective memory determines how members of a group relate to other peoples and 
has influence over the development of present day conflicts. Key historical events 
are critical in defining a group’s identity and determining how that group behaves in 
conflict situations (Bar-Tal, 2007). Collective memory of past conflicts can increase 
social cohesion, salience of in-group identification and fuel feelings of hostilities 
towards the out-group, which comes to be identified as the current foe (Paez & Liu, 
2011). Memory of past conflicts can shape a society’s perception of the out-group 
and evoke threat and fear, which inevitably delegitimizes the out-group and creates 
mistrust (Bar-Tal, 2007; Bilali & Ross, 2012).  
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Historical memories can be used instrumentally to promote the interests of those in 
power and mobilize popular action (Wersch, 2002; Hammack, 2011). Re-enacting 
collective memory of past atrocities can elicit fear, motivate collective action and 
justify harmful actions against out-group members (Liu & Hilton, 2005). For 
instance, in ethnic conflicts, leaders manipulate the past to justify discrimination 
against other ethnic groups. Kaufman (2001) stresses that people are taught ethnic 
hatred, not born into it. Powerful elites take real events in a group’s history and 
manipulate the narratives to delegitimize the out-group members, and justify harms 
against them. And these events must resonate with some concrete experiences and 
incidents in popular consciousness in order to have any currency (Kammen, 1991). 
War occurs as a result of symbolic politics in which leaders use emotions evoked by 
historical memories to promote hostility toward other groups and pursue ethnic 
domination (Kaufman 2001; Kammen, 1991; Staub, 1998). Historical memories of 
past conflicts enable people to blame the out-group for provoking the conflict and 
perceive their in-group’s aggression as a response to their provocation (Bilali, Tropp, 
and Dasgupta, 2012; Staub, 1998).  
 
2.4.3  Divergent historical narratives  
 
Studies have shown that groups in conflict often have different interpretations of the 
past and distinct narratives attached to those histories. Scholars argue that there are 
group-based needs, goals and motives that contribute to shaping a group’s historical 
memories (Bilali & Ross, 2012) and that these psychological needs explain why 
groups develop conflicting narratives of past events. Competing narratives of the 
same historical event play an integral role in prolonging the conflict between the 
perpetrator and the victimized (Hammack, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2007). Societies engaged 
in intractable conflicts become entrenched in conflict-supporting narratives that 
would be used to justify the maintenance of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007). Divided 
memories of past violence can lead to renewed outbreaks of violence and perpetuate 
the sense of grievance amongst the victims, thereby increasing the risk of revengeful 
acts and intolerance towards the former adversary (Brewer & Pierce, 2005).  
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People are motivated to view their in-group favourably and because historical 
memory constitutes an essential core of a group’s identity, perpetrator groups may 
avoid remembering the past in a way that would challenge its morality and put its 
group to shame (Bilali & Ross, 2012). Those who identify strongly with the in-group 
are therefore motivated to maintain a positive group identity by distorting their 
memories in systematic ways (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Liu & Laszlo, 2007).  
 
Victim and the perpetrator groups will often present their own side’s historical 
narrative as the accurate 'truth' and accuse the opposing group of distorting or 
ignoring history (Bilali & Ross 2012, 124). While victims tend to emphasize the 
gravity of the violent harm and the perpetrator’s responsibility for the injustice, 
perpetrators, on the other hand, are prone to downplay and mitigate the consequences 
of their actions, and criticize victims for exaggerating the facts (Baumeister & 
Hastings, 1997).  
 
In the face of a shameful past, perpetrator groups may defend their positive identity 
by deleting accounts of past injustices from their master narratives. 'Collective 
amnesia,' for example, is a conscious decision by the group to forget which is likely 
to emerge when the group is confronted with past injustices.  
 
Another means by which the perpetrator group protects its esteem is by emphasizing 
the harm inflicted on the in-group while simultaneously minimising the severity of 
the harm they themselves have inflicted on the out-group (Branscombe & Miron, 
2004). Focusing on the in-group’s own suffering and victimization rather than its 
harmful actions defends the moral status of the in-group (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 
2008). Collective victimization of the past can perpetuate cycles of violence between 
the perpetrator and the victim and has been examined as an important source of 
intractable conflicts (Vollhardt, 2009, 2012). The psychological wounds of past 
trauma are transmitted through the commemoration of victim narratives, the way 
history is taught, and the way parents transmit the past to their children (Bar-Tal, 
1998b). As events in the present become interpreted through the lens of past 
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injustice, collective victimization can give rise to defensive and violent responses 
(Staub, 2012, 282). 
 
2.5  Competitive Victimhood 
Groups that have engaged in long term intractable conflicts are prone to compete 
over their victim status (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori & Gundar, 2009; Noor, 
Brown, & Prentice, 2008). Competitive victimhood refers to a group’s perception 
and effort to establish that it has suffered more than its adversaries (Noor et al., 2008, 
2012).  
 
At the group level, perceptions of collective victimization have been positively 
correlated with feelings of in-group entitlement (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Victim status 
can actually give groups moral license to commit acts that would normally be 
condemned (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012, 779). This moral 
license means that social groups of both high and low status compete for 
acknowledgement of greater relative victim status (Noor et al., 2008).  
 
Collective victimization emerges when individuals believe that 1) they were harmed; 
2) they were not responsible for the occurrence of the harmful act; 3) they could not 
prevent the harm; 4) they are morally right and suffering from an injustice done to 
them; and 5) they deserve sympathy (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Bar-Tal et al emphasize 
that the mere experience of harm is not enough.  In order to have a sense of 
victimhood, individuals need to perceive the harm as undeserved, unjust and 
immoral, an act that could not be prevented by the victim (Bar-Tal et al., 2009, 232). 
To prove that their in-group has been subjected to more physical victimization than 
the out-group, groups may simply quantify suffering and portray their in-group as 
having endured a larger share of the overall suffering (Noor et al., 2008).  
 
In the state of competitive victimhood, groups develop narratives to establish that 
they have been subjected to more injustice at the hands of the out-group and that 
their suffering is unique (Noor et al, 2012, 353). Although seeking a common 
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narrative about the past is considered a core element of reconciliation, Bilali and 
Ross stress that creating a shared history between the harm-doers and the victims is a 
daunting process. This is because whatever the objective truth is, the victim and the 
perpetrator groups will have their own truth, their own victimhood narrative and 
adhere to their own 'collective memory' of events (Bilali & Ross, 2012). 
 
2.6  Reconciliation  
Unresolved trauma, historical memory and identity anxieties generate the ideal 
conditions for conflicts to protract. Recent decades have seen an increased interest in 
and research on reconciliation due to the many prolonged ethnic and interstate 
conflicts which emerged after the end of the Cold War. Even after the establishment 
of peace agreements and democratic processes for conflict resolution, reconciliation 
remains a long and onerous process, especially for groups which have experienced 
violent trauma. The key obstacles to reconciliation often involve deep psychological  
wounds that stem from unaddressed violence and  historical injustices. If these past 
wrongdoings are not dealt with appropriately, they can lead to the derailing of the 
peace process and to the recurrence of violence (Noor et al. 2008). Hence, intergroup 
reconciliation must involve the removal of the conflict-related emotional barriers 
which compromise the success of conflict resolution (Nadler & Shnabel 2008, 39).  
 
In the previous section, the literature on the dynamics of intractable conflicts was 
reviewed as an important framework within which to analyse the socio-emotional 
drivers that may be contributing to the tensions between China and Japan. At the core 
of many protracted conflicts are deep-rooted divisions that arise from the unmet 
needs of each party. Existing literature on reconciliation is an invaluable resource for 
the analysis of Sino-Japanese conflict, especially as studies stress the importance of 
looking beyond pragmatic interests of conflicting communities to the transformation 
of internalized societal beliefs within them (Bar-Tal, 2007).  
 
In order to understand the necessary factors that facilitate reconciliation, it is useful 
to draw on Herbert Kelman’s (2008b) distinction between conflict settlement, 
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conflict resolution and reconciliation. While conflict settlement is a negotiated 
agreement that aims to meet the interests of both parties, conflict resolution goes 
beyond tangible interests and explores the causes of conflict in threatened or unmet 
needs for identity, security, recognition, autonomy, and justice (Burton, 1990; 
Kelman, 2008a). The peace agreement may be supported by publics but does not lead 
to changes in attitudes toward the adversary. Although conflict resolution transforms 
the adversarial relationship to a pragmatic partnership in which the parties can 
cooperate and co-exist, Kelman (2008b) points out that this instrumental relationship 
may still be fragile and vulnerable to changes in circumstances, such as the interests 
of the political leadership. 
 
Reconciliation, on the other hand, entails a difficult and long-term process. Kelman 
stresses that reconciliation requires changes in the identities of the conflicting 
groups. Further, Staub and Bar-Tal define reconciliation as “mutual acceptance by 
members of hostile or previously hostile groups of each other and the societal 
structures and psychological processes directly involved in the development and 
maintenance of acceptance,” adding that, “genuine acceptance means trust in and 
positive attitudes toward the other, and sensitivity to and consideration of the other 
party’s needs and interests (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003, 733).  
 
Confronting history and acknowledging past wrongs is an essential component of the 
process of reconciliation. The re-examination of historical narratives and the re-
evaluation of national myths—on both sides of the conflict—are critical components 
of reconciliation processes (Kelman, 2008b). Reconciliation requires acceptance by 
both sides of the harm committed to the other during the course of the conflict. Many 
scholars believe that it may be unrealistic to establish a single, objective truth. 
However, Kelman stresses that it is nonetheless important to recognize that the 
different narratives of different groups exist and that they reflect different historical 
experiences. Reconciliation does not require writing a joint consensual history, but it 
does require accepting the other’s truth in one’s own narrative. 
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2.7  Importance of Acknowledging Collective Responsibility  
Collective acknowledgement of past wrongs is critical to the healing of damaged 
relationships (Lazare, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991; Minow, 2002; Bar-Tal & Bennink, 
2004). Many protracted conflicts have their roots in traumatic memories of past 
violence. Recognizing this, an increasing number of governments have been offering 
apologies to aggrieved citizen groups and states (Barkan, 2000). Govier (2003) 
stresses that the wrongs of the past need to be acknowledged by perpetrators to assist 
social healing. Barkan (2000) and other scholars (Brooks, 1999; Minow, 2002) also 
argue that the primary purpose of apologizing for wrongdoing is to begin addressing 
the victims’   grievance and trauma, and to validate their self-worth. Whether it be 
genocide or massacres, acts of harm to others imply that the victims do not matter, 
and that their personal needs, interests, moral dignity and status as human beings are 
of no consequence (Govier, 2003, 84). Acknowledgement and assumption of 
responsibility for the harm done dignifies the victim and accords him/her/them the 
respect they need to reconsider and restore functional relationships.   
 
Despite the recent growth in scholarship examining the role of public apologies in 
forgiveness and reconciliation, there is still little research on when, why and how  
government apologies for historical injustices are effective (Blatz et al. 2009, 221). 
Nonetheless, apology is a key component in reconciliation. Without 
acknowledgement of responsibility, the wounds caused by the historical injustice 
continue to fester, causing resentment to deepen and exacerbating conflict "because 
the lack of acknowledgement indicates that people condone the wrongs and do not 
care about the baneful results" (Govier, 2003, 85). 
 
Cehajic and Brown (2010) further stress that acknowledgement of in-group 
responsibility forms an important psychological foundation for such emotions as 
guilt or empathy for the out-group to arise. Feelings of guilt, driven by acceptance of 
responsibility, have been found to increase the members of the perpetrator group's 
motivation to redress the past harm (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998; 
Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005). Reconciliation therefore requires acceptance 
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of responsibility for the wrong that was done to the other, together with appropriate 
apologies and concrete measures of restitution.  
 
2.8  Victims and Perpetrators Have Different Needs  
Victims suffer a threat to their identity as political actors whereas perpetrators suffer 
a threat to their identity as moral actors.  The differential threats to power and moral 
identity evoke feelings of powerlessness and moral inferiority, respectively. To avoid 
these negative feelings and ameliorate threatened identities, victims are motivated to 
regain the identity of powerful actors and perpetrators are motivated to regain the 
identity of moral actors. Revenge and social distancing are two ways in which groups 
can unilaterally ameliorate their feelings of powerlessness and moral inferiority. 
(Nadler & Schnabel, 2008, 46) 
 
Scholars who have analysed the role of emotions in international conflicts make 
similar arguments by noting that victims’ feelings of humiliation (in this case nations 
that have been humiliated in the past) can generate enmification, polarization, and 
hostility (Lindner, 2006; Scheff, 1994). To cope with these threats, victims need to 
restore feelings of self-worth, self-control and social equality. Perpetrators who hold 
power over the victim during the conflict have control but worry about their image as 
moral social actors. This is especially so when this power is challenged or as in the 
case of Japan when they are defeated. This reputational threat results in feelings of 
guilt, shame and moral inferiority, which is driven by perpetrators’ fear that they will 
be rejected from moral communities to which they belong or would like to belong 
(Tavuchis, 1991). To cope with these threats perpetrators strive for acceptance as 
moral actors. 
 
Victims can restore their identity as powerful actors by taking revenge on their 
perpetrators. Revenge changes the power asymmetries between victim and 
perpetrator and makes relations more equal (Frijda, 1994). Revenge, however, is 
unlikely to contribute to the ending of conflict because of its unilateral and conflict 
creating nature. While revenge may restore victims’ feelings of power and control, it 
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may not satisfy the perpetrator’s need for acceptance. Revenge will not promote the 
prospects of reconciliation since what one party sees as justified revenge, the other 
will commonly view as unjustified aggression that needs to be avenged. Acts of 
revenge therefore are likely to lead to an increased cycle of violence and the 
prolonging of the conflict (Scheff, 1994) 
 
Perpetrators can defend threats to their moral identity by denying the painful 
consequences of their actions and/or their responsibility for having caused them 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). They can distance themselves from the pain and suffering 
of their adversaries by belittling them or by feeling no empathy with the victim’s 
sufferings. Since increasing social distance between oneself and one’s victim reduces 
empathy (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), the ultimate tactic of social distancing is the 
dehumanization of the victim. This common practice of parties in intractable 
conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2007) allows one to feel no empathy for the victim. 
 
2.9  Collective Guilt  
Accepting and acknowledging collective responsibility has been found to be a 
necessary precursor of experiencing collective guilt for the in-group's transgressions 
(Cehajic & Brown, 2010). A group-based emotion that is closely related to collective 
responsibility and relevant to the design of this research is collective guilt, a 
prerequisite for promoting reconciliation (Sullivan et al., 2012). Substantial amount 
of literature in social psychology has been focused on 'collective guilt' 
 
Social identity theory posits that feeling guilt for events for which an individual is 
not personally responsible is feasible because people categorize themselves as 
members of a group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). Hence, the actions 
taken by the in-group can elicit an emotional response to the degree that the 
individual associates him/herself with the in-group. This is what distinguishes 
personal guilt from collective guilt: collective guilt can be experienced by group 
members who were not in any way involved in the harm doing (Doosje et al., 1998). 
Individuals can experience collective guilt as long as an important in-group is 
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perceived as responsible for having committed an illegitimate harm against another 
group (Doosje et al., 1998; Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Branscombe, 
2004). In support of this, (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2009) in intergroup emotions 
theory suggest that individuals can experience emotions based on their in-group’s 
actions during conflict, regardless of whether or not they actually participated. These 
emotions are considered collective emotions because they arise from an individual's 
shared identity with a particular social group. They involve appraisals of an in-
group’s actions and can foster behaviour aimed at maintaining in-group 
distinctiveness relative to an out-group. Although the experience of collective 
emotions may seem similar to individual emotions, the antecedents and 
consequences are different because collective emotions arise from a shared in-group 
identity (Mackie & Smith, 2002). 
 
Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead’s (1998) pioneering work on collective 
guilt demonstrated this phenomenon using Dutch students. Dutch participants 
expressed guilt about their nation’s colonial occupation of Indonesia and the past 
harm done. In the case of this study on Dutch colonialism, group-based guilt led 
participants to support material restitution to Indonesia, the harmed group.  
 
2.10  Antecedents of Collective Guilt 
In order for a feeling of collective guilt to emerge, certain antecedent conditions must 
be met (Branscombe, 2004; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). The first antecedent 
has to do with an individual’s attachment to a collective identity. If the individual is 
to feel any moral responsibility for the group’s past wrongdoing, that group needs to 
be an important part of his or her self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 
1987). Therefore, the basic precondition of collective guilt requires that the 
individual self-categorizes as a member of the relevant group, identifies with and 
even feels a strong attachment to that group. In support of this hypothesis, Zagefka, 
Pehrson, Mole and Chan’s (2010) research demonstrated that essentialism or strong 
identification with a group is a necessary antecedent for collective guilt. Their study 
revealed that when participants felt deeper connection and attachment with an in-
 36 
group across time, they felt greater collective guilt for the historical victimization of 
the out-group. 
 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), as the group becomes 
more important to one’s self-conception, the more likely that emotions derived from 
that group membership will be experienced. Past research has shown that collective 
identity is an essential component of collective guilt; however, evidence regarding 
in-group identification’s relationship with collective guilt has been mixed. In some 
studies, researchers have found a positive relationship between in-group 
identification and guilt. In Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead’s (2006) 
study, when Dutch participants received information about the Netherland’s colonial 
transgression, those who strongly identified with their in-group reported feelings of 
greater guilt. This was particularly so when influential in-group members validated 
and sanctioned the negative information. On the other hand, various studies have 
revealed a negative relationship between group identification and collective guilt, 
especially when highly-identified group members defend their group’s past 
behaviour (Branscombe, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998). Consistent with that notion, 
Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) found that higher identification with being British 
predicted lesser guilt for the treatment of Australian Aborigines. 
 
As mentioned earlier, an important antecedent of guilt that is closely examined in 
this thesis is collective responsibility—the perception that one’s in-group is 
responsible for committing unjustifiable harm to another group (Branscombe, 2004; 
Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Past research (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 
2006; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; McGarty et al., 2005) demonstrates that 
perceiving the in-group as responsible for harming the out-group increases collective 
guilt. Hence, even if the harm done is perceived as severe, if one’s salient in-group is 
not seen as responsible for those outcomes, then it is less likely that collective guilt 
would be experienced. In past studies that have examined feelings of responsibility 
for historical injustices, such as the Dutch colonial oppression of Indonesians 
(Doosje et al., 1998), white settler victimization of Native Americans (Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006), and Australian mistreatment of Aborigines (McGarty et al., 
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2005), when participants perceived the in-group as responsible for harmful actions 
against out-group members, they experienced greater collective guilt. When the 
responsibility was diffused across other groups and the in-group was not seen as 
uniquely responsible for the transgression, this led to lower guilt assignment to the 
perpetrator group (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Accepting collective responsibility, 
therefore, is an essential precursor for experiencing collective guilt for the in-group's 
harm doing. 
 
The third antecedent of guilt is whether the harm is perceived as illegitimate. When  
in-group behaviour toward out-groups is appraised as illegitimate and immoral, 
collective guilt can be experienced (Iyer & Leach 2008; Mackie et al., 2002). 
Branscombe (2004, 326) argues that although responsibility and legitimacy are 
empirically and conceptually intertwined, when disentangled, legitimacy may at 
times outweigh responsibility. One such instance is the American people’s lack of 
collective guilt for the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Although the atomic bomb is universally acknowledged as a weapon of massive 
destruction and the United States clearly responsible for its use, because Americans 
perceive the act as legitimate and justifiable, feelings of collective guilt are assuaged. 
Thus, for collective guilt to emerge, the in-group needs to accept responsibility for 
committing an illegitimate and immoral harmful act. 
 
2.11  Positive Consequences of Collective Guilt 
One positive effect of collective guilt directly relevant to this thesis is its promotion 
of behaviours that foster reconciliation between groups. Various studies have 
examined how guilt resulting from the moral transgression of one’s in-group can lead 
to pro-social attitudes which serve to promote reconciliation between groups. Some 
theorists contend that because guilt focuses on the misdeed itself and personal 
responsibility for the particular moral failure, it can be action-oriented, motivating  




2.11.1  Reparations 
 
Collective guilt has been associated with support for reparations. A wide range of 
studies have shown that collective guilt among perpetrator groups is related to 
greater support for reparations to victim groups. Research has proven that guilt 
increases reparative attitudes (Leach et al., 2006; Brown, & Cehajic, 2008; Allpress 
et al., 2010, Brown et al., 2008). Doosje et al.’s (1998) study showed that guilt leads 
to compensatory behaviour regarding the in-group’s historical misdeeds. In Brown 
and colleagues’ (Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008). longitudinal 
study, collective guilt and shame predicted participants’ desire to make reparations to   
indigenous Chileans. In Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen’s (Leach et al., 2006) work, guilt 
was causally related to predicting positive political action towards Aborigines in 
order to compensate for the material and cultural advantages of non-Aboriginal 
Australians. Further, stronger collective guilt for Dutch (Zebel et al., 2008) and 
Serbian actions during the Bosnian War (Cehajic & Brown, 2008) was related to 
more general support for reparations to Bosnian Muslims.  
 
2.11.2 Apology and Forgiveness 
 
Guilt has also been found to strengthen the will to apologize (Baumeister, Stillwell, 
& Heatherton, 1994). Given that apology is a form of restitution, studies have shown 
that guilt strengthens support for government apologies for historical wrongdoings 
(McGarty, Pedersen, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005; Allpress et al., 2010). 
McGarty et al. (2005) found that stronger guilt among white Australians was 
associated with more support for an official government apology to indigenous 
Australians.  
 
Other studies have examined the relationship between collective guilt and intergroup 
forgiveness. Cehajic, Brown, and Castano (2008) found that collective guilt 
increased feelings and perceptions of responsibility which led the transgressors to 
engage in forgiveness-seeking behaviour. Stronger guilt for historical violence was 
found to be related to greater willingness to forgive out-groups for violence against 
the in-group (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008; Manzi & Gonzalez, 2007). 
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2.11.3 Positive Attitudes 
 
Collective guilt has also been associated with increased positive attitudes toward the 
victimized group. Various studies have found guilt to be positively associated with 
constructive responses, perspective-taking and increased empathy towards the out-
group (Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Tangney 
1991). Similarly, greater guilt for white Americans’ treatment of African Americans 
predicted more favourable attitudes toward African Americans and support for 
affirmative action (Swim & Miller, 1999; Powell et al., 2005; Harvey & Oswald, 
2000; Iyer et al., 2003). Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, and Anisman (2013) also 
found that greater collective guilt was related to stronger expectations that apologies 
would encourage positive intergroup relations. 
 
Other studies have examined the relationship between collective guilt and support for 
social and economic redistribution policies. Iyer and associates (2003) found that 
greater collective guilt among white Americans was related to stronger support of 
affirmative action for African Americans. Stronger collective guilt in European New 
Zealanders was associated with more support of redistribution policies for native 
New Zealanders (Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005). 
2.12  Avoiding Collective Guilt 
Collective guilt is an aversive emotion, which means that while it can lead to positive 
changes and promote reconciliation, individuals are often motivated to avoid or 
reduce feelings of collective guilt through a variety of different means. Social 
identity theory posits that individuals are driven to perceive their important social in-
group in a positive light (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Because collective guilt arises from 
a negative evaluation of the in-group’s actions, in order to defend threats to the 
group’s positive identity, group members may be motivated to avoid or mitigate 
feelings of collective guilt. The most critical threat to a group’s identity occurs when 





2.12.1 Moral identity threat  
 
Accusations that the in-group has committed illegitimate harm against another group 
can be seen as a major challenge to its moral status. A growing body of research 
shows that morality is a crucial dimension in the process of in-group identification. 
Morality has been found to be a fundamental quality that people consider when 
forming evaluations about themselves and others (Leach, Ellemers, & Baretto, 2007; 
Tauber & van Zomeren, 2012; Wojciszke, 1994, 2005; Sullivan et al., 2012). It is 
because morality is so critical to social and cultural order that it becomes such an 
important attribute. A single immoral act has more impact on how an individual or a 
group is evaluated than a number of acts of incompetence and the potential 
consequences of being judged immoral are more severe than the consequences of 
being judged incompetent. Being judged immoral involves the risk of being excluded 
from the moral community. Becoming a target of moral exclusion is to be perceived 
as undeserving, expendable, and a nonentity (Opotow, 1990).  
 
Because morality is so important to individuals and groups, being reminded of the 
group’s immoral past can become an aversive experience (Monin, 2007), and   
accusations that one’s dominant in-group has committed acts that are incompatible 
with moral standards can be very threatening. Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto’s (2007) 
study demonstrates that a group’s moral status is more important for the positive 
evaluation of the in-group than other attributes such as competence or sociability. 
Furthermore, Ellemers et al.’s (2008) work showed that people are more motivated to 
improve the status of their group when they perceive it has high moral standing as 
opposed to higher competence (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008).  
Various studies on individual responses to moral threats (Monin, 2007; Leach et al, 
2007; Tauber & van Zomeren, 2013) have demonstrated that defensiveness appears 
to be the most prominent reaction. In Monin (2007), for example, individuals engage 
in defensive strategies to defuse threats elicited by being confronted with a morally 
superior comparison target. Similarly, Tauber and van Zomeren (2013) show that 
when the in-group’s moral status is threatened, instead of feeling motivated to 
improve the situation, individuals defend their social identity and direct their outrage 
towards the out-group. 
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Consistent with prior research, Sullivan and colleagues demonstrate that when 
confronted with accusations of in-group transgression, individuals defensively 
attempt to bolster the in-group’s moral status in order to defuse the threat to its 
positive identity (Sullivan et al., 2012). And one way in which members can avert 
feelings of collective guilt and restore the group’s moral identity is by focusing on 




Remembering the in-group’s previous victimization can help diminish feelings of 
guilt and responsibility for the harm done to the out-group (Sullivan, Landau, 
Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012). According to Kelman, the increasing salience of 
Nazi victimization of the Jewish race resulted in Israeli harm doing being perceived 
as a defence of the in-group rather than an offence against another group threatening 
harm (Kelman, 1992). In what is referred to as competitive victimhood, members of 
conflicting groups experience a strong desire to establish that their in-group suffered 
more at the hands of the out-group than vice versa. Groups establish and disseminate 
particular historical narratives about their victimization through media coverage, 
textbooks, political leaders’ speeches and rituals to construct a discourse that 
revolves around competitive victimhood for the whole group as a collective (Noor et 
al, 2012, 353).  
 
Wohl and Branscombe’s (2008) research was the first to demonstrate that feelings of 
collective guilt for harm to the current adversary are reduced when members are 
reminded of past victimization that befell their own group. Referencing the in-
group’s past victimization (Holocaust) led Jewish participants to accept less 
collective guilt for their group’s harmful actions toward the Palestinians. Similarly, 
less collective guilt was felt by American participants for the group’s harmdoing in 
Iraq when they were reminded of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Reminders of 
historical victimization by a victim group often instigate a negative defensive 
reaction in the perpetrator group rather than an empathetic response towards victims 
leading to pro-social behaviour to amend the wrong. Wohl and Branscombe’s results 
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suggest that such reminders can, therefore, be counterproductive, as they are 
particularly threatening to the group that endured the historical harm (Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2008). 
 
For the above reason, past collective victimization can become an important source 
of conflict in the present—perpetuating ongoing, intractable conflict and instigating 
renewed violence (Vollhardt, 2012, 136). According to Volkan (2001), when groups 
are driven by chosen traumas, they are less likely to show empathy for the out-
group’s sufferings. Chosen traumas may increase the in-group’s legitimization of the 
harms done to the adversarial group. Consistent with this theory, past research has 
demonstrated that reminders of past collective victimhood decrease the in-group’s 
acceptance of collective responsibility and guilt for inflicting harm on the out-group 
(Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). 
 
2.12.3 Denying collective responsibility 
 
Various studies have examined the tendency of group members to deny shared 
responsibility in order to lessen the feeling of guilt. They may do so by asserting that 
the victim 'brought it on himself or herself,' or by attributing harmful actions to 
external constraints. Denying the consequences for the victim (or one’s own 
responsibility for them) reduces perpetrator guilt and the threat to moral identity. For 
example, white Australians who rejected the notion of collective responsibility were 
less likely to report collective guilt for harm to native Australians (McGarty et al., 
2005). The denial of collective responsibility has been found in political rhetoric 
regarding historical victimization of Australian Aborigines (Augoustinos & 
LeCouteur, 2004). This research examined political speeches made by Prime 
Minister John Howard in which he stated that current generations cannot, and should 
not, be held responsible for the wrongs of previous generations. Thus it can be seen 




Blaming the harmed group as deserving of the suffering 
Individuals may place the blame on the out-group’s past action for causing the 
historical event, making it look like the out-group deserved the suffering. As a means 
of dispelling guilt, group members may deny or distort past injustices and shift the 
blame on to the victims (Dresler-Hawke, 2005). We can identify this phenomenon in 
the Nazi rhetoric which identified Jewish conspiracy as the cause of Germany’s 
defeat in World War I and blamed Jews for the suffering that followed. By blaming 
the victim, the perpetrators feel less distress when faced with accusations about their 
in- group’s immoral behaviour (Bandura, 1990). 
 
Several other studies have examined in-group members’ tendency to deny or reduce 
the illegitimacy of in-group behaviour. One way to reduce the illegitimacy of in-
group behaviour is to portray out-group members as a threat. For instance, Wohl and 
Branscombe (2008) found that Israelis who justified their treatment of Palestinians as 
responses to terrorism were less likely to experience collective guilt for their 
behaviour. Other research has demonstrated similar results (Zagefka et al., 2010; 
Zebel et al., 2008). 
 
Placing the blame on a few deviant group members 
According to Wohl, Branscombe, and Klar (2006), another means by which group 
members can absolve themselves from collective responsibility for wrongdoings 
(without actually denying the occurrence of harm-doing) is to hold a few deviant in-
group members responsible. In Doosje et al.’s (1998)’s study, when confronted with 
information about Dutch violence against Indonesians, Dutch participants who 
identified highly with their in-group tended to isolate responsibility for the 
wrongdoing amongst a deviant few, thereby avoiding harming the positive image of 
the group as a whole.  
 
Legitimizing the immoral act 
Even if responsibility for the wrongdoing cannot be denied, collective guilt can be 
reduced by legitimizing the immoral act. While acknowledging that a past injustice 
had been committed, a group’s moral status can be sustained by legitimizing the 
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group’s decision to commit the act. As noted above, United States’ official narratives 
justifying the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were   
portrayed by Truman and the media as unavoidable and legitimate since they ended 
the war early and saved countless lives as a result. 
 
Minimising harm and group responsibility 
Another means by which members of a group avoid responsibility for the harmful 
treatment of another group is by minimising the severity of the harm committed 
(Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Leach et al., 2006).  
 
Temporal Distancing 
Members of in-groups may restore their collective esteem through defensive 
temporal distancing. In Peetz, Gunn, and Wilson (2010)’s study, German participants 
were induced to perceive the Holocaust as either subjectively close or subjectively 
distant. Participants who viewed the Holocaust as ‘closer’ admitted greater guilt and 
a willingness to seek pro-social actions to compensate the victims. On the other 
hand, participants who regarded the atrocity as ‘an event of the remote past,’ felt 
reduced collective guilt. This research demonstrated that individuals may relegate the 
in-group’s immoral acts to the distant past in order to reduce the threat to their 
collective identity. Individuals can ameliorate the threat to their identity as moral 
actors by denying the painful consequences of their actions and distancing 
themselves from the pain and suffering of the out-group by belittling them or by 
feeling no empathy with the victim’s sufferings. Increasing social distance between 
oneself and the victim lowers empathy (Fry, 2006; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008); the 
ultimate result of social distancing is the dehumanization of the victim.  
 
Motivated Forgetting 
Historical memories play an important role in mobilizing collective action of a group 
or a nation. Reviving historical memories has been crucial to the building of national 
identity and the reenactment of past victimization becomes shared through narratives 
and rituals. Volkan (2001) asserts that collective memory of past victimization 
becomes institutionalized in society as 'chosen trauma.' On the other hand, groups 
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that have committed historical injustices against members of other groups are likely 
to experience collective 'forgetting' (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & 
Miron, 2004; Sahdra & Ross, 2007). When confronted with the in-group’s past 
immoral conduct, threatened collective identities can elicit defensive reactions such 
as ‘motivated forgetting’ (Rotella & Richeson, 2013). 'Motivated forgetting’ is the 
process by which individuals attempt to avoid or forget information that could be 
embarrassing, painful, or threatening (Rotella & Richeson, 2013; Hein & Selden, 
2000). Refusing to acknowledge threatening information can be considered as 
motivated ‘forgetting’ as a way to restore people’s esteem for their important in-
group. 
 
Motivated ‘forgetting’ of in-group aggression was demonstrated in Sahdra and Ross’ 
(2007) study of Hindus and Sikhs. Participants had clear memories of past events in 
which their in-group was victimized, but recalled fewer instances of aggression 
committed by their own in-group. Rotella and Richeson (2013) further examined 
how information that one’s in-group has harmed another group affects memory and 
collective guilt. When American participants were given information describing 
historical injustices to Native American Indians, perpetrators of violence were 
described either as early Americans (in-group) or as European settlers (out-group).  
Remembering negative historical events was significantly diminished when the 
perpetrators were framed as Americans (in-group) versus Europeans (out-group). In 
terms of guilt, American participants who were primed to be high identifiers reported 
significantly less collective guilt. When the in-group’s moral status is threatened, 
group members often experience collective forgetting to diminish that threat. This 
phenomenon of motivated ‘forgetting’ under threat was evidenced in Imhoff and 
Banse’s (2009) study in which majority of German participants whose positive group 
identity became threatened by information on the suffering of Jews today (threat 
condition) either rejected acknowledgement or simply forgot the passage they read 





Branscombe (2004) claims that it is plausible that collective guilt in response to past 
harms may serve to enhance identity discontinuity in which the members of the 
perpetrator group disconnect the current generation from harmdoing done by earlier 
generations (Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 2004). Studies have shown that the present 
generation can experience collective guilt and be motivated to remedy past harms 
because it enables them to distance themselves from racist ancestors. Admission of 
collective guilt to promote a sense of temporal discontinuity   allows current 
generations to protect their positive social identity. 
 
2.13  National Identification and Collective Guilt 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner 
et al., 1987) suggest that social categorization together with in-group identification 
are both necessary for individuals to experience group-based emotions. When in-
group identification is salient, individuals link their self-concept and image with the 
group. For highly identified individuals, studies have shown that the distinction 
between the 'I' and the 'We' is blurred, and events that affect members of the in-group 
are experienced as if they affect the self (Roccas & Elster, 2012). High identifiers of 
the group therefore will feel strong emotions as a response to events that have 
occurred to other group members, even if they themselves were not in any way 
involved (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999).  
 
As such, one of the important antecedents of collective guilt that has been studied is 
in-group identification. When people self-categorize as members of a perpetrator 
group, they are more likely to feel collective guilt for their group’s harmful 
behaviour (Branscombe, 2004). Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead’s study 
(2006) has shown that salient self-categorization with the perpetrator group could 
elicit collective guilt. From this theoretical perspective, one may expect that people 
who are strongly identified and most invested in maintaining a positive image of the 
group are most likely to experience collective guilt. Since group-based guilt is ‘guilt 
by association’ (Doosje et al., 1998), one would expect to see a positive relationship 
 47 
between in-group identification and collective guilt. Other research, however, has 
demonstrated a negative relationship between in-group identification and collective 
guilt. These studies have shown (Doosje et al., 1998; Branscombe et al., 2004) that 
high identifiers are more prone to defend their group’s past harm-doing, as 
individuals who identify strongly with a group are motivated to maintain a positive 
image of the group. For instance, Doosje et al.’s (1998) study supports this theory 
and reveals that high-identifying Dutch participants reported lower levels of guilt 
than low identifiers when they were confronted with ambiguous information about 
Dutch colonial harms in Indonesia. They may respond with various defensive 
measures which were described earlier, such as denial, justifying, legitimizing, 
minimising the harm to the other group or by focusing on their own victimhood.  
 
Recent studies have offered a deeper understanding of the relationship between guilt 
and collective identity. One such example is the research conducted by Roccas and 
colleagues (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) in which they addressed the 
inconsistencies found in past findings on the relationship between in-group 
identification and group-based guilt. They suggested that inconsistent empirical 
findings may result from the complex effects of in-group identification as an 
antecedent. They proposed that identification with a group may simultaneously 
increase and decrease the propensity toward group-based guilt (Roccas et al., 2006, 
699). To address these complex effects, they used a more finely tuned approach by 
distinguishing between two modes of identification with the national group: 
glorification versus a more liberal form of in-group attachment.  
 
Glorification of the national group involves the motivation to view the group in the 
best possible light. It entails the viewing of the national in-group as more worthy 
than and superior to other groups and as having respect for various national symbols 
such as flags and leadership. High national glorifiers are therefore likely to reject 
information that indicates that the in-group has been involved in immoral actions in 
the past. Individuals with critical attachment to the group (attachment without 
glorification), on the other hand, would categorize themselves as in-group members, 
be patriotic, wish to contribute to the welfare of the nation, and still be capable of 
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seeing the group in a critical light. When tested in the context of Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, Roccas and colleagues' key findings (Roccas et al., 2006) revealed that the 
two partly overlapping modes of national identification have opposing relations to 
reactions to information about their group’s moral transgressions. Glorification was 
associated with lower levels of guilt, and when the glorification component was 
controlled for, attachment was consistently associated with stronger feelings of guilt. 
Furthermore, the studies revealed that high national glorifiers are likely to employ 
‘exoneration cognition’ and avoid feeling morally responsible by justifying the 
group’s actions. On the other hand, critical attachment (when glorification was 
controlled for) was associated with a reduced tendency to legitimize or justify the in-
group’s transgressions. These studies indicate that different dimensions of 
identification have different effects on attitudes toward the out-group. It would be 
useful, therefore, to differentiate the types of identification in order to gain a better 
understanding of intergroup relations. 
 
2.14  Conclusion 
What one can draw from the literature on intergroup conflict and reconciliation is 
that unaddressed and unresolved historical harm-doing and identity anxieties 
generate many impediments to reconciliation and may protract the conflict. This 
chapter has elucidated the social psychological literature that provides the theoretical 
framework to guide the methodology, design and data analysis of this research. The 
ongoing conflicts between Japan and its East Asian neighbours have their roots in 
unresolved history of injustices. Kelman’s model for reconciliation and Nadler and 
Shnabel’s Needs-based Theory of Reconciliation have both shed light on the 
importance of satisfying victims’ psychological needs to restore their esteem and 
positive identity. In order for the victims to heal and for the damaged relationship to 
be mended, responsibility for the wrongs of the past must be accepted and 
acknowledged by the perpetrators.  
 
This chapter has examined the potential factors that can facilitate or inhibit feelings 
of collective guilt. Existing scholarship and theories on the psychological barriers 
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that impede the perpetrator group’s acknowledgement of its past has offered 
important insights to identify the key variables to test in this study. The next chapter 
will outline the research design and methods used to examine whether or not 
contemporary Japanese are willing to accept inherited responsibility for their 
ancestors' past behaviour and what this means for Sino-Japanese rapprochement or 





3. Context: Apology and Forgiveness in East Asia 
 
[The chapter ‘Apology and Forgiveness in East Asia’ will be published in Clements, 
K. P. (Ed.) (2017). Identity, trust, and reconciliation in East Asia. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan] 
 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter will analyse some of the obstacles to reconciliation in East Asia. In 
particular, it will address why China and South Korea are unable to accept Japan’s 
apologies and expressions of remorse as 'genuine and sincere.' It will also analyse the 
psychological drivers that motivate Japanese revisionists to nullify the government’s 
official apologies, making Chinese and Korean forgiveness problematic. 
 
Nearly seven decades have passed since the end of the Second World War, and the 
'history issue' still haunts East Asia. Japan continues to be accused of failing to 
apologize and express remorse for its past injustices. Various scholars argue, 
however, that it is not accurate to simply conclude that Japan has failed to 'address its 
past' (Seaton, 2007, 65). Yamazaki, who has conducted an extensive rhetorical study 
of Japan’s past war apologies, also contends that it is a “common simplistic view that 
Japan has never apologized” (Yamazaki, 2006, x). Dujarric further argues that in 
view of the number of official apologies issued by Japanese leaders in the past, “this 
is far more apologizing and contrition than the world average” (Dujarric, 2013). Why 
then has Japan gained so little recognition for its efforts for reconciliation? 
 
Although the post-war political environment was not conducive to processes 
facilitating reconciliation in East Asia, the emergence of global human rights norms 
in the last three decades has revived active discussions about war guilt, justice, 
memory and apology. The 1990s saw increased calls for unresolved compensation 
 51 
and justice for human rights violations of the Second World War. Barkan (2001, 46) 
described this trend as “a sudden rush of restitution cases all over the world.” This 
international political climate placed considerable pressure on Japan to respond to 
the demands of the former victims for reparations and proper apology. The 1990s 
saw a series of official apologies issued by the Prime Ministers of Japan. However, 
despite the many apologetic statements offered, critics in China and South Korea still 
repeat their demands that Japan 'has not apologized.' What are the factors underlying 
the victim nations’ rejection of the perpetrator’s expressions of remorse? What are 
the impediments to their willingness to forgive and reconcile? Apology is an issue 
that needs to be addressed as it has long been a major linchpin in Japan’s 
deteriorating relations with its neighbouring countries in East Asia. This chapter 
provides an important context and historical background in understanding one of the 
essential puzzles of this thesis, why the majority of the Japanese population feel they 
have done enough while the victim nations continue to denounce Japan for its lack of 
remorse.  
 
3.2  Apology and Basic Human Needs 
Many prolonged conflicts have their roots in traumatic memories of past violence. To 
manage and prevent such conflicts governments are increasingly offering apologies 
to aggrieved citizen groups and states to acknowledge their complicity in historical 
injustices. Scholars argue that collective responses to historical injustices are critical 
to the healing of damaged relationships (Lazare, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991; Minow, 
2002). Recently, there has been growing scholarship devoted to understanding how 
public apologies may contribute to forgiveness and reconciliation, but there is still a 
dearth of research on when and why government apologies for historical injustices 
might or might not be effective (Blatz et al., 2009, 221). Nonetheless, apology is a 
key component in reconciliation. Barkan (2000) and other scholars (Brooks, 1999; 
Minow, 2002) assert that in the process towards reconciliation, the primary purpose 
of apology is in the healing of the victims’ sense of trauma, grievance and validation 
of identity. Without amends and reparations, the wounds from a historical injustice 
will continue to fester, causing resentment to deepen and conflict to exacerbate. 
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As explained in Chapter 2, the perpetrator group's full acknowledgement of guilt and 
responsibility for the past injustice is critical for the victim group's social healing and 
restoration of self-worth and power (Minow, 1998; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The 
kind of action that contributes to reconciliation therefore is that which addresses the 
deep emotional and psychological needs of both the victims and the perpetrators. In 
this chapter, I will examine the Japanese government’s official attempts to redress the 
past injustices which fail to satisfy the fundamental needs for recognition and 
restoration of self-esteem amongst the victimized nations. It will demonstrate how 
conflicts are likely to protract when the feeling of humiliation and pain makes needs 
satisfaction challenging for both the perpetrator and the victim (Burton, 1987; 
Kelman, 1995; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Azar, 1990). 
 
3.3  What Makes an Apology Effective? 
Lazare (2004) contends that there are certain psychological needs that successful 
apologies can satisfy. He proposes that for an apology to help heal a damaged 
relationship, one of the important psychological needs that must be met is the 
“restoration of dignity and self-respect.” Many historical injustices are humiliating. 
They rob the victims of self-respect and dignity, and reduce them to inferior positions 
where they feel powerless. Hence, a successful apology must somehow restore these 
vital aspects of the victims’ self-esteem in order for them to heal (Lazare, 2004, 45). 
Furthermore, Blatz and colleagues have conducted a systematic analysis of what 
improves or undermines the effectiveness of intergroup apologies for reconciliation. 
These researchers have discovered that the following key elements are necessary to 
increase the perceived sincerity and potential effectiveness of an apology: 1) the 
perpetrator’s acceptance of responsibility; 2) acknowledgement of harm and/or 
victim’s suffering; 3) expression of sorrow and remorse; 4) admission of injustice or 
wrongdoing; 5) forbearance, or promises to behave better and never repeat the 
mistake again and; 6) offers of reparations/to repair the damages (Blatz et al., 2009,  
221). Studies showed that these elements were found to enhance sincerity and 
effectively promote forgiveness.  
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3.3.1  Sincerity 
 
If apologies are to be accepted as a symbolic redress of transgression, then they are 
only effective as long as they appear to be sincere. In an interpersonal context, 
sincerity can be defined as congruency between inward thoughts and outward 
expression. For some apologies to be effective, victims need to see the wrongdoer 
suffer and that suffering becomes evident when they express their remorse, guilt, 
shame, and humiliation for what they have done (Lazare, 2004, 61). Although 
sincerity is difficult to measure with public apologies, it can be evaluated based on 
how thorough the acknowledgements of the offence are whether there is “consistency 
and consensus as visible in public record” (Yamazaki, 2006, 21). As Yamazaki aptly 
notes, “actions speak louder than words”; government representatives need to avoid 
actions or statements that seem to contradict the nation’s apologetic stance 
(Yamazaki, 2006, 21). Sincere apologies can underscore the transition from an unjust 
past to a peaceful future, whereas insincere apologies may serve to reinforce the 
original injustice (Iyer & Blatz, 2012). As such, a great deal of effort is often placed 
into communicating sincerity in an apology.  
 
3.3.2  Representation 
 
Norma Field stresses that for a national apology to be of value, the issue of 
representation becomes a key component (Field, 1997, 7). Tavuchis (1991, 48) also 
agrees that for a collective apology to be considered satisfactory, it must be offered 
with the backing and authority of the collective so that the apology is official and 
binding and must be made publicly and on the record. For example, many who argue 
that Japan has 'never apologized' are attached to the fact that there has not been any 
parliamentary resolution issued (e.g. the case of 'comfort women'). To the extent that 
is possible, apologies should be formally endorsed by government representatives 




3.3.3  Clear acknowledgement of the offence 
 
For an apology to be effective, it needs to clearly acknowledge the offence. It is 
important to specify the wrongdoing, especially if the apology is to be seen as 
genuine. An inability to clearly identify who was responsible for the grievance, and 
to whom the apology is owed and to recognize the impact of the offence on the 
victim(s) leads to failed apologies (Lazare, 2004, 75). Clarifying the details of the 
offence demonstrates that the party is fully aware of the seriousness of the moral 
offence that they have violated. Apologizing for specific offences is an important 
element that makes a national apology credible. Instead of apologizing in abstract 
terms with passivity and ambiguity about agency, Tavuchis (1991) claims that the 
most important function of collective apologies is to provide an official record that 
outlines the specificity of the nature of the wrongdoing and who was responsible.  
 
Apologies are considered deeply significant since they recognise the victims’ own 
memory of suffering, and acknowledge perpetrator guilt, all of which helps the 
healing process. Apologies have been often found to be more significant than 
material compensation in the beginning of reconciliation processes.  
3.4  Japan’s Official Stance  
The Japanese government has been criticized frequently by the international 
community for its wartime conduct. Accusations of Japan’s wrongdoing occur at two 
levels: first, specific atrocities like the Nanjing Massacre, inhumane treatment of 
prisoners of war, the forced sexual services of 'comfort women' for Japanese soldiers, 
medical experimentation in Manchuria and on a more general level, Japanese 
aggression, annexation and colonial rule in Asia (Yamazaki 2006, 24).  
 
In response to these accusations, the Japanese government has explained its official 
position regarding war history and reparations in the following document issued by 
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 2005: 
 
During a certain period of the past, Japan followed a mistaken national policy 
and caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many 
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countries, particularly to those Asian nations, through its colonial rule and 
aggression. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. 
With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in 
mind, Japan, underpinned by its solid democracy, has resolutely and 
consistently strived for peace by adhering to a strictly defensive security 
policy, preventing the escalation of international conflict, and dedicating 
itself to international peace and stability by mobilizing all its 
resources…After the end of World War II, Japan renounced all rights, titles 
and claims to Korea, Taiwan, the Kurile islands, a portion of Sakhalin, and 
other territories, and accepted the judgments of the International Military 
Tribunal of the Far East (Tokyo Trial), in which 25 Japanese leaders had been 
convicted of war crimes. Many other Japanese were convicted in other war 
crimes courts. Japan has dealt with the issues of reparations, property and 
claims, in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the bilateral 
peace treaties, agreements and instruments. Japan paid reparations to 
Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, while others waived them. 
After the normalization of its relations with the Republic of Korea, China and 
other countries, Japan extended a substantial amount of economic 
cooperation. With the parties to these documents, the issues of reparations, 
property and claims, including the claims by individuals, have been settled 
legally (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005, cited in Seaton, 2007, 66). 
 
Many critics and activists stress that in order for reconciliation to take place in East 
Asia, Japan needs to issue a clear apology and pay reparations to its former victims. 
However, Japan’s official position is that the country has already accepted war 
responsibility, has issued clear apologies, and has fulfilled all its legal obligations to 
pay reparations and compensation. From an interests-based realpolitik perspective, 
Japan feels it has fully addressed the past. 
 
3.5  Legal Reparations  
Through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Japan signed peace treaties and paid 
reparations to almost all the countries that it had occupied or invaded. These 
agreements sometimes took the form of technological or economic assistance, but it 
was understood that they were meant to serve as wartime compensation. Most of 
these treaties contained clauses saying that the compensation issue had been finally 
resolved by those treaties, and this understanding constitutes the core of the Japanese 
official position. Seaton (2007) has offered explanations as to why the demands for 
compensation stipulated in San Francisco Peace Treaty have been so 'lenient' on 
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Japan. The Versailles Treaty of 1919 demonstrated how excessively punitive post-
war treaties can lay the grounds for future conflict. In Japan’s case, preventing a 
resurgence of militarism or a backlash against the harshness of the post-war treaties 
were key aims (Seaton, 2007).  
 
Japan and South Korea signed a treaty in 1965 normalizing diplomatic relations. At 
that time, they also signed a separate agreement for Japan to provide financial aid to 
Seoul, in return for South Korea relinquishing its right to claim wartime 
compensation. Likewise, the Chinese government relinquished the right of pursuing 
claims for wartime compensation after gaining the possession of Japanese assets in 
China at the end of the war. In 1972, the Japan-China Joint statement waived 
reparations. The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (excerpted) states: 
 
The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious 
damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and 
deeply reproaches itself… 
 
(5) The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares that in the 
interest of friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it 
renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan (Tanaka and Chou, 
1972). 
 
So, why are Japan’s efforts to apologize and restore relationships with its former 
victims failing to bear fruit?  Barkan claims that restitution is a process where 
“victims and perpetrators (come) face to face to barter the suffering and 
responsibility for the past and create a future, which both sides can subscribe to…” 
(Barkan, 2001, S-49). It can encompass compensation to victims, an admission of 
guilt, recognition of suffering and responsibility for the past. An important element 
he emphasizes is the “willingness of governments to admit to unjust and 
discriminatory past policies and to negotiate terms for restitution or reparation with 
their victims based more on moral considerations than on power politics” (Barkan, 
2000, 317).  
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According to the earlier theories on effective collective apology (Tavuchis, 1991, 
101), the apology has to be: 1) official, in the sense that the prime minister of Japan 
acts as the representative of the collective and; 2) on record and therefore binding. 
An apology needs to be accompanied by an assurance that there will no repetition of 
the acts to reassure that the perpetrator is genuinely sorry. Barkan states that an 
apology needs to validate and show respect for the victims’ memory and identity, the 
very recognition of past injustices constitutes the core restitution. It is recognition 
that transforms the trauma of victimization into a process of mourning which allows 
for the rebuilding of relationships (Barkan, 2000, 323) With these criteria in mind, let 
us look at some representative cases of official apologies that Japan successfully 
issued in the past to understand why they were accepted as genuine and sincere by its 
former victims. 
 
3.6  Sincere Apologies by Japanese Leaders 
In August 1993, Hosokawa Morihito became the prime minister of a coalition 
government consisting of eight minority parties including the Socialist Party. For the 
first time since 1955, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had lost its 
majority in the Diet and was out of power. During his brief nine-month term in 
office, Hosokawa made more than four official apologies for Japan’s “aggressive 
acts” and “colonial rule” causing “intolerable pain and suffering” to the people of 
Asia and around the world. Hosokawa’s statements were hailed as having shifted the 
apology discourse of the Japanese government. The new administration of Hosokawa 
marked a significant break with the past. In the international arena, the end of the 
Cold War cast a new light on Japan’s position in the international community. 
“Comfort women” lawsuits and the surrounding publicity continued to plague the 
Japanese government. Despite apologies by Prime Minister Miyazawa in January 
1992 and investigations conducted by the Japanese government in 1992 and 1993, 
the comfort women issue continued to gain momentum. During the 1990s there was 
a shift toward greater contrition in the official narrative.  
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The Hosokawa administration shift in war apology discourse was exemplified in a 
press conference statement of 10 August after his inauguration as the prime minister: 
“My understanding is that it was a war of aggression and it was wrong” (Asahi 
Shimbun, 1993). This was the first time a Japanese Prime Minister had 
acknowledged that the war was wrong and a mistake. Hosokawa’s statements made 
front-page headlines and the statement was welcomed enthusiastically by China and 
South Korea. 
 
On 23 August 1993, in his speech at the 127th Diet Session, Hosokawa made another 
apology in his first policy speech to the Japanese Diet: 
 
Going back just four turns of the twelve-year cycle, it was with the end of the 
war in August 1945 that we realized the great mistake we had made and 
vowed to start a new, resolutely determined never to repeat the wrongs of the 
past. 
 
     I would like to take this opportunity to express a new our profound 
remorse (hansei) and apologies (owabi) for the fact that Japanese actions, 
including acts of aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering 
and sorrow for so many people and to state that we will demonstrate our new 
determination by contributing more than ever before to world peace 
(Hosokawa’s policy speech to the 127th session of the National Diet, 23 
August 1993). 
 
The final example of Hosokawa’s apologetic statement was made during his trip to 
South Korea to meet with the new President Kim Young Sam on 7 November 1993.  
 
Because of our country’s past colonial rule, residents of the Korean peninsula 
experienced various forms of unbearable pain and grief, including such things 
as not being allowed to use their own language in school, being forced to 
change their names to Japanese style names, and the requisitioning of military 
comfort women. As the perpetrator of these actions, from the heart we want 
to express our deep remorse (fukaku hansei) and apologize (chinsha) (Asahi 
Shimbun, 8 November 1993). 
 
In this statement, what makes Hosokawa’s apology to Korea strong and effective was 
his explicit reference to the details of Japanese occupation in Korea. President Kim 




I want to commend PM Hosokawa’s understanding of history. Previous 
administrations have requested compensation for the former military comfort 
women. We have decided that, although looking to the past and keeping alive 
the lessons of history is important, it is more important to build a relationship 
[for the future]. As for the comfort women issue, although previous 
administrators have pursued compensation, [we find it] unnecessary (Asahi 
Shimbun, 8 November 1993, cited in Yamazaki, 2006). 
 
Hosokawa’s apologies in 1993-94 were considered the “zenith of Japanese apologies, 
judging by their reception in neighboring countries, and his apologies seemed to be 
taking Japan on a bold new course” (Seaton, 2007, 87). Hosokawa’s apology 
statements were positively accepted by Korean leaders. The Korean Foreign Minister 
even said, “The summit was 110 out of 100. The issue of past history is closed” 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 November 1993).  
 
Japanese public opinion concerning Hosokawa’s usage of the term 'aggression' and 
'colonial rule' was positive. A public opinion poll of 3,000 respondents conducted by 
the Asahi Shimbun on 13 November 1993 revealed that 76% approved Hosokawa’s 
Diet speech while only 18% opposed it. National apologies for the country’s past 
wrongdoing must gain acceptance from the domestic audience. For the government 
to maintain its political legitimacy apologies must be justified to the audience in such 
a way that they still protect positive national pride and identity. Hosokawa 
differentiated himself from the old LDP political establishment and was able to 
apologize with a renewed determination without making the nation lose face. 
Moreover, Hosokawa never compromised or nullified his apologies with other 




3.6.1  Murayama’s apologies 
 
Towards the fiftieth anniversary of the war, it was hoped that it might be possible for 
Japan to produce a definitive resolution in the Diet which would include an apology 
to Asian victims of the war, and an assurance that Japan would not follow the same 
path again (Rose, 2005; Field, 1995). Plans for the adoption of a resolution for the 
renunciation of the war was advanced by a project team of the government under 
Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi of the Socialist Democratic Party. The internal 
politics of the coalition government (SDP, LDP and Sakigake) in addition to 
opposition from LDP hard-liners led the final draft to become a disappointingly 
watered down version. Despite the promise that the LDP would support the Socialist 
call for an apology, the Diet resolution was passed in June in a greatly altered version 
from the original draft amid much public criticism of the Japanese government. The 
final draft failed to include the words 'apology' or 'renunciation of the war' as was 
originally intended. Prime Minister Murayama tried to salvage the situation by 
issuing a personal statement. On 15 August 1995, Murayama called a press 
conference at his home where he read a statement in which he apologized for Japan’s 
wartime conduct: 
 
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a 
mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the 
Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and through its colonial rule and 
aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many 
countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such 
mistake by made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these 
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep 
remorse (tsuusetsu na hansei) and state my heartfelt apology (kokoro kara no 
owabi) (Murayama, 15 August 1995, cited from Yamazaki, 2006). 
 
Murayama redeemed the situation with his 'heartfelt apology' by mentioning 
“colonial rule and aggression” and having caused “tremendous damage and 
suffering.” The phrase “irrefutable facts of history” was interpreted as a rejection of 
the revisionist historical views of the conservatives and nationalists. The Chinese 
government adopted Murayama’s statement as a benchmark against which to 
evaluate subsequent official statements and apologies for the war (Rose, 2005, 103). 
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His personal integrity and his long-time association with leftist politics gave his 
statement credibility and the sincerity and emotional content of his speech was 
persuasive in indicating true repentance (Yamazaki, 2006, 109).  
 
Reactions to Murayama’s statement were generally positive. The statement was not 
representative of the Japanese government as a whole, but Murayama nonetheless 
obtained a cabinet endorsement (kakugi kettei). This move reflected his wish that his 
statement would be interpreted both at home and abroad as the general will of the 
Japanese cabinet, which then would politically bind future cabinets (Mukae, 1996, 
1029). Subsequent Japanese prime ministers did use Murayama’s statement as a 
model for their own apologies. Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Koizumi modelled 
their apologies in accordance with Murayama’s speech and the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry repeatedly affirmed this speech as the official government statement on 
apology. 
 
China and South Korea accepted it in a reserved manner as they felt that Murayama’s 
speech was a personal gesture rather than an official position. Added to this, in the 
afternoon on the same day of the press conference, more than half of Murayama’s 
LDP cabinet visited the Yasukuni Shrine, showing how little support he had from his 
own cabinet despite the prior cabinet approval.  
 
3.7  Why Japanese Apologies Have Failed 
The main problem surrounding the apparent failure of the Japanese to come to terms 
with the past is (from the Chinese and Korean points of view) the refusal of 
successive Japanese governments to offer genuine, sincere apologies to the Chinese 
people, backed up by consistent actions and behaviour that support the apologies. 
 
Although the Japanese government, politicians, and the public may feel that 
apologies have already been offered on a number of occasions, this view is at odds 
with the Chinese and Koreans who contend that Japan still has not apologized for its 
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past. Repeated requests from leaders of Korea and China are evidence of the failure 
of Japanese apologies.  
 
Based on the criteria explained earlier, Japanese apologies have expressed remorse 
and regret for the harm done. Another important aspect of regret concerns the 
expression of emotion in apologies. The success of Murayama’s speech owes much 
to his 'heartfelt' apology. In terms of representation, as the elected head of state, the 
prime minister appropriately represented the Japanese people as the legitimate person 
to apologize. However, those who argue that Japan “has never apologized’ focus on 
the lack of a parliamentary resolution of apology. The failure to pass a Diet apology 
resolution in 1995, along with the wrangling over words, have undermined the 
impact of the past official apologies made. The issue of representativeness was also 
the main reason why former 'comfort women' were dissatisfied with the Japanese act 
of apology on their issues. 
 
3.7.1  Comfort women apologies 
 
During the 1990s, Japan came under international pressure to make amends for its 
historical crimes during World War II. International pressures together with domestic 
criticisms forced Japan to revisit its responsibility for wartime acts and the core of 
the dispute was over Japanese treatment of the 'comfort women.' The practice of 
sexual slavery was brought into international prominence in 1990. The Japanese 
government, the two Koreas, China, the UN, and several nongovernmental, and 
women’s organizations became embroiled in the question of how to respond to 
injustices inflicted upon these women fifty years ago. 
 
It was not until 1991 that a public testimony by a former comfort woman Kim 
Haksoon was given in Korea. The Japanese government initially denied direct 
involvement in the recruitment of comfort women. The Japanese government gave a 
statement in 1990 rejecting any official connection to the management of the 
brothels. Instead, the government attributed the coordination to private contractors. 
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However, after historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi discovered government records in the 
Japanese Defence Agency library in 1992 providing a direct role in managing the 
brothels. The lawsuits promoted the appointment of a Japanese committee to study 
the comfort women issue. This led to several official expressions of remorse, 
including that of Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama who acknowledged Japan’s 
'mistaken national policy' and offered his 'feelings of deep remorse' and 'heartfelt 
apology.' 
 
In 1993, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono made a statement regarding “the 
involvement of the military authorities” in the 'comfort women' issue and added that 
“Japan would like to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those…who 
suffered immeasurable pain and incurable…wounds.” Several Japanese prime 
ministers wrote to surviving sex slaves noting that “with an involvement of the 
Japanese military, it was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of 
women…our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of 
apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past.” Although these statements 
mark a turning point in the official position of the Japanese government, the former 
comfort women rejected them as merely individual responses that did not represent 
the people of Japan, as long as the Diet refused to issue an apology. Added to this, 
there is considerable ambiguity and passivity in these statements. 
 
While accepting some involvement in the military-servicing brothels, the 
government evaded legal responsibility toward the comfort women. The 
government’s denial, then downplaying of the state’s position in institutionalizing 
sexual slavery during the war, is the reason why the Japanese government’s 
statement failed to satisfy the emotional needs of the former comfort women. The 
victims argue that official acknowledgement and apologies are both necessary. When 
the Japanese government apologized to the comfort women in August 1993, it was 
welcomed by the victims’ groups only until it became evident that compensation 
would be 'unofficial' via the Asian Women’s Fund set up in July 1995. The victims 
wanted monetary reparation to be directly from the government as a symbolic 
gesture of taking responsibility for the harms caused (Chang, 2009).  
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Although Murayama released statements that expressed remorse and apologies 
toward former comfort women and their suffering, his message was taken as an 
individual’s message, and not representing the reluctant government. “For such a 
significant issue, individuals cannot speak convincingly on behalf of a heel-dragging 
government” (Chang, 2009). Hence, the Japanese Diet has largely been considered 
not to have extended formal acknowledgement, apologies, or acceptance of 
responsibility. 
 
Even this acknowledgement was recently challenged by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
remarks in 2007 that there was “no evidence to prove that there was coercion as 
initially suggested.” Abe's statement was widely denounced by international 
organizations and other nations.  
 
3.7.2  Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
  
Gestures and remarks made by Japan’s nationalist leaders have nullified the official 
apologies and help to explain why Japan is widely perceived as having inadequately 
addressed the past. Despite the number of apologies made, Prime Ministers Koizumi 
and Abe’s Yasukuni Shrine visits have provoked the greatest public anger in East 
Asia. Such contradictory messages and actions cast doubt on the sincerity of any 
apology, and therefore nullify its effect. 
 
For China and South Korea the most problematic issue that destroys the authenticity 
of the past apologies is that of Japanese prime ministers’ controversial visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine is where the souls of over 2.5 million war 
dead are enshrined. The shrine originated from the wishes of the new Meiji leaders to 
perform rituals for those who had died in wars for the nation.  
 
Japanese Prime Ministers and cabinet ministers have made regular visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine from 1951 onward. The problem first emerged in the 1980s when 
Yasuhiro Nakasone paid a visit in his official capacity on 15 August 1985. But it was 
not until Koizumi became prime minister that the issue developed into a diplomatic 
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problem once again. The heart of the problem is the fact that those honoured and 
worshipped there include fourteen convicted Class-A war criminals, such as Prime 
Minister Tojo Hideki.  
 
When there is a threat to the perpetrator group’s moral identity, memory would be 
used to valourize the group and restore its collective esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; 
Nadler and Shnabel, 2008). In the process of valourizing Japan, one critical memory 
that Abe and the nationalists needed to reshape was the history of humiliation 
following the judgments rendered by the Tokyo Tribunal. Recently, in a written 
message sent to an annual memorial ceremony honouring Class-A and other war 
criminals in August 2014, Abe asserted that those executed by the Allied Powers are 
“the foundation of the nation” and should be hailed for having “staked their souls to 
become the foundation of their nation so that Japan could achieve the peace and 
prosperity of today” (AJW, 2014). In his message sent to the ceremony in 2013, Abe 
further expressed his own preferences by stating, “I want to establish the existence of 
a new Japan that would not be an embarrassment to the spirit of the war dead” (AJW, 
2014). As the inscription on the statue honouring the 1,180 war criminals at the 
Yasukuni Shrine also stresses, to Abe and his supporters, the International Tribunal 
for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal) was “a harsh and retaliatory trial never before seen 
in the world” (AJW, 2014), one which needs to be denounced for the sake of 
posterity.  
 
Abe and the conservatives have repeatedly voiced their frustrations that the Japanese 
people have been forced to live far too long under the shadow of their defeat and it is 
time they restore a strong national identity with dignity and pride. From this 
perspective, it is therefore imperative that they negate the verdict of the Tokyo 
Tribunal which convicted Class A war criminals on charges of “crimes against 
peace” and “crimes against humanity” thereby erasing the stain of being 
“descendants inheriting the DNA of people who have committed heinous crimes” 
(Abe & Hyakuta, 2013, 154).  
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To the revisionists, the Class-A war criminals were victims who were unjustly 
punished under victor’s justice. Abe’s essential argument is that “the military tribunal 
was a scheme designed by the victor to impose its political judgment upon the 
vanquished and as such, it had no moral authority” (Abe, 2006, 69-70). This blatant 
glorification of Class-A war criminals in his messages demonstrate Abe’s resolve not 
only to exonerate his own grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi,1 who was imprisoned as a 
Class-A war criminal (later released) but to reject the tribunal’s verdict that the past 
war was an act of aggression.  
 
By paying obeisance and patronizing the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe and past prime 
ministers of Japan are viewed by China and South Korea as endorsing the shrine’s 
public position nullifying Japan’s past apologies, claiming that the Tokyo Tribunal 
should be rejected and “the recent great war was not a war of aggression, but a war 
of self-defense, in which the very survival of Japan was at stake and which aimed, 
moreover, at liberating Asia from European and American colonial oppression” 
(Takahashi, 2005, 115). As social identity theory suggests, in the face of shameful 
events in history, groups are driven to remember the past in ways that eliminate 
humiliating events altogether from their historical narratives (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). 
Abe and the nationalists’ efforts to honour the wartime leaders and whitewash the 
past can be interpreted as their way of defending the nation’s damaged moral status 
and replacing it with a glorious trope of which its citizens can be proud. And for 
China and South Korea, this act appears only as further evidence of Japan’s lack of 
remorse over its wartime conduct. 
 
3.7.3  Apologies nullified 
 
The table below highlights why political leaders in China and Korea feel agitated by 
the verbal apologies which are then subverted by the Japanese leaders’ nationalist 
actions. China is very insistent that 'actions speak louder than words,' especially on 
delicate questions as acknowledgement and responsibility for wartime atrocities. 
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25 September 1972: as part of the 
restoration of Sino-Japanese 
relations, expresses remorse for 
the “trouble” (meiwaku) Japan 
caused. The comments cause 
some anger because the word 
“meiwaku” does not express 
sufficient remorse. 




26 August 1982: Miyazawa 
statement on history textbooks 
Note: Miyazawa statement led to 
the adoption of “neighbouring 
countries clause” in the textbook 
screening standards of the 





22 August 1984: in Korea, 
expresses “deep remorse” (fukai 
hansei) for the trouble and 
“terrible damage” (sangai) in the 
past. 
Makes “official” worship to 
Yasukuni Shrine on 15 
August 1985, and marks the 
internationalization of the 
Yasukuni issue. 
 
July 1986: Education 
Minister Fujio Masayuki 
states, “The erroneous view 
that only Japan committed 
aggression must be 
corrected…the verdict that 
Tojo was a Class-A war 
criminal was wrong” (Fujio 
was later dismissed by 




6 March 1989: in the Diet, states 
that the “militaristic aggression” 
(gunjishugi ni yoru shinryaku) of 
our country cannot be denied. 
30 March 1989: expresses deep 
remorse and “feelings of regret” 
for colonial rule to North Korea, 





3 May 1991: At the ASEAN 
summit, Kaifu expresses deep 
remorse for the “unbearable 
suffering and sadness” (taenikui 
kurushimi to kanashimi) caused 





17 January 1992: apologizes for 
the “comfort women” on his trip 
to Korea. 
 
Made 1 secret visit to 
Yasukuni in 1992. 
Hosokawa 
Morihiro 
10 August 1993: makes a 
statement it was “an aggressive 
war and a mistake” (shinryaku 
senso). 
15 August 1993: Hosokawa 
becomes the first prime minister 
to offer condolences to Asians on 
15 August. 
6 November 1993: In Korea, 
Hosokawa lists specific Korean 
grievances such as the “comfort 
women” and comments that “as 
the aggressor” (kagaisha to shite) 
he expresses remorse and a “deep 
apology” (fukai chinsha). 
20 March 1994: In China, 






1993 Kono Statement:	Yohei 
Kono, the then Chief Cabinet 
Secretary made a statement 
regarding “the involvement of the 
military authorities” in the 
“comfort women” issue and added 
that “Japan would like to extend 
its sincere apologies and remorse 
to all those…who suffered 






15 August 1995: the Murayama 
statement (danwa) tried to salvage 
the widely criticized Japanese 
Diet statement (9 June). 
Murayama’s “personal heartfelt 
apology” became the standard for 
later apologies by Japanese prime 
ministers. 
May 1994: Justice Minister, 
Nagano Shigeto repeatedly 
objected to the term of 
Nanjing Massacre, calling 
the incident a fabrication. 
He did not deny that there 
was killing, rape and 
pillaging but he argued that 
the term “massacre” was too 
strong. He also claimed that 
“the war should not be 
called an aggression since 
Japan’s intent was to 
liberate colonies and 
establish a co-prosperity 
sphere.” Nagano was forced 
to resign and apologize. 
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12 August 1994: Sakurai 
Shin, Director General of 
the Environment Agency 
stated that Japan did not 
fight with the intention of 
waging an aggressive war, 
and thanks to Japan Asia 
could “throw off the 
shackles of colonial rule” 
(Sakurai resigned two days 
later). 
 
8 November 1995, Director 
General of the Management 
and Coordination Agency, 
Eto Takami, rejected 
Murayama’s apology 
statement and said that he 
believed “Japan also did 
good things during its 
colonial rule.” Eto was 
forced to resign. This led 
Murayama to issue a written 




26 January 1996: in the Diet, 
Hashimoto states it was 
aggression and restates the content 
of Murayama communiqué.  
23 June 1996: Hashimoto 
apologizes (owabi) to the 
“comfort women.” 
15 August 1996: Hashimoto 
expresses remorse to the Asians, 
but he also praises the soldiers 
who fought for “the security of the 
nation” and sacrificed their 
precious lives (totoi gisei). 
12 January 1997: In China, 
Hashimoto repeats the Murayama 
communiqué. 
Hashimoto’s words were 
taken with skepticism 
because of his position as 
the former head of the War 
Bereaved Association 
(izokukai), his private visits 
to Yasukuni Shrine, and his 
earlier comment that he had 
“lingering doubts about 
whether it could be called a 
war of aggression” (when 





15 August 1998: Obuchi repeats 
Hashimoto and Murayama 
position. 
8 October 1998: Obuchi expresses 
remorse (hansei) to President Kim 
Dae-jung as part of the Japan-
Republic of Korea Joint 
Declaration. 
25 November 1998: President 
Jiang Zemin visits Japan. Obuchi 
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issues a verbal apology but there 
is wrangling over a written joint 






8 October 2001: Koizumi 
expresses remorse and apology in 
China and visits the Marco Polo 
Bridge and the Anti-Japanese War 
Museum. 
15 October 2001: Koizumi 
expresses remorse and apology 
(owabi) for Japan’s colonial 
domination. 
17 September 2002: Koizumi 
acknowledges “Japan caused 
tremendous damage and suffering 
to those in Asia, and expresses ‘on 
behalf of people of 
Japan…feelings of profound 
remorse and heartfelt apology.’” 
 
Makes 5 visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine: 13 August 2001, 21 
April 2002, 14 January 




October 2006: Abe expresses an 
apology for the damage caused by 
its colonial rule of aggression. 
Abe’s apology was followed 
on the same day by a group 
of 80 LDP lawmakers’ visit 
to Yasukuni Shrine. 
 
1 March 2007: Abe stated 
that “there was no evidence 
that the Japanese 
government had kept sex 
slaves, even though the 
Japanese government had 
already admitted the use of 
brothels in 1993. The fact 
is, there is no evidence to 
prove there was coercion.” 
 
Abe claimed that the Class 
A war criminals “are not 
war criminals under the 
laws of Japan.” 
 
Abe expresses doubt on 
Murayama apology saying, 
“The Abe Cabinet is not 
necessarily keeping to it.”  
 
“There is no definitive 
answer either in academia 
or in the international 
community on what 
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constitutes aggression. 
Things that happened 
between countries appear 
different depending on 
which side you’re looking 
from.” 
 
December 2013, Abe makes 
a surprise visit to Yasukuni 
Shrine 
 14 August 2015, Abe issued his 
statement on the 70th anniversary of the 
Second World War in which he 
expressed “deepest remorse” and 
“sincere condolences” to wartime 
victims both home and abroad. 
Abe at the same time 
stressed that Japan has 
“repeatedly expressed the 
feelings of deep remorse 
and heartfelt apology for its 
actions during the war” and 
that future generations 
should not be obliged to 
apologize for Japan’s 
wartime actions 70 years 
ago. 
 
Abe sent a monetary 
offering to Yasukuni Shrine 
the following day on August 
15 on the 70th anniversary 
of the end of World War II. 
15 August 2015: Three 
cabinet ministers—Haruko 
Arimura, state minister for 
women’s empowerment, 
Sakae Takaichi, minister for 
internal affairs and 
communications, and Eriko 
Yamatani, minister in 
charge for the abduction 
issue—paid their visits to 
Yasukuni Shrine. 
66 Diet members also 








3.7.4  Abe’s war anniversary statement 
 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 14 August 2015 statement marking the seventieth 
anniversary of the end of World War II was issued at a sensitive time when tensions 
were rising in Japan’s diplomatic relations with its neighbouring countries in 
Northeast Asia. As China and Korea closely watched the outcome of the war 
anniversary statement, South Korean President Park Geun-hye expressed her hopes 
that Prime Minister Abe's statement would uphold the views held by past cabinets on 
wartime history "to show the Japanese government's mature attitude in trying to 
make a fresh start in relationships with neighbouring countries, including us" 
(Reuters, 2015). Abe’s statement was drafted as he juggled conflicting priorities, 
amidst pressure to appease both his conservative supporters and the approval of the 
pacifist-leaning coalition parter, Komeito. The resulting anniversary statement drew 
mixed responses from both camps. One key issue was whether Abe’s seventieth 
anniversary statement would continue the legacy of the landmark fiftieth war 
anniversary statement made by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 in 
which he expressed “feelings of deep remorse” and a “heartfelt apology” for Japan’s 
“colonial rule and aggression.” Ten years later, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
repeated the same expressions in his own statement. Abe referred to the statements of 
his predecessors stating that “Such positions articulated by the previous cabinets will 
remain unshakable into the future.” This could be taken as a compromise for Abe and 
his conservative cohorts who have repeatedly questioned the rulings of the Tokyo 
War Crimes Tribunal that singled out Japan to be guilty of aggressive war. 
 
Chinese and South Korean leaders were far from satisfied with Abe’s war 
anniversary statement. According to the Asahi Shimbun, China’s first vice foreign 
minister Zhang Yesui summoned the Japanese Ambassador to convey Beijing’s 
stance on the issue. “Japan must clearly explain the nature of its war of aggression, 
as well as its responsibility for the war, while also making a sincere apology to the 
peoples of nations that suffered from the war. It should not try to gloss over this 
important and fundamental issue” (AJW, 2015b). Chinese, Korean media and left-
leaning groups in Japan also criticized it as a step back from the Murayama 
Statement for not including a more explicit acknowledgement of Japan’s actions. 
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Although Abe’s statement repeated several of Murayama’s key phrases, it was 
criticized for its ambiguity in failing to clarify the scope of Japan’s responsibilities 
during the war. For example, Abe used the word “aggression” without clarifying 
whose aggression he was referring to: “Incident, aggression, war —we shall never 
again resort to any form of the threat of use of force as a means of settling 
international disputes. We shall abandon colonial rule forever and respect the right of 
self-determination of all people throughout the world” (Abe, 2015). 
 
South Korean leaders were dissatisfied with the indirect use of terms, particularly 
“aggression.” Another issue that was raised by Korean officials was the indirect 
reference made to “comfort women” as “women behind the battlefields whose honor 
and dignity were severely injured.” He failed to acknowledge that Japanese military 
authorities coerced tens of thousands of Asian women to work as sex slaves, a claim 
he has consistently denied. 
 
Although Abe did include such key words as “aggression,” “colonial domination,” 
“deep remorse” and “apology,” Murayama dismissed his successor’s anniversary 
statement for not having upheld the spirit of his 1995 statement. At a news 
conference following Abe’s delivery of the statement, Murayama made critical 
remarks regarding the ambiguity and indirect language. He said Abe’s address did 
not make clear for which actions Japan was apologizing (AJW, 2015a).  
 
Another area of focus was whether the Prime Minister would express “apology” for 
Japan’s actions seventy years ago. Abe in fact expressed “feelings of profound grief” 
and “eternal, sincere condolences” to the victims of war at home and abroad in his 
statement. However, these words of remorse were questioned by Japan’s neighbours 
when he stressed that “Japan has repeatedly expressed the feelings of deep remorse 
and heartfelt apology for its actions during the war” (Abe, 2015). He further added 
that “We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to 
come, who have nothing to do with the war, be predestined to apologize. Even so, we 
Japanese, across generations, must squarely face history. We have a responsibility to 
inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.” To suggest that Japan 
 74 
has done enough apologizing reflects not only the conservatives’ position: according 
to the recent Pew survey, more than 50% of the Japanese public feel that they have 
apologized enough.  
 
Critical Chinese and Korean media questioned the sincerity of Abe’s apology 
pointing out to his attempt to use “rhetorical twists” to appease both the conservative 
camp and critics in China and South Korea. Xinhua news agency described Abe’s 
war anniversary statement as “rife with rhetorical twists” and “carefully calibrated 
context into which he has embedded those too-fundamental-to-avoid terms, the 
apology was diluted one at best, thus marking only a crippled start to build trust 
among its neighbors (Xinhua.net, 14 August 2015). As mentioned in the earlier 
section, specificity of the wrongdoing is a critical element that makes a national 
apology genuine (Tavuchis, 1991). Abe’s statement failed to satisfy the victimized 
nations with his ambiguous rhetoric that avoided specifying the nature of the 
wrongdoing and who was responsible for it. 
 
3.8  Conclusion 
Unresolved and unacknowledged harm, historical memory and identity-based needs 
generate deep contextual dynamics that protract tensions and conflict in East Asia. 
This chapter has examined some of the factors underlying the victim nations’ 
rejection of the perpetrator’s apologies and explained why both China and South 
Korea are dissatisfied that Japan’s expression of remorse is not 'genuine and sincere.' 
Sincerity of an official apology requires the appearance of consistency and consensus 
in government statements, actions and institutions. Many scholars have highlighted 
the insincerity of Japanese apologies as each one becomes subverted by a steady 
stream of cabinet officials visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. This insincerity is further 
exacerbated by conservative politicians seeking to revise history by denying or 
minimizing the impact of Japanese wartime atrocities. Revisionist history especially 
in the area of textbooks is another indication of insincerity on the part of the 
Japanese government.  
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Given the current tense relationships between China, Korea and Japan, it is 
imperative that ripe conditions are established for the giving and receiving of 
apologies considered acceptable to China and Korea. Some of these conditions have 
been mapped out in this chapter. The most important of which, however, is that 
official apologies are not subverted by provocative subversion of the statement by 




4.  Context: Japan’s Identity Crisis and Sino-Japanese Relations 
 
[The chapter ‘Japan’s identity crisis and Sino-Japanese relations’ was published in: 
Mullins, M., & Nakano, K. (Eds.) (2015). Disasters and social crisis in 
contemporary Japan: Political, religious, and cultural responses. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.] 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The social crises of the 1990s and the disastrous earthquake of March 2011 served to 
undermine the confidence, sense of security and positive self-esteem of many 
Japanese. This chapter examines the resurgence of nationalist discourse in Japan as 
an effort to reinterpret, reshape and restore what is perceived as Japan’s damaged 
reputation. The rise of nationalist discourse in Japan is an attempt to deal with 
Japan’s identity crisis in the face of insecurity and anxieties generated by economic 
stagnation, natural disasters, and increasing competition with China. Japanese elite's 
revamping of Japan’s national identity as a proud, beautiful, and strong nation fuels 
tension with China. Drawing on social identity theory, I will explore some of the 
drivers of the Sino-Japanese 'history problem'. 
 
Growing anxieties about China’s economic rivalry, potential threats from its rapid 
and opaque military buildup, the intrusion by Chinese submarines into Japanese 
territorial waters, and the unilateral declaration of an Air Defence Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) by China have contributed to growing divisions between China and Japan. 
Many scholars agree, however, that the underlying driver of this division is the gulf 
between each nation’s interpretation of the past. China and Japan are caught in a 
vicious cycle that is fuelled by conflicts over history. Every example of Japan 
‘forgetting’ its role as perpetrator in World War II catalyses a resurgence of 
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nationalist fervor in China. Chinese and Korean criticisms of Japan for its denial of 
the past serve to deepen Japanese resentment towards these countries and increases 
tensions in the bilateral and trilateral relationships.  
 
National or ethnic identities are shaped in large part by certain struggles or glorious 
achievements a group has experienced (Volkan, 1997). Social identity and social 
categorization theories posit that the more important a group identity is to the self, 
identification with that group or nation becomes a source of individual pride and 
self-esteem (Tajfel, 1986). Past studies have demonstrated that high national 
identification may be oriented to a more right-wing political stance (Doosje et al., 
1998). Individuals who identify highly with the nation are likely to collectively 
‘forget’ the nation’s past injustices and attempt to distinguish the nation by glorifying 
its past or by enhancing memories of its past victimization (Bilali and Ross, 2012, 
128). Ruling elites who strongly identify with the nation are therefore prone to 
construct narratives that bolster solidarity and protect the nation’s positive identity. 
 
In the light of this research on how national identities are formed or reshaped, this 
chapter will explore the ways in which a quest for positive self-esteem and a proud 
identity has driven Japan’s conservative elites to elevate its ‘Chosen Glory’ 
(narratives and myths as well as its ‘Chosen Trauma’ (shared mental representation 
of a group’s massive trauma that drives narratives of victimhood and humiliation) 
myths, both working to construct a collective memory that serves nationalist and 
neo-nationalist aspirations (Volkan 1997, 48-49). These narratives of ‘Chosen Glory; 
and ‘Chosen Trauma’ have strengthened Japanese conservative efforts to bolster the 
nation’s self-esteem after a series of social crises and natural disasters from the 
1990s onward. 
 
4.2  Japan’s Identity Crisis  
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’ generated a mood 
of deep insecurity and a desire to develop a new Japanese sense of identity and 
purpose. The 1990s was a ‘lost decade’ for Japan as the nation experienced the worst 
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political and economic crisis since the end of the war. Economic stagnation and the 
collapse of stock and real estate markets meant that Japan was no longer a 
developmental model for the world. Nonperforming loans mounted to more than one 
trillion dollars and dozens of financial institutions declared bankruptcy. Pyle states 
that as Japan suffered from the breakdown of its economic system, its international 
stature dramatically diminished (Pyle 2007, 6). 
 
Moody’s Investors Service in 2002 downgraded Japanese government bonds 
one grade below the African nation of Botswana. For the status conscious 
Japanese to be rated below a country that was a recipient of Japanese aid 
provoked public outrage. 
 
Japan’s international status as a miraculous economic superpower was further 
challenged by the rise of China. Economic stagnation produced other identity-
threatening results. Until the 1990s, Japan’s international identity was enhanced by 
substantial economic assistance and advice given to countries in Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere. In 1991, Tokyo provided US$ 13 billion for the United Nations operation 
in the Gulf War. However, the economic downturn deprived successive Japanese 
governments of the funds needed to finance 'aid diplomacy'. 
 
The prolonged recession deprived Tokyo of economic largesse—both in the 
form of overseas development assistance and overseas private-sector 
business networks—which were used to compensate for its refusal to use the 
military as an instrument of state power. (Glosserman & Snyder, 2008, 4).  
 
This undermined Japan’s status in the international community and diminished its 
diplomatic influence, as the country was no longer viewed as a great power to be 
reckoned with. 
 
On the domestic front, Japan faced various developments that further threatened its 
postwar identity as a model state. The 1990s was a time when the Japanese people 
faced a shocking failure of what they always believed to be the most secure and 
stable social system in the world. Such national crises as the Hanshin earthquake and 
the Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway revealed weaknesses in the 
‘Japanese system.’ “The earthquake that devastated one of the largest metropolitan 
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areas in the country…also became a striking symbol of the government’s 
bureaucratic rigidity and ineptitude in crisis management” (Yoda and Harootunian 
2006, 20). Japanese bureaucracy, once hailed as critical to economic growth, became 
a source of media scandals because of its corruption, greed and ineptitude, leading to 
further loss of public confidence. Japan was no longer the envy of the world, a model 
of a robust economy, with an effective bureaucracy and secure social system. As 
Japan struggled desperately to regain its economic and political standing, The Great 
East Japan Earthquake hit Japan’s northeast coast on 11 March 2011. It was an 
unprecedented catastrophe in which the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and enormous 
tsunami led to unimaginable social and nuclear havoc.  
 
Allison (2013) states that when the earthquake hit on March 11, 2011, Japan was 
already struggling with social 'precarity' and vulnerability. Japanese society 
following the 'lost decades,' as Kingston (2004) notes, was also crippled by ongoing 
problems such as falling birthrates, growing unemployment, homelessness, a rising 
suicide rate and increasing crime. Allison further portrays the 'precarity' of Japanese 
society after the burst of the bubble economy with the following sobering statistics: 
 
Today one-third of the labor force but one half of youth between the ages of 
15 and 24 and 70% of women work in irregular employment: part time, 
contract, dispatch, day labor.…In a country where employment secures not 
only livelihood but one’s place in the social—identity, safety net, status—
the un(der)employed are materially precarious and socially dead….(Allison, 
2012, 345) 
 
As these numbers suggest, Japan was already facing severe social malaise and 
instability before the earthquake hit. The earthquake and tsunami only reinforced the 
inherent vulnerability of Japan. The country suffered from a lack of strong 
leadership, made worse by a sclerotic and decrepit political system. With the nuclear 
meltdown unresolved, the Japanese people live with a deep uncertainty about the 
actual risks of the radioactive leakage from Fukushima.  
 
Although much of the discourse of the March 11 earthquake also emphasized the 
social solidarity (kizuna) of the Japanese people, a year after the disaster, 86 percent 
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of Japanese were dissatisfied with the state of Japanese politics, 60 percent of 
Japanese disapproved of the government’s recovery efforts and only 7 percent were 
optimistic about the economic situation. 5  The March 11 earthquake exposed on 
various levels the precarity of a society in crisis and further deepened the insecurity 
of a people already demoralized by two decades of economic stagnation and 
deflation. The pressing demands about how to respond to a series of crises led 
Japan’s political elites to engage in discussion on the need to not only reshape its 
national interests but even its national identity. 
 
4.4  Abe’s Vision of 'Chosen Glory' 
The gradual resurgence of nationalistic sentiments amongst Japanese can be seen as a 
response to their fragile, spoiled identities and a desire to be identified with 
something stronger and more glorious. Nakano observes that Japan has been 
constantly moving rightward over the past decades with the “shifting pendulum 
dynamics of the elite-driven process of rightward shift obscuring the shift itself” 
(Nakano, 2014). Obscure or not, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō returned to office in 
2012, this time with greater intensity and a resolve to rid Japan of its sense of defeat 
and reestablish Japanese pride and collective self-esteem. Thomas Berger (2014) 
adds that “one of the root causes of Japan’s current difficulties is a loss of self-
confidence. They [conservative politicians] see restoring Japan’s ‘confidence’ as vital 
to getting the country back on track.…Abe wants to convince Japan—and the 
world—that ‘Japan is back.’”  
 
In a February 2013 Statesmen’s forum at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS), in Washington D.C., Abe stated in his opening remarks:  
 
Last year, Richard Armitage, Joseph Nye, Michael Green and others 
published a paper about Japan. They asked if Japan would end up becoming 
a tier two nation. Secretary Armitage, here is my answer to you: Japan is not 
and will never be a tier two country. That is the core message I'm here to 
                                                
5 Data is from Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes & Trends Survey Report released 
June 5, 2012. http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/06/05/japanese-wary-of-nuclear-energy/ 
 81 
make, and I should repeat it by saying I am back and [laughter, applause] 
and thank you and so shall Japan be. (Abe, 2013) 
 
This is the statement of a Prime Minister dedicated to ensuring that Japan will not 
slip down in world systems rankings from tier one to tier two. Abe Shinzo has 
returned to make sure Japan is back, and this time with a revamped national identity.  
 
The vision of 'Chosen Glory' that Abe Shinzō is advocating is reflected in his book 
Utsukushi kuni e (Toward a beautiful Japan: My vision of Japan), a nation in which 
the Japanese people can take pride in their nation’s achievements, tradition and 
autonomy. Abe has been quite clear with his goals from the outset, and one of them is 
to “cast off the post-war regime.” Abe and fellow nationalists are on a mission to 
discard the masochist view of Japan’s war history which asserts that “the nation had 
engaged in immoral, unjustifiable, and illegitimate wars of aggression against its 
neighbours and that Japan well deserved the punishment it received based on the 
verdicts of the Tokyo Tribunal following its defeat in the Second World War” (Akaha 
2008, 157). They are frustrated that the verdicts of the Tokyo Tribunal and the 
postwar regime imposed by the United States have denied and destroyed all sense of 
national pride and esteem in the Japanese people. They further blame the postwar 
educational system for having implanted a sense of defeat and created a population 
that has been forced to live in shame. 
 
Abe also feels that Japan’s post-war pacifism, represented by the war-renouncing 
Article 9 of the constitution supported by Japan’s leftist intellectuals, allowed other 
countries like the United States to restrain Japanese power and influence in the 
world. Abe and his supporters therefore believe it is imperative that Japan’s identity 
be renewed as a 'normal nation,' disengaged from the US security umbrella and 
equipped with a more robust and autonomous military. To this end, they believe that 
the outdated Peace Constitution needs to be revised. To the nationalists, Japan’s 
Pacifist Constitution is a reminder of their humiliating defeat in the last war and of 
post-war Japanese subservience towards the United States. Essentially, Abe is 
determined to restore the glory of Japan as a strong, tier one nation with economic, 
military and diplomatic power (Clements, 2017).  
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In 2013, Abe implemented security-related changes which he described as a move 
from “passive pacifism” to “proactive pacifism.” These were aimed at enabling 
Japan to become more involved in international cooperation and peace building in 
the world. He set up the Japanese National Security Council followed by the 
establishment of the first National Security Strategy and the National Defense 
Program Guidelines. In December 2013, the government announced that $239 billion 
was to be spent for the Mid-Term Defense Program. Around the same time, Abe’s 
government forced through the Diet the new State Secrecy Law. Although concerns 
have been expressed by liberal intellectuals that this law poses a serious threat to 
democracy and the fundamental constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, “the 
law is an integral part of Mr. Abe’s crusade to remake Japan into a ‘beautiful 
country’”(New York Times, December 16, 2013). This goal envisions expanded 
government power over the people and reduced protection for individual rights—a 
strong state supported by a patriotic people. Despite strong public protest, Abe 
successfully reinterpreted the constitution to allow for the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense. In 2015, his goal was to change Article 9 of the pacifist 
constitution, which would enable him to complete his agenda to cast off the shackles 
of the postwar regime. In his statement commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of 
the enactment of the Japanese Constitution, Abe stated his agenda as follows: 
  
....while we continue to uphold the fundamental principles of the present     
Constitution as abiding values, a bold review all the way back to its origins 
and an in-depth discussion of the Constitution toward realizing a new Japan 
will lead to a spirit of laying the path to a new era (Abe, 2007).  
 
China’s aggressive moves on the Islands, dispatching patrol planes and boats and 
unilaterally establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone makes many Japanese 
fearful of China’s short and long term intentions. This shift in negative public 
perception justifies rightist claims that the Constitution needs to be revised. Abe and 
his supporters’ long-awaited ambition is to legitimate the use of military force and 
reestablish Japan as a stronger, more self-reliant, autonomous country that shines 
with dignity and pride.  
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Volkan defines 'Chosen Glory' as a group’s future vision which induces a sense of 
success, pride and triumph. From this perspective, Japan’s past UN diplomacy can 
also be seen as an integral part of Japan’s attempts to be recognized as a great power 
and restore its esteem. Japanese conservatives have long been dissatisfied with 
Japan’s current position in the United Nations, which they feel fails to fully reflect 
Japan’s economic power and rising political status in the world. Despite the fact that 
Japan makes a significant financial contribution to the UN, it feels it has been 
excluded from the “great power club” (Li, 2008, 115). Being a permanent member of 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would serve Abe’s agenda well as 
Japan would be expected to be more responsible for maintaining international peace 
and security, which could include UN sponsored military deployment and 
peacekeeping missions. Securing a seat in the UNSC therefore serves Abe and the 
conservative politicians’ motive to revise the pacifist constitution and become a 
normal military power. China’s vociferous opposition to Japan’s bid to gain a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council is particularly irritating to Japanese 
nationalist elites who see it as a threat to the positive national identity they are 
striving to build.   
 
4.4  'Chosen Glory' of the War Criminals  
Social identity theory posits that in a time of crisis, when there is a threat to a group’s 
identity, memory is used to valourize the group and restore its collective esteem. As 
identity is challenged, undermined, or possibly shattered, so memories are drawn on 
and reshaped to defend unity and coherence, to shore up a sense of self and 
community (Bell, 2006, 6). In the process of valourizing Japan, one critical memory 
that Abe needed to reshape was the history of humiliation following the judgements 
rendered by the Tokyo Tribunal. 
 
Abe’s sentiment is also shared by Matsudaira Nagayoshi, the chief priest of Yasukuni 
Shrine who carried out the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in 1978: 
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Even before I became the chief priest of Yasukuni, I have always argued that 
Japan’s spiritual revival will not be possible unless we reject the Tokyo 
Tribunal which placed the entire blame on Japan (Matsudaira, 1992, 162-
71). 
 
By paying obeisance and patronizing the Yasukuni Shrine, Abe and former prime 
ministers of Japan are viewed by China and other Asian neighbours as endorsing the 
shrine’s public position that Japan was not at fault, the Tokyo Tribunal should be 
rejected and “the recent great war was not a war of aggression, but a war of self-
defense, in which the very survival of Japan was at stake and which aimed, 
moreover, at liberating Asia from European and American colonial oppression” 
(Takahashi, 2005, 115). Groups are driven to remember the past in ways that 
eliminate shameful and humiliating events from their historical narratives (Bar-Tal et 
al., 2009). Nationalist efforts to honour wartime leaders and whitewash the past can 
be interpreted as their way of replacing Japan’s damaged moral status with a glorious 
trope that its citizens can be proud of. And for China and South Korea, this act only 
appears as further evidence of Japan’s lack of remorse over its wartime conduct. 
 
4.5  The Japanese Textbook Controversy 
History books are key to the construction and reconstruction of national narratives 
that develop a group’s collective identity and its positive distinctiveness. Michael 
Apple argues that the selection and organization of school curricula is an ideological 
process that serves the interests of particular classes and social groups (Apple, 1992, 
8). Textbooks are often used as ideological tools to promote a certain belief system 
and legitimize an established political and social order. “Ever since the rise of the 
nation-state, history textbooks have been used by states as instruments for glorifying 
the nation, consolidating its national identity, and justifying particular forms of social 
and political systems” (Apple and Christian-Smith, 1991, 10). Social identity 
theorists claim that as a way of maintaining positive self-concept and esteem, 
individuals tend to prefer favourable historical portrayals of their group. Group 
members are therefore motivated to reinterpret or silence events of the past that 




As the social crises of the 1990s eroded the Japanese people’s confidence, pride and 
security, a powerful neo-nationalist discourse emerged offering the promise of 
“renewed pride and purpose through a reconnection with the unalloyed (and 
unpolluted) Japanese spirit as it existed in the traditional past” (Nathan, 2004, 122).  
 
The 1990s were also a time of huge political shifts. In 1993, the long rule of the 
conservative Liberal Democratic Party was replaced by the Japan New Party and the 
new Prime Minister, Hosokawa Morihiro, made clear-cut public statements on the 
Asia-Pacific War: “I personally recognize it as a war of aggression, a mistaken war.” 
In 1995, Hosokawa’s successor, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, issued a 
statement to China and other Asian nations containing formal expressions of apology 
and regret. This spurred Japanese right-wing political movements and various 
revisionist groups to go on the offensive to counter the revisionist trend. These 
conservative actions spanned a wide range, from academic efforts to revise history 
textbooks, to popular nationalist mangas that portrayed Japan’s imperialist past in a 
positive light and presented highly contentious positions on issues such as the 
Nanjing Massacre and 'comfort women.' 
 
In 1993, a committee (Rekishi kentō iinkai) was formed with more than a hundred 
senior members of the Liberal Democratic Party to review history textbooks. Their 
objective was to publish a new textbook claiming that the Greater East War was one 
of self-defense and liberation, that the Nanjing Massacre and accounts of the comfort 
women were fabrications, and that a new textbook battle was necessary in light of 
the emphasis on damage and invasion in recent textbooks (Rose, 2005, 19). The 
conservative political elites of Japan were not prepared to incorporate Japanese war 
crimes into the national narrative and collective memory. And in constructing this 
'bright' narrative, it was essential for them to exclude the 'dark' chapters of Japan’s 
wartime history and to reinterpret the war in a positive way (Saaler, 2005, 25).  
 
The key group at the centre of the textbook debate was the Japanese Society for 
History Textbook Reform (Tsukuru-kai). This group launched a campaign to 
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challenge the “masochistic” view of Japanese history and build a “proud and 
confident Japan.” The nationalist group’s main concern was that postwar Japanese 
education is afflicted by a self-negating view of Japanese history, written “to reflect 
the combined perspectives of the Asian nations’ hatred of Japan, and the national 
interests of the Western Allies” (Fujioka, 1996, 2). In terms of specific issues, it was 
the mention of comfort women in junior high-school textbooks that provoked the 
group to campaign for a rewriting of Japan’s history. The group argued that there was 
no such thing as comfort women. These women were not forcibly recruited by the 
army, but were prostitutes, and prostitution was not illegal in pre-war Japan. The 
rightist camp argued that the mentioning of “comfort women” in school texts would 
lead to “the spiritual degeneration of the Japanese state” (Tawara, 1997, 2). The 
group also questioned the validity of the Nanjing Massacre, doubting the accuracy of 
the estimates of victim statistics. On the ground of inconsistency of such figures, the 
group claimed that the massacre may not have happened at all (Fujioka, 1996, 22). 
The Tsukuru-kai’s new history textbook, which represented the revisionists’ agenda, 
was finally approved in 2001 after many officially-requested revisions. The textbook 
itself remained a marginal presence with the adoption rate being considerably low 
among schools in Japan; however, it nonetheless became an object of deep 
contention for China and South Korea. 
 
The motivation of the revisionists is explained in Prime Minister Abe’s dialogue with 
the novelist, Hyakuta Naoki (Abe & Hyakuta, 2013, 152-54):  
 
What is the purpose of teaching pure and innocent children fabricated lies 
[by China and South Korea] about “300,000 massacred in Nanjing” or 
“Forced sexual slavery of the comfort women”?....it only serves to make the 
children become disillusioned by their country, hate their ancestors and 
become ashamed of their evil conducts. That will lead to an even more 
horrifying outcome. It will rob them of a sense of pride to live as worthy 
individuals.  
 
If succeeding generations are to restore national esteem in Japan, Abe and fellow 
nationalists feel it is imperative that they omit dark episodes of the past that might 
demoralize the nation. This goal is also driving Abe and his supporters to reform the 
postwar education system, which they believe was designed by the US occupation to 
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disempower the Japanese in the second half of the twentieth century. Abe’s recent 
educational reforms are aimed at replacing what he thinks of as a degenerate 
education system with one that teaches morality and patriotism, and which will 
encourage future generations to serve their country with pride (Abe, 2006). 
 
4.6  Narratives of Victimhood and 'Chosen Trauma' 
The term 'Chosen Trauma' refers to the collective memory of an episode that has 
caused the group to feel victimized. Myths about suffering and humiliation resulting 
from historical events are as essential to group identity as chosen glories. The 
memory of victimhood becomes transferred through socialization processes to 
successive generations and becomes heavily mythologized and at times manipulated 
by powerful elites (Volkan, 2001). A sense of victimhood protects group members’ 
collective self-esteem and prevents feelings of guilt for committing harmful acts 
against the other group. Victimhood narratives constructed and promoted by Japan’s 
ruling elites have strategically served to minimize the consequences of the nation’s 
historical injustices. 
 
Various scholars claim that post-war narratives encouraged the Japanese people to 
identify themselves as victims and diverted their attention from their nation’s 
wartime aggression by blaming the military regime for their victimization (Orr, 
2001; Yoshida, 2005). They point out that this mythology of victimhood was 
developed with the help of the United States. The Tokyo Tribunal exonerated the 
Emperor from all war responsibility, and enabled the Japanese to become victims at 
the hands of the militarists. The ordinary people came to see themselves as having 
been “duped by leaders who started a war that could not be won” (Fujiwara, 2006, 
149). The Japanese narrative of victimhood is essentially a discourse narrated by 
non-combatants, where only Japanese civilians appear as victims of war.  
 
The most salient victimhood narrative for the Japanese is the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Orr (2001, 6) examines the atomic victimhood narrative as 
 88 
the driving force behind Japanese post-war peace movements, giving the Japanese a 
unique sense of mission to protest against the use of nuclear weapons. 
 
The vision of the Japanese as innocent war victims reached its purest 
expression in the public dialogue over nuclear weapons. The Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki bombings privileged the Japanese nation with an exclusive claim 
to leadership in the ban-the-bomb movement and provided the country with 
its first powerfully unifying national myth after the defeat.  
 
This victim mentality came to dominate Japanese public memory via popular cultural 
products such as literature, film and arts. A large proportion of post-war literature on 
pacifism is devoted to the wartime sufferings of Japanese civilians from massive air 
raids and atomic bombs. Hotaru no Haka, an animated drama film produced by 
Studio Ghibli in 1988, more widely known by its English title, The Grave of the 
Fireflies, elicited a deep identification of viewers with the innocent victims of the 
war. Set in Kobe in 1945, it is a realistic drama based on an autobiographical essay 
by Nosaka Akiyuki, which focuses on the suffering and eventual starvation deaths of 
fourteen-year-old Seita and his four-year-old sister, Setsuko. The film vividly 
portrays its child protagonists as passive and pitiful victims of chance and reinforces 
in the public mind the horrors and tragedies of war experienced by civilians. It also 
attempts to construct an ideology of victimhood and loss that allows for a national 
identity in which the loss of the war gives depth to the Japanese soul (Landsberg, 
2004, 173). The historical narratives of civilian victimization “cancel out 
responsibility for Pearl Harbor and simply glosses over the colonization of Korea and 
the previous ten years of aggression against China” (163).  
 
The Japanese victimhood narrative in mainstream media accentuates the suffering of 
the innocent civilians of the homelands, i.e. the sight of the burnt wastelands and 
women and children fleeing in flames. The resulting victim consciousness makes it 
difficult for individuals to view things from the rival group’s perspective, empathize 
with their suffering and accept responsibility for the harm inflicted by its own group 




The historical narrative that has been canonized and passed down there 
focuses on the death and suffering of Japanese soldiers and Japan’s civilian 
population, omitting the death, suffering and destruction endured by other 
Asians at the hands of the Japanese during the years of World War II. The 
younger generation thus mostly views Japan as a victim of the war, not the 
perpetrator or aggressor. A result of this self-perception of victimhood is that 
many Japanese find it psychologically disorienting to be asked to recognize 
the victimhood of others, especially when it involves admitting the 
unfamiliar responsibility of Japan as victimizer and perpetrator.  
 
Japanese victim mentality is a key issue that sits at the heart of the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. Yoshida (2005, 59) states that Japan’s postwar public discourse on war was 
about ordinary citizens having been deceived by a handful of “bad militarists” thus 
leading to the narrative of a victimized nation. Dissatisfied with the common claim 
that “Japanese victim consciousness” is a conservative tactic to avoid responsibility, 
Orr (2001, 13) argues that “a victim mindset simply does not fit the style of proud, 
self-consciously virile conservatives…” Seaton (2007, 26) also questions, “since 
judgments about the responsibility remain open to debate, victim consciousness 
cannot act as a truly unifying factor in the context of war memories.” As he posits, 
there may be multiple victim consciousnesses or victim mentalities depending on 
how high or low an individual identifies with a collective called Japan. To 
understand the role victimhood plays in the high identifiers’ agenda to restore proud 
Japan, it is necessary to examine how a group’s moral standing generates high or low 
levels of in-group identification. Studies have shown that perpetrators feel that their 
identity as moral actors is threatened when faced with accusations about harms done 
to out-groups (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Hence, they would be driven to reduce 
that threat by denying the consequences of their past actions and the moral 
responsibility for having caused them. This is because victim status affords a certain 
amount of moral license (Sullivan et al. 2012). Another tactic groups may employ is 
to distance themselves from the suffering of the victimized out-group by 
“dehumanizing” and belittling them, and legitimizing the consequences on the basis 
that the out-group deserved them. Victimhood, therefore, is not a status for the weak, 
it is a status that gives a group high moral standing and a means to protect itself from 
feeling inferior in the face of shameful episodes in history. 
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4.6.1  Victimhood narrative of the kamikaze pilots  
 
Kingston (2014) argues that Abe is waging a culture war to redefine Japanese 
national identity, one that he thinks is grossly masochistic. Hyakuta Naoki, the author 
of the best-selling novel Eien no Zero [The Eternal Zero], is a powerful ally of Abe 
in this cultural undertaking. He shares Abe and the rightists’ sentiment that there is a 
need to encourage the downcast country of Japan and to urge its people not to lose 
pride in being Japanese. Eien no Zero sold four million copies (as of February 2014) 
and the film adaptation of the novel, known by its English title The Eternal Zero, 
grossed 8.5 billion yen and topped the Japanese box office for eight consecutive 
weeks since its release in December 2013, becoming one of Japan’s top ten most 
successful films of all time. Internet reviewers have recommended “everyone who 
has no knowledge of the war to go see this,” and warned that several handkerchiefs 
will be required as “one will be moved to tears.” Abe Shinzo not only publicly 
commented that “he was moved,” but according to a Japan Times article on February 
20, 2014, his wife, Abe Akie also wrote: “I couldn’t stop crying.…The film made me 
really think how we should never wage war again, and we should never ever waste 
precious lives that were lost for the sake of their country.”  
 
The tale of victimhood of the Zero fighter pilot in The Eternal Zero is different from 
those of kamikaze pilots glorified as willing fighters dying heroically for the 
Emperor and their country as depicted in conventional rightist narratives. The hero of 
the story, Miyabe Kyuzo, is determined to return home alive to fulfil the promise he 
made to his wife and daughter. He openly admits that he doesn’t want to die, and 
despite being an outstanding fighter pilot, he is despised by some of his comrades 
and superiors as a coward.  
 
The story humanizes kamikaze pilots as ordinary people who felt fear, despair and 
wanted to live to return to their loved ones. Thus it strikes a chord of sympathy with 
today’s audience and makes the tale more relevant and engrossing. Nonaka Hiromu, 
former secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic party, also admitted that he was 
moved to tears in his interview with Asahi Shimbun (14 August 2012): 
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I read Eien no Zero, a novel about kamikaze pilots, twice last year with 
tears. I went to see its movie adaptation and wept for the third time, but was 
disillusioned later to learn that Naoki Hyakuta, author of that work, is not 
opposed to war but is looking in the opposite direction and is calling for 
powerful Japan. I regretted very much that I had wept.  
 
It is uncertain how many people are aware that Hyakuta Naoki is one of the new 
board members that Abe personally appointed to the NHK [Japan’s national public 
broadcasting corporation]. It is also unknown how many know that Hyakuta made a 
controversial statement that the “Nanjing Massacre is a fabrication.” In his published 
dialogue with Abe Shinzō titled “Bloom proudly, Oh Japan, bloom in the heart of the 
world,” Hyakuta describes Abe as a hero, “the Ace player who has returned to launch 
a counterattack and save Japan from the crisis” (Abe and Hyakuta, 2013, 164). Both 
Abe and Hyakuta (2013) agree that during wars, some military personnel may have 
committed cruel acts, but that is not a situation peculiar to the Japanese. They feel 
that it makes no sense to teach such “masochistic” history to children who are still in 
compulsory education. They urge that what first needs to be taught to children is 
“what a wonderful nation Japan is, and instill in them a sense of pride and 
confidence” (152-154). Eien no Zero was written with the aim of reminding the 
Japanese not only of the horrors of war but of the heroism of the soldiers who 
sacrificed their lives for Japan despite their anguish and fears. The book wraps the 
tale of victimhood in a heart-wrenching narrative framed as a message of peace that 
appeals to the Japanese ear.  
 
The narrative of victimhood of the kamikaze pilots woven into Hyakuta’s novel and 
presented in the museums dedicated to memorialise these young pilots’ heroism (e.g., 
Yushukan on the grounds of Yasukuni Shrine and Chiran Peace Museum in Minami 
Kyushu) is personalized, and the pilots are humanized as 'ordinary' people who 
courageously died to protect their homeland. What is excluded from these 
sentimental narratives is the inhumaneness of the military strategy that forced these 
young, innocent citizens to sacrifice their lives for suicidal attacks to satisfy the 
Imperial agenda, and the many American lives that were lost as a result of these 
brutal tactics.  
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In the past, extreme right-wing discourse was marginal and out of touch with 
Japanese mainstream thinking. Rightist narratives advocating imperial jingoism or 
hatred towards minorities were basically frowned upon and dismissed. However, 
Hyakuta’s Eien no Zero has demonstrated that when the message is packaged 
appropriately, it can effectively enter the mainstream market. Abe and his allies are 
gradually changing the marginal right-wing discourse to become a dominant 
discourse with the potential for public acceptance.  
4.7  Conclusion 
As we have seen, nationalist discourse in Japan, based on its chosen glories and 
traumas, emerged as the country and its people struggled to restore their pride and 
positive identity following decades of social malaise and economic impasse. 
Although the Japanese public is not necessarily in support of Abe’s constitutional 
amendments, or rewriting of history, his rhetoric about building a stronger Japan 
against threats like China and North Korea resonate with many members of the 
public.  
 
China and Japan share a conflicted history, and neither can project its own concept of 
national identity without provoking interpretative questions from the other side. Both 
nations share common war experiences—one as victim, one as aggressor—giving 
rise to very specific kinds of historical narratives that play into the present. 
Confronting these war narratives has led to simmering distrust and a stereotyping of 
the other in both countries.  
 
When these factors are embodied in educational curricula they become deeply 
entrenched in popular consciousness. Decisions made by political leaders in both 
China and Japan shape strong nationalist public sentiments in both countries and 
stereotyped reactions to each other. Popular nationalism deeply rooted in historical 







5. Methodology and Research Design 
 
5.1  Introduction  
The purpose of the research presented in this thesis is to identify the impeding factors 
to the perpetrator group's acceptance of collective responsibility for the in-group's 
historical injustices. This phenomenon is examined and explored with a sample of 
Japanese university students, representing a generation that were never directly 
involved in the nation's misdeeds. This chapter presents the research methodology of 
this study and addresses the following relevant components: (1) overview of the 
research and rationale for selecting mixed methods as the research approach, (2) 
description of the research sample, (3) overview of the research design, (4) methods 
of data collection, (5) methods for data analysis, (6) ethical considerations, and (7) 
limitations of the study. 
 
5.2  Background and Context 
As was explained in Chapter 1, extensive research analyzing Sino-Japanese relations 
continues to be dominated by realist and liberal perspectives focusing on strategic 
geopolitical rivalry and economic interdependence in Asia. The purpose of this 
empirical research is to move beyond the analyses of Sino-Japanese relations 
predominantly centred around security and international relations, and to look at the 
relationship from a different perspective, specifically, examining the possible social 
psychological drivers that may be prolonging the conflict between China and Japan. 
Japanese people's lack of genuine contrition for the past continues to stand as an 
obstacle to forgiveness and reconciliation related to nations that were victimised by 
Japan during the Second World War. The theories and existent literature presented in 
Chapter 2 suggest that the social psychological needs of the perpetrator group may 
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diminish its members’ acceptance of collective responsibility for past misdeeds 
committed by their in-group. Drawing on these theories, I have chosen in this thesis 
post-war Japanese descendants as a sample for a case study to examine the key 
factors that may be impeding the perpetrator group’s inherited responsibility for the 
nation’s past injustices.  
 
5.3  Research Overview 
A mixed methods approach employing a sequential explanatory design involving two 
phases was utilised in this study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The quantitative 
phase was carried out to guide a broad understanding of situational and contextual 
factors shaping participants' perceptions and behaviours. After completion of the 
quantitative phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected survey 
respondents in order to gain a deeper contextual understanding of the results of the 
quantitative analysis. 
 
This research is based on the assumption that unresolved historical trauma drives the 
intractability and recent escalation of the conflict between China and Japan. This 
study explores the possibility of the perpetrator group's identity-related needs to 
defend their collective esteem impacting its members' willingness to accept and 
acknowledge responsibility for the past. 
 
5.4  Key Constructs and Social Psychological Variables 
Scholarship in social psychology suggests that to preserve a positive identity of their 
group in the face of shameful episodes in history, groups may eliminate humiliating 
events altogether from their historical narratives and feel less collective guilt and 
responsibility. A sense of victimhood protects the group members' positive identity 
and prevents feelings of responsibility for harms committed to the other group (Bar-
Tal et al., 2009; Sullivan et al., 2012). Further, when the group's moral identity is 
threatened, those who identify strongly with the in-group will attempt to defend the 
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in-group's positive image by denying the injustices (Sullivan et al., 2012; Tauber & 
van Zomeren, 2013; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). 
 
Guided by the theoretical insights above, the quantitative strand of the research 
examined to what extent identity-related variables impede Japanese acceptance of 
collective responsibility when compared to other variables such as out-group contact, 
out-group attitudes, and awareness of in-group's historical transgressions. 
 
Collective responsibility: Feelings of collective responsibility for harm done to the 
out-group are lessened when one’s in-group’s identity is threatened by accusations 
about its immoral past (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008).  
 
Variable 1: Moral identity threat: Accusations that one’s in-group has perpetrated 
illegitimate harm can pose a threat to the group’s moral identity (Sullivan et al., 
2012). When confronted with these accusations of in-group harm doing, individuals 
will attempt to bolster the in-group’s moral status in order to defuse the threat (Noor 
et al., 2012).  
 
Variable 2: Competitive victimhood: A threat to the group’s identity will motivate the 
group members to engage in competitive victimhood, claiming that the in-group has 
suffered more than the harmed out-group (Noor et al., 2012). Studies have also 
shown that competitive victimhood reduces the perpetrator group’s sense of 
collective guilt and responsibility for the harm done to the out-group. 
 
Variable 3: In-group identification: Individuals who identify more strongly with their 
in-group (national identity) are more inclined to justify their in-group’s position and 
feel less collective guilt and responsibility than those who are low in identifying with 




5.5  Research Questions 
To obtain an understanding of Japanese post-war descendants' acceptance of 
'inherited responsibility,' the following research questions were addressed: 
 
(1) To what extent are contemporary Japanese willing to accept inherited 
responsibility for the injustices committed by their forebears? How prevalent is 
‘apology fatigue’ amongst contemporary Japanese? 
 
(2) What are the social psychological factors impeding current Japanese acceptance 
of inherited responsibility for their nation's past misdeeds?  
 
a) Do the Japanese descendants feel that their moral identity is threatened when 
confronted with criticisms from the victimized nations about the nation’s 
immoral past? To what extent do threats to Japanese moral status affect the 
descendants' acceptance of collective responsibility for their nation’s past 
transgressions? 
 
b) Do contemporary Japanese engage in competitive victimhood? To what 
extent does the salience of Japanese victimhood [during World War II] affect 
the descendants' willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation's 
past transgressions? 
 
c) Do contemporary Japanese identify with their nation (in-group 
identification)? To what extent does in-group identification affect Japanese 
descendants' willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation’s 
past transgressions? 
 
(3) What are the external factors that are impeding current Japanese acceptance of 
inherited responsibility for their nation's past misdeeds? 
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a) How is the history of Japanese transgressions presented to contemporary 
Japanese? To what extent does the descendants' awareness of their nation's past 
transgressions affect their willingness to accept collective responsibility? 
 
b) To what extent does the descendants’ negative out-group attitude affect their 
willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation's past 
transgressions? 
 
c) To what extent does the descendants’ contact with the out-group affect their 
willingness to accept collective responsibility for their nation's past 
transgressions? 
 
5.6  Methodology  
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the impeding factors affecting Japanese 
descendants’ acceptance of collective war responsibility, this study employed a case 
study approach using sequential mixed methods design. Mixed methods is a 
relatively new methodology originating around the late 1980s (Creswell, 2009) and 
combines both quantitative and qualitative data in the analysis (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2007). The use of mixed methods design is becoming widespread in the social 
sciences, health sciences and other disciplines for its strength of drawing from both 
quantitative and qualitative data and minimizing the limitations of both approaches 
(Creswell, 2009, 218). By offering a complex and sophisticated approach, mixed 
methods can be employed as an effective means by which to gain a more complete 
understanding of the research problems and questions. By affording the vigour and 
broad applicability of the quantitative data and depth of understanding of the 
phenomenon from the qualitative data, mixed methods approach provides a holistic 
analysis of the research problem (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010). 
 
An empirical examination of social psychological factors that impede feelings of 
remorse and responsibility by present-day Japanese for the nation’s immoral past is a 
complex phenomenon where a variety of causal factors come into play. Although 
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there are some existing polling data on the Japanese public's perception of war 
responsibility, it is nonetheless an area in which little inferential study has been 
made. According to Creswell and other experts (Creswell, 2009; Merriam, 1998, 
2009), a case study entails an exhaustive description and analysis of a phenomenon 
or social unit bounded by time and place. Hence, within the framework of mixed 
methods, I felt that this study, which attempts to gain an in-depth view of a present-
day phenomenon, seemed most suited for case study design.  
 
The use of sequential explanatory mixed methods approach involves a two-phase 
design. In the first phase, the study analysed quantitative data obtained from the 
survey, then built on the results to explain them in more detail with qualitative study 
in the second phase. The qualitative segment of the research was intended to 
complement the quantitative segment by expanding the breadth and depth of 
understanding and corroboration (Johnson et al., 2007, 123). The use of sequential 
explanatory design allowed for the understanding of the process; with the how and 
why of the results revealed in the quantitative data. By themselves, neither the 
quantitative nor qualitative approach would adequately deal with a research problem 
as complex as the identity-related needs and war responsibility of present-day 
Japanese. Mixed methods provided me with an opportunity to take advantage of both 
quantitative and qualitative data to gain a richer, more comprehensive, and nuanced 
understanding of the complex real-life phenomena, perceptions and behaviour of 
individuals in a group locked in a protracted conflict. Taking into consideration 
culturally relevant factors, the qualitative interviews are critical to explaining and 
making sense of the quantitative findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; 
Onwuegbuzie et al., 2010).  
 
5.7  Procedures 
The two-phase design began with the collection and analysis of quantitative data 
from the survey, followed by the subsequent collection and analysis of qualitative 
data from interviews with selected survey participants. The purpose of the 
quantitative phase was to statistically analyse the possible impeding factors to 
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present-day Japanese acceptance of responsibility for the nation's immoral past. A 
survey was designed to investigate the relationship between acceptance of collective 
responsibility and six variables that emerged from the review of the literature. These 
included three identity-related variables of 1) moral identity threat, 2) competitive 
victimhood, and 3) in-group identification and potential moderating variables of 4) 
out-group attitudes, 5) out-group contact and 6) awareness of in-group's 
transgressions. This was followed by the next phase of qualitative research 
comprised of in-depth interviews with selected survey respondents as a follow-up to 
further explain the quantitative findings of the survey. Semi-structured in-depth 
interviews were conducted based on a purposive sampling of survey respondents 
who reported low vs. high levels of collective responsibility. Participants with both 
high and low measures on the collective responsibility scale were selected so that the 
reported phenomenon could be explored and expanded in depth (Druckman, 2005). 
The mixed methods approach was appropriate for the Japanese case study as the 
study required particular attention to actual contents of local and cultural processes 
that shaped the participants’ psychological outcomes (Lonner, 2003; Yin, 2003).  
 
The following three hypotheses were investigated in the quantitative phase: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Members of the perpetrator group who experience threats to their 
group's moral status are less likely to accept collective responsibility for the in-
group's past injustices. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Belief in the in-group's own history of victimhood is likely to 
negatively affect the members' acceptance of collective responsibility for the in-
group's past injustices. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are highly identified with their in-group (with strong 





Independent variables:  
1) Threat to moral identity 
2) In-group identification 
3) Competitive victimhood  
4) Awareness of in-group's transgressions (moderator) 
5) Negative out-group attitudes (moderator) 
6) Contact with the out-group (moderator) 
Dependent variable: Collective responsibility for the in-group’s historical injustices 
Control variables: Gender, income level, religiosity, political orientation 
 
5.8  Research Sample 
Purposeful sampling is a method typically employed in a case study in order to gain 
in-depth information about a specific phenomenon that is under study (Silverman, 
2010). A purposeful sampling procedure was used to select the sample for this study. 
Participants were 162 Japanese university students (91 female, 71 male); age ranged 
from 18 to 30 years (M=19.5). All participants identified themselves as Japanese. 
The researcher recruited students of Japanese nationality at a number of universities 
in Tokyo (Waseda University, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Sophia 
University, Meiji Gakuin University, Meiji University, Tokyo University of Science 
and Shirayuri Women’s University) and from Osaka, Kyoto, and Hiroshima 
(Hiroshima Shudo University, Ritsumeikan University and Osaka University). 
Letters were emailed to the key contacts (faculty members) of these universities 
describing the purpose of the research and requesting their help in recruiting students 
who would be willing to participate in it. After a positive response was received, an 
email including a short description of the research project was sent together with the 
link to the survey. A hard copy version of the questionnaire was also developed for 
participants who preferred to have the questionnaire completed after class. All the 
participants were asked to provide informed consent when completing the survey. 
The questionnaire was made available in Japanese language (translated and 
thoroughly checked by professional Japanese-English translators) and was either 
completed by the participants during class or completed online after receiving the 
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survey link via email. With the support of faculty members from the above 
universities, a total of 162 under- and postgraduate Japanese students were recruited 
to complete a self-administered survey on Sino-Japanese relations between March 
and September 2014. (258 students were contacted and 166 responded) Four 
participants were excluded from the sample for not meeting the criteria of Japanese 
citizenship.  
 
The sample of this study represents highly-educated descendants of the perpetrator 
group who have not directly experienced or witnessed the harm-doing of the in-
group, and whose understanding of the out-group’s suffering is based entirely on 
exposure to socially constructed narratives. With increasing economic 
interdependence and cultural and academic exchanges between the two countries, 
one would assume that the negative imaging of the other would diminish or be 
neutralized as intergroup contact increases and successive generations’ memories of 
the war wane with the passage of time. This has not been the case in Sino-Japanese 
relations. An examination of the factors inhibiting the sense of contrition felt by the 
future elites of Japan—the issues shaping their collective memory of the war and 
their nation's past misdeeds in China—offers valuable insights for breaking the 
impasses in Sino-Japanese relations.  
 
5.9  Research Design 
The following list summarizes the steps of the research design: 
1) Review of Literature: Preceding the collection of data, a thorough review of the 
literature was conducted to gain the insights of other researchers who have studied 
the relationship between identity, collective memory, collective guilt and 
responsibility. Literature on Japanese war guilt and responsibility was also reviewed 
to identify areas that warranted further study. 
2) Ethics Approval: After the research proposal was developed, the researcher 
obtained necessary approval from the University of Otago’s Ethics Approval 
Committee (Reference 13/258). The ethics approval process involved outlining all 
procedures and processes needed to ensure adherence to standards put forth for the 
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study of human subjects, including participants’ confidentiality and informed 
consent. 
3) Survey Development: In order to develop the survey and identify the key 
variables to examine, several experts of Japanese and Sino-Japanese studies were 
consulted from October-December 2013 to verify if the measurement instruments 
drawn from existent social psychology literature were suitable for the Japanese 
context. Experts on studies of collective responsibility, competitive victimhood and 
social identity were consulted to ensure the validity of the instruments. Their 
feedback was used to develop and refine the constructs of the survey. 
4) Pilot Test: Prior to administering the survey, a pilot survey was conducted in 
February 2014 with a purposefully selected sample of 30 Japanese university 
students. The purpose of the pilot-tested survey was to assess the reliability of the 
instruments and test their internal consistency based on the measurement of 
Cronbach's alpha. All items were translated into Japanese and adapted to suit the 
Sino-Japanese context. The survey was reviewed by Japanese participants and 
experts on the question type, clarity of the language used and completeness of the 
survey. Their feedback was used to modify the final survey. 
5) Phase I Quantitative Data Collection: Potential research participants were 
recruited by faculty members of ten universities across Japan. Those students who 
agreed to participate were asked to complete the final questionnaire after class, or 
were sent an email with the link of the online survey and a short description about 
the research. 
6) Quantitative Data Analysis: Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted 
using SPSS version 22 to test the three hypotheses and identify strong predictors of 
Japanese participants' feeling of collective responsibility for the nation's past 
misdeeds. Descriptive statistical information from the survey was also analysed 
using SPSS version 22. 
7) Phase II Qualitative Data Collection: In a sequential explanatory mixed 
methods design, the qualitative data in the second phase is intended to follow up the 
quantitative findings in Phase I (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The qualitative 
follow-up study was conducted from February 2015 to gain a more complete 
understanding of the processes that were shaping the Japanese descendants' 
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perceptions as revealed in the survey results, specifically focusing on factors that 
were either diminishing or augmenting their experience of collective responsibility. 
Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with a purposeful sampling of 
15 individuals who reported significantly low measures of collective responsibility 
and with 10 individuals with high measures of collective responsibility. The 
interview protocol was designed to prompt participants to explain the 'why and how' 
of the perceptions and experiences revealed in the quantitative survey.  
8) Qualitative Data Analysis: Transcribed interviews and extracted statements were 
managed and analysed using NVivo 10 for Mac. Thematic analysis (Guest et al., 
2012) and code development were performed focusing on patterns and themes that 
provided insight regarding congruence and differences of perceptions among high-
responsibility and low-responsibility participants (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). 
9) Integration of the Quantitative and Qualitative Results:  
Integration in mixed methods involves a combined analysis of both quantitative and 
qualitative components of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009). The researcher used integration of both data sets to draw 
conclusions in the Findings and Discussion Chapters.  
 
5.10  Phase 1: Quantitative Data Collection 
Pilot survey 
Prior to administering the survey, in February 2014 a pilot survey was tested with a 
selected sample of 30 Japanese university students who agreed to participate in 
research on Sino-Japanese relations. The results of the internal consistency analysis 
of the measures tested are shown in Table 2. Interviews were conducted after the 
participants completed the pilot survey to solicit feedback on the type of questions, 
clarity of the language used, and completeness of the survey. Based on the feedback 
from survey participants, eleven items were reworded for clarity in Japanese 
language. All items and concepts were translated by professional translators to 
capture the nuanced meaning, carefully adapted to suit the Sino-Japanese context and 
verified by sociology scholars specializing in Japan studies. This process of 
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verification was repeated when transcribing and translating the interview data into 
English as well 
 
Table 2: Pilot Test Internal Consistency Analysis (n=30) 
Construct Number of Items Cronbach's alpha 
1. Collective responsibility 5 0.74 
2. Moral identity threat 6 0.77 
3. Competitive victimhood 5 0.73 
4. In-group identification 5 0.75 
5. Out-group attitude 1 n/a 
6. Awareness of injustice 1 n/a 
7. Contact with out-group 1 n/a 
 
The next section describes the instruments using Likert-scale that were used to 
measure the participants' perceptions. Several other types of questions were also 
added to the survey to gather descriptive information to complement the findings.  
 
5.10.1 Main measures and validity of instruments 
 
Content validity gauges the degree to which the content of an instrument matches the 
content it is intended to measure (Druckman, 2005). A panel of experts including 
Daniel Bar-Tal and John Hunter were consulted to judge the relevance of the items to 
the content the test is meant to measure. Content validity of the measures used in this 
survey were assessed and validated after some minor revisions. In order to increase 
the validity of the instruments, the researcher conducted extensive reviews of the 
literature to locate standardized measures that have been successfully tested and used 
in the past. In order to ensure good content validity for the measures, the 
questionnaire went through several stages of refinement and rigorous procedures of 
instrument-scale development. 
 
Collective Responsibility Measure: 
Collective responsibility refers to a realization and acceptance of in-group 
responsibility when one’s group has illegitimately harmed another group and not 
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repaired the damage done. Studies have shown that acceptance of in-group 
responsibility is a necessary precursor of experiencing collective guilt for the in-
group's historical misdeeds (Iyer et al., 2003; McGarty et al., 2005). Group 
responsibility items from the widely tested Collective Guilt Scale developed by 
Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen (2004) were adapted to assess the extent to 
which the Japanese felt collective responsibility for their nation's wrongdoing in the 
past. 
 
1) “Our generation should not be held responsible for Japan's military actions 
during the last war.” [Collective responsibility acceptance; reverse coded] 
2) “As Japanese, we should feel remorse for Japan’s military actions during the 
war.”[Collective guilt] 
3) “We should not have to feel responsible for the actions of our 
forebears.”[Collective responsibility acceptance; reverse coded] 
4) “As Japanese, we should accept responsibility for Japan’s injustices in the last 
war.”[Collective responsibility acceptance] 
5) “I think as Japanese, we are accountable for what the other Japanese did in the 
past.” [Whole Group accountability] 
 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). The 
measures produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α =.94, n=162). 
 
Apology Fatigue: 
1)  Japan has apologised enough for its military actions during the last war. 
2)  I am tired of hearing endless demands from China to apologise. 
 
Moral Identity Threat Measure: 
Threat to Moral Identity:  
A scale of 6 items was developed based on the Moral Outrage Scale introduced by 
Tauber and Zomeren (2013) to assess Japanese participants’ negative responses 
[annoyance, anger, irritation] when their moral status became threatened by China’s 
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accusations of Japan’s harm doing and denial of the past. Six items were designed to 
measure the participants’ level of annoyance/outrage when their moral identity was 
challenged:  
1)“As a Japanese, I feel annoyed every time China demands that Japan apologize for 
its past actions.” 
2)“I wish China would stop criticizing that Japan is unrepentant about its past 
actions.” 
3)“I get annoyed when the Chinese blame Japan for making them suffer during the 
war.” 
4)“I feel irritated when China attacks Japan for not facing up to the past.” 
5)“I think Japan deserves to be criticized for its wartime actions.”[Reverse coded] 
6)“As a Japanese, I don't want to hear about the cruelties committed by the 
Japanese soldiers in the past.” 
 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) The 
measures produced a reliable scale. (Cronbach’s α =.93, n=162) 
 
Moral Identity Scale: 
The Moral Identity Scale developed by Aquino & Reed (2002) was used to assess 
how important moral identity is to the participants’ perception of the self. Five items 
from the scale were selected to measure the degree to which individuals’ self-
concepts and identity centre on moral traits (caring, fair, honest, responsible, 
compassionate). According to Leach, Ellemers and Barreto (2007), morality is an 
important dimension on which individuals evaluate their in-group. A single-item 
question was added to measure the importance of morality in group identification: “It 
is important for me that Japan has these moral traits.” Participants were asked to rate 
their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 




Competitive Victimhood Scale: 
To preserve a positive image of their group in the face of shameful episodes in 
history, groups may remember the past in ways that eliminate humiliating events 
altogether from their historical narratives. A sense of victimhood protects the group 
members’ self-esteem and prevents feelings of responsibility for committing harmful 
acts against the other group (Bar-Tal et al 2009). A competitive victimhood scale was 
designed with five items reflecting Noor and Bar-Tal’s (Noor et al., 2008; Bar-Tal et 
al., 2009) theories of competitive victimhood that posit the following conditions to 
be met: the group has suffered more than others; the group has suffered from an 
undeserved injustice; the group could not prevent the harm; the harm was immoral 
and should not be compared with other tragic events. 
 
1) Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the most inhumane and immoral 
act in history. 
2) The dropping of the atomic bomb was the most horrendous act perpetrated in 
human history. 
3) Japanese civilians suffered as victims of the war. 
4) As the only country in the world that has ever been atomic-bombed, we must never 
forget this history. 
5) The magnitude of the destruction wrought by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
cannot be compared to any other tragic event of war. 
 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) The 
measures produced a reliable scale. (Cronbach’s α =.96, n=162) 
 
In-group Identification Measure: 
In-group identification was measured as past studies show that it moderates how 
individuals interpret an event. Luhtanen and Crocker’s findings showed that people 
with high collective self-esteem versus those with low collective self-esteem, react 
self-protectively to threats to their collective self-esteem. People who strongly 
identify with their social group may distort information to enhance their group’s 
 108 
image (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw & Ingerman, 1987). Luhtanen and Crocker’s 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) was used to assess the 
participants’ level of in-group identification.  
 
1) “I am so glad to be a Japanese.” 
2) “Japan is a country highly regarded by people around the world.” 
3) “The nation I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.” 
4) “I am proud to be a Japanese.” 
5) “I am a contributing/worthy citizen of Japan.” 
 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) The 
measures produced a reliable scale. (Cronbach’s α =.93, n=162) 
 
Nationalism Measure: 
Nationalism subscales were drawn from Kosterman and Feshback’s Nationalism 
Scale (1989) and adapted based on Karasawa’s study (2002) to differentiate 
nationalism vs. patriotism and assess the full picture of Japanese participants’ 
national identity.  
 
1) “I love my country, Japan.”(Patriotism) 
2) “In view of Japanese economic superiority, it is only right that we should have a 
bigger say in the United Nations.”(Nationalism) 
3) “The Japanese people are among the finest of the world.”(Nationalism) 
4) “The remarkable growth of Japan after the war is mainly due to the excellence of 
the people.”(Nationalism) 
5) “Japan is the best country in the world.”(Nationalism) 
 
Participants were asked to rate their level of agreement on a 7-point scale from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). The 
measures produced a reliable scale. (Cronbach’s α = .82, n=162) 
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Historical Memory Measures: 
Memory of Japanese war history: After identifying the first thing that comes to mind 
when thinking about the history of the war, participants were asked to answer how 
and where they learnt about that history by indicating the top three sources of 
information they could think of. 
 
Awareness/Knowledge of in-group’s transgressions: Participants were asked to 
answer on a 4-point scale (1=not aware at all, 4=very aware) to what extent they 
were aware of Japan’s wartime atrocities in China, i.e. the Nanjing Massacre. If they 
answered “aware,” then in the following question the participants had to indicate 
how they came to learn about that particular history, i.e. the Nanjing Massacre. 
(Salience of these historical narratives was explored in-depth in the second 
qualitative phase.) 
 
Negative Out-group Attitude Measures: 
Various instruments were employed to measure Japanese participants’ attitudes and 
perceptions of China and the Chinese people.  
 
Negative stereotype index (Stephan & Stephan, 2000): To assess the degree of 
negative stereotyping of the Chinese, a list of four positive and negative traits was 
produced in discussion with Sino-Japanese specialists: friendly, aggressive, self-
centred, do not conform to rules. The participants were asked to score these traits on 
a 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Higher positive 
score indicated that the stereotype is viewed more negatively (positive traits were 
reverse coded). Studies have shown that high levels of negative stereotyping are 
associated with a greater likelihood of prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 2000).  
 
Perception of the Chinese: A question asking the participants to describe their 
perception towards the Chinese. Participants rated their perception towards the 
Chinese on a 5-point scale ranging from “very favourable” to “very unfavourable.” 
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Trust scale: This scale was included because a dominant feature of the relationship 
between the groups involved in a prolonged conflict is a lack of trust. Generalized 
distrust is a common emotional reaction of protracted conflicts and one that poses an 
obstacle to the process of reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2007). Participants were asked to 
score on a 5-point scale from “trust completely” to “do not trust at all.” 
 
Realistic threats:  
To measure the extent to which realistic threats are driving the negative perception of 
China, a scale of five items was adapted from Stephan et al.’s (2002) realistic threats 
scale (political, economic, and military threats). Participants were asked to rate their 
level of agreement on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree; Cronbach’s α = .71, n=162)  
 
5.10.2 Quantitative data analysis 
 
The quantitative sample consisted of 162 respondents. Data obtained from the survey 
was managed and analysed using SPSS version 22. The researcher conducted 
hierarchical regression analyses for two purposes: first, to identify significant factors 
that were impeding participants’ acceptance of collective responsibility; and second, 
to determine the extent to which identity-driven variables (moral identity threat, 
competitive victimhood, in-group identification) predicted participants’ feelings of 
responsibility and remorse. Multiple regression analyses were used to examine the 
association of the independent variables in relationship to collective responsibility 
while controlling for individual characteristics including gender, age, religiosity and 
political orientations. 
 
5.11  Phase 2: Qualitative Data Collection 
In sequential explanatory research design, the second phase of qualitative study is 
conducted for the purpose of explaining and expanding the results from the 
quantitative research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Following the analysis of the 
data obtained from the survey, a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews was 
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conducted with selected participants of the survey who reported low vs. high levels 
of collective responsibility.  
 
5.11.1  Research sample 
 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted based on a purposive sampling 
strategy of 25 survey participants who reported significantly low levels (n=15) vs. 
high levels of collective responsibility (n=10). The target population for the 
qualitative follow-up study was required to be individuals who participated in the 
initial quantitative study. Survey respondents were asked to indicate their email 
address and the name of their university if they were willing to be contacted for a 
follow-up interview. Using SPSS software, the researcher was able to identify 
participants who reported significantly low level vs. high level of responsibility 
(CRhigh≥6; CRlow≤2 on a scale of 1-7). The 55 participants who met these criteria 
were sent emails inviting them to participate in the follow-up study. In the end, 15 
low-responsibility and 10 high-responsibility respondents agreed to be interviewed. 
Interviews were conducted between February-May, 2015. Each semi-structured 
interview lasted approximately 60 minutes, was audio-recorded and then transcribed 
for thematic analysis. According to Patton (1990), “the logic and power of purposive 
sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth, with an 
underlying focus on intentionally selecting specific cases that will provide the most 
information for the questions under study” (Patton, 1990, 169). Purposive sampling 
enabled the researcher to select only those cases that might best illuminate the key 
findings of the quantitative research of Phase 1. 
 
5.11.2  Interview protocol 
 
The content of the interview protocol was guided by the results of the quantitative 
strand of the study. Questions for the semi-structured interviews were designed to 
explore and expand on the quantitative findings that revealed six variables to have 
strong association with Japanese collective responsibility. Questions focused on the 
processes – the how and why – to explain the three identity-related variables that 
emerged as significant predictors of Japanese acceptance of collective responsibility.  
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Inherited responsibility acceptance: 
1) Do you think Japanese people today should be/should not be held responsible for 
the nation's actions in the past? Please explain why. 
2) Do you think Japan as a nation should apologize to China for its role in the 
Second World War? 
3) Do you think that the Pacific War was a war of aggression? Please explain why. 
How did you feel when you first learned about Japan’s wartime actions in China 
(through textbooks, the media, people, etc)? Why did you feel that way? 
 
Threat to moral identity: 
1) Why do you think you get irritated when China accuses Japan of cruelty during 
the war, e.g. the Nanjing Massacre? What is the problem? (CRLow/Low-responsibility 
respondents) 
2) Is it important to you that Japan is a country with moral traits you can be proud 
of? Is being Japanese an important part of who you are? 
3) How do you feel when the Chinese criticize Japan for being immoral, unrepentant 
and unapologetic? 
 
Salience of victimhood narratives: 
1) When I say victims of the' past war,' of whom do you immediately think? 
2) Do you think that Japanese citizens were victims of the war? (If answered yes, 
then probe on why) 
3) Have you seen “Grave of the Fireflies”or “Barefoot Gen”? What was your 
response when you saw these movies/read the books? (These popular books/films 
represent narratives of Japan’s wartime victimization.) 
 
Awareness of in-group’s transgressions: 
1) How much do you know about the Japanese military's atrocities in China during 
the war? 
What do you know about the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731 experiments and the 
comfort women issue? (Probe on the process and sources of information) 
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Collective memory of the war: 
1) What comes to mind first when I say 'the last war' ('saki no sensō' is a common 
term in Japan to imply the Asia-Pacific War or World War II)? (If the respondent 
immediately associated the war with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, then probe 
on the process and sources of information)  
2) How did you learn about the history of 'the last war'? 
 
In-group identification: 
1) Is being Japanese an important part of who you are? 
2) How would you describe your feelings towards your country? 
 
5.11.3  Qualitative data analysis 
 
An IC recorder was used to digitally record the 25 interviews conducted in Japan. 
Interviews were conducted in Japanese and were transcribed by the researcher and 
translated into English by a professional translator. Consistency and validity of the 
obtained data was increased by having the same translator perform all the 
translations.  
 
A 6-step process was used to conduct a thematic analysis of the transcriptions of the 
recorded interviews (Guest et. al, 2012). Thematic analysis and code development 
focused on patterns and themes that provided insights regarding the congruence and 
differences of perceptions among high-responsibility and low-responsibility 
participants (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). The first step was 
comprised of preliminary exploration of the data. The transcript was read and reread 
so that the researcher became familiarised with the data content. In the second step, 
the researcher extracted significant phrases from the transcripts. In the third step, 
initial coding of the data was conducted by labeling the extracted phrases. 
Commonalities were identified among the extracted phrases. In the fourth step, the 
researcher developed categories and sub-categories from the codes by aggregating 
similar codes together. In the fifth step, a number of recurring, emergent themes were 
identified. In the sixth step, the findings of the qualitative study were analysed with 
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respect to relevant empirical findings and were compared with issues that had been 
raised by the broader academic literature. 
 
5.12  Integration of Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
In the final analysis of this mixed methods study, quantitative and qualitative data 
sets were integrated and triangulated (Crewwell & Plano Clark, 2007). The two data 
sets were synthesised and analysed to consider the broader implications of the 
research. Conclusions on the impeding and facilitating factors of Japanese 
descendants' collective responsibility were drawn from the two data sets (Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2009) and recommendations were made for future research and policy 
makers. 
 
5.13  Ethical Considerations 
Ethical issues relating to the protection of the participants are of great importance in 
any research study (Merriam, 1998). As researchers we are responsible for both 
informing and protecting respondents. Therefore, participants were thoroughly 
informed of the purpose and content of this study prior to their participation. Various 
safeguards were employed to ensure that participants' rights were respected. An 
informed consent was requested from each participant throughout the study, and a 
written consent to voluntarily proceed with the study was received from every 
participant. Participants' rights and interests were considered of primary importance 
with regard to the reporting and dissemination of data. The researcher assured the 
participants that all names and other significant identity characteristics would be kept 
confidential by using pseudonyms. Cautionary measures were taken to secure the 
storage of research-related records and data inside the university. Nobody other than 




5.14  Limitations of the Study 
The principal aim of this study was to examine the various social and psychological 
factors that may be inhibiting Japanese descendants from acknowledging collective 
responsibility for the injustices perpetrated by the past generations during the ‘last 
war.’ This study was conducted with a purposive sample of a specific population of 
Japanese college-educated youth in Eastern and Western regions of Japan (n=162). 
Efforts were made to recruit students from ten universities with diverse interests and 
disciplines ranging from humanities, arts, sciences, technology to political science. 
However, it should be noted that the data of this study does not constitute a 
representative sample of Japanese university students. The researcher acknowledges 
that the data does not allow generalized statements or conclusions for (i) all Japanese 
university students and (ii) all Japanese. To address this limitation, the findings of 
this research are compared and contrasted in Chapter 9 with other institutes’ past 
polling data which involved larger Japanese samples. 
 
Another potential limitation of the qualitative phase of this study comes from the 
self-reported data of the in-depth interviews with respondents who expressed 
high/low levels of collective responsibility.  Self-reported data may contain potential 
sources of bias such as selective memory of what the interviewees remember hearing 
or learning about Japan’s negative war history. Furthermore, the study was conducted 
following the heightened tensions between China and Japan surrounding the dispute 
over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. It is highly likely that the respondents have 
been exposed to critical and negative media coverage about ‘aggressive China.’ 
Perhaps a longitudinal observation in the future can be conducted to assess the 
impact of negative media coverage of China in Japan. 
 
The third limitation of this study concerns the subjectivity and potential bias of the 
researcher being a Japanese national. Qualitative research is concerned with 
meaning, how people make sense of the world and how participants experience 
events from their perspective (Willig, 2001). However, Malterud (2001, 483-484) 
points out that "a researcher's background and position will affect what they choose 
to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this 
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purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, and the framing and 
communication of conclusions." Hence, assumptions and interpretations are framed 
from the researcher's perspective. Recognizing these challenges, the researcher used 
reflexivity as a strategy to reduce the researcher's bias and address the issue of 
personal subjectivity. Reflexivity is a commonly used method in qualitative research 
to validate research practices. The researcher reflects continuously on how their own 
actions, values and perceptions, social and political identities may have an impact 
upon the research setting, data collection and analysis (Gerrish & Lacey, 2006; 
Pillow, 2003). This recognition can help the researcher to address   possible bias 
while gaining insight into and understanding of the phenomenon under exploration. 
Moreover, the decision to employ mixed methods enabled the researcher to use 
quantitative techniques to supplement the weakness of the qualitative research.  
 
In the quantitative phase, I selected variables of investigation on the basis of 
theoretical and empirical interest and developed hypotheses from the findings of 
current research in this area. Standardized measures were used to increase construct 
validity and produce objective, numerical data that can be statistically analysed. In 
this design, the qualitative data material further validated the results of the 
quantitative phase. Consequently, the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
data sets in mixed methods design and having advisors and colleagues scrutinize the 
thematic analysis of the qualitative findings also helped address the limitations of 
this research. 
 
5.15  Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a detailed description of the methodology of this research 
study. A sequential mixed methods approach was employed to examine the impeding 
factors to the present-day Japanese generation's acceptance of responsibility for the 
nation's past injustices. The two-phase design began with the collection and analysis 
of quantitative data from the survey, followed by the subsequent collection and 
analysis of qualitative data from interviews with selected survey participants. The 
participant sample of the first phase of the quantitative study was comprised of 162 
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purposefully selected Japanese university students across ten universities in Japan. 
The purpose of the quantitative phase was to statistically analyse the possible 
predictors of Japanese acceptance of responsibility for the nation's immoral past.  
 
An extensive review of literature was conducted to devise a conceptual framework 
for the design and analysis of the study. Drawing on the theoretical assumptions from 
the literature, the survey was designed to investigate the relationship between 
acceptance of collective responsibility and six variables, three of which were the 
identity-related social psychological factors of moral identity threat, competitive 
victimhood, and in-group identification. This was followed by the next phase of 
qualitative research comprised of in-depth interviews of selected survey respondents 
as a follow-up to further explain the quantitative findings of the survey. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with survey respondents who reported 
low/CRLow vs. high/CRHigh level of collective responsibility to analyse their 
perceptions and experiences in depth. In order to evaluate the inhibiting factors to 
collective responsibility, qualitative analyses in the Findings chapters primarily 
focused on the perspectives of the CRLow participants. Similarities and differences in 
the perspectives of the two samples (CRLow vs. CRHigh) were then explored and 
presented in the Discussion Chapter. This chapter highlighted how the use of 
multiple methods and triangulation of data sets was critical to obtaining an in-depth 
understanding of the complex present-day phenomenon of Japanese collective 
responsibility. The two data sets from the quantitative and qualitative phases were 
integrated, analysed and compared with the theoretical assumptions and the broader 






6.  Findings: Multiple Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
 
6.1  Introduction 
As was explained in Chapter 5, multiple hierarchical regression analyses were 
performed for two reasons: first, to identify the main factors impeding participants’ 
acceptance of collective responsibility; and second, to determine the extent to which 
identity-driven variables (moral identity threat, competitive victimhood, in-group 
identification) affect participants’ feelings of remorse and acceptance of 
responsibility. These regression analyses revealed the following key variables to be 
significant predictors of collective responsibility: 
 
1) Moral identity threat* 
2) Awareness of in-group’s transgressions 
3) Competitive victimhood* 
4) Negative out-group attitude 
5) Out-group contact 
6) In-group identification* 
(*Identity-driven variables) 
 
The following hypotheses were tested in order to understand the underlying factors 
that are associated with the perpetrator group’s collective responsibility. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Members of the perpetrator group who experience threats to their 
group's moral status are less likely to accept collective responsibility for the in-
group's past injustices. 
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Hypothesis 2: Belief in the in-group's own history of victimhood is likely to 
negatively affect the perpetrator group members' acceptance of collective 
responsibility for the in-group's past injustices. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals who are highly identified with their in-group (with strong 
collective self-esteem) are likely to feel less responsibility for the immoral actions of 
their in-group. 
 
Multiple Hierarchical Regression Analyses 
Predicting the Descendants' Collective Responsibility 
 
Multiple hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to identify strong 
predictors of Japanese people’s feelings of collective responsibility. First, control 
variables were selected for the analyses. In the first step of the regression analysis, 
demographic variables such as age and gender were entered together with other 
factors such as political ideology and the importance of religion (or level of 
religiosity), factors which have been shown to influence intergroup attitudes and 
behaviour in previous social psychological studies (Brown, 2000). 
 
In the second step, variables identified in previous studies as moderators of collective 
guilt were entered. These included inter-group contact, and negative out-group 
attitude (prejudice).  Both of these variables were important correlates of collective 
guilt and responsibility in Hewstone et al’s study on forgiveness and guilt in 
Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2004). Awareness/knowledge of the out-group's 
suffering was also included, as scholarly discourse on Japanese war memory tends to 
highlight  Japanese amnesia on  wartime atrocities in Asia. 
 
In the third step, three key identity-driven variables—in-group identification, 
competitive victimhood and threat to the group’s moral identity—were entered 





6.2  Descriptive Data 
Tables 3 and 4 provide a summary of the correlations, means, and standard 
deviations for the measured variables. 
 
Table 3: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD 
1. Collective responsibility 3.78 1.74 
2. Moral identity threat 4.56 1.60 
3. Competitive victimhood 5.28 1.60 
4. In-group identification 5.38 1.20 
5. Awareness of transgressions 2.18 1.00 
6. Out-group contact 2.94 1.56 
7. Negative out-group attitude 3.16 1.12 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations Between Predictors and Collective Responsibility 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Collective 
Responsibility 
1 -.87** -78** -.70** -.78** .80** -.86** 
2. Moral identity 
threat 
 1 .75** .66** -.70** -.78** .86** 
3. Competitive 
victimhood 
  1 .67** -.63** -.70** .73** 
4. Ingroup 
identification 
   1 -.56** -.61** .64** 
5. Awareness of 
transgressions 
    1 .65** -.74** 
6. Out-group 
contact 
     1 -.77** 
7. Negative out-
group attitude 
      1 
 





Table 5: Coefficients of Regression Models for Collective Responsibility 
Variables      B       SE β Standardized 
Coefficients 
        P 
Significance 
   t-value 





















































































































































































Table 6: Model Summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 R2 Change Sig.F 
change 
      
Step 1 .299 .089 .066 .089 .005**, 
p<.01 
      
Step 2 .903 .815 .807 .726 .000***, 
p<.001 
      
Step 3 .931 .866 .857 .051 .000***, 
p<.001 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Dependent variable: Collective responsibility 
 
Step 1 Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Political ideology, Religiosity. 
 
Step 2 Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Political ideology, Religiosity, Awareness of in-
group’s transgressions, Contact, Negative out-group attitude 
 
Step 3 Predictors: (Constant), Age, Gender, Political ideology, Importance of religion, 
Awareness of in-group’s transgressions, Contact, Negative out-group attitude, In-group 
identification, Competitive victimhood, Moral identity threat 
 
6.3  Key Findings 
Step 1 
The results of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting Japanese participants' 
acceptance of collective responsibility for the nation's past harm are summarized in 
Tables 5 and 6. The model in the first step was significant at the .05 level and 
accounted for 7% of the variance in collective responsibility, Fchange (4, 157) = 3.84, p 
< .01. This was mainly due to the contribution of the religiosity variable. The 
importance of religion emerged as a significant positive predictor of collective 
responsibility, p < 01, although it became non-significant in the next two steps. The 
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rest of the control variables of gender, age and political ideology remained non-
significant throughout the analyses. Although liberal political ideology is normally 
assumed to be a significant positive predictor of collective responsibility, in the case 
of contemporary Japanese youth, many were unable to indicate any significant 
political orientation.  
 
Step 2 
By way of contrast, Step 2 showed that the additional predictor variables explained a 
further substantial 73% of the variance in collective responsibility, Fchange (3, 154) = 
201.8, p < .001. Consistent with past studies, increased contact with the out-group 
and awareness about in-group’s historical transgressions were both positively 
associated with acceptance of collective responsibility. These two variables had equal 
weight in contributing to predicting collective responsibility with a standardized 
coefficient of .27. In this step, negative out-group attitude (prejudice) emerged as the 
strongest negative predictor of collective responsibility with the highest standardized 
coefficient of -.45 and significant at the level of p < . 001.  
 
Step 3 
As was hypothesized, in the final model, the three identity-driven variables—in-
group identification, competitive victimhood and moral identity threat—all emerged 
as significant negative predictors of collective responsibility. Adding the three 
variables in Step 3 increased the explained variance at the level of p < .001, Fchange 
(3, 151) = 19.17 and explained an additional 5% of the variance in acceptance of 
collective responsibility. This step revealed that amongst the tested identity-related 
variables, threat to a group’s moral identity is the most significant negative predictor 
of collective responsibility (p < .001) followed by competitive victimhood (p < .01) 
and in-group identification (p < .05). 
 
In sum, the above analysis revealed that the measured predictors were able to explain 
a total of 86% of variance in collective responsibility. The analyses also provides 
good support for all three hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 and demonstrates that an 
increase in moral identity threat, in-group identification and competitive victimhood 
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will predict a decreased willingness to feel remorse and accept collective 
responsibility for the past transgressions of the in-group. 
 
Social identity theory posits that individuals attain a sense of self-esteem and self-
worth not just from their identity as an individual, but also from their membership in 
social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Individuals are therefore driven to maintain a 
positive evaluation of their social group. The possibility that one’s group has 
perpetrated an unjust act can pose a threat to the in-group’s positive moral identity 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). 
When confronted with accusations of in-group malevolence, individuals will try and  
bolster the in-group’s moral status in order to defuse real or potential reputational   
threat (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012, 778). One strategy   
groups employ to restore positive esteem and moral status is competitive victimhood. 
This enables the accused group to claim that they have suffered more than those who 
are being critical (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor et. al., 2012). This study 
hypothesized that Japan’s lack of repentance, which is at the heart of the Sino-
Japanese conflict, is driven by a need to defend and protect a positive national 
identity. Based on the aforementioned theories, this thesis examined the extent to 
which identity-driven responses such as ‘moral identity threat,’ ‘competitive 
victimhood,’ and ‘in-group identification (degree of national identity)’ may be 
affecting Japanese acceptance of and remorse and responsibility. 
 
Consistent with these hypotheses, the hierarchical regression analysis identified the 
three identity-driven variables as significant predictors of collective responsibility. 
One key finding from the regression analyses was that individuals who felt that their 
in-group’s moral status was threatened when confronted with accusations of past 
injustices defended their in-group's positive identity by avoiding acceptance of 
collective responsibility. As previous studies have shown, threats to moral identity 
and esteem were positively associated with competitive victimhood which also 
emerged as a negative predictor of collective responsibility. The regression analysis 
further indicated that participants who strongly identify with their nation experience 
less collective responsibility, while those with high levels of contact with the out-
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group are likely to feel more remorse. Those with less salient knowledge and 
awareness about their nation’s transgressions are less likely to feel responsible for 
their ancestors’ misdeeds.  
6.4  Descriptive Statistics: Collective Responsibility 
Previous opinion polls have aimed to uncover the Japanese public’s sense of 
responsibility and apology for the war. However, this is the first empirical study 
which deploys tried and tested psychological measures to assess Japanese 
descendants' acceptance of collective and inherited responsibility. Table 7 presents 
the statistical data obtained from survey participants’ responses to the Collective 
Responsibility Measure adapted from the widely-accepted Collective Guilt Scale 
developed by Branscombe, Slugoski and Kappen (2004). 
 
 
Table 7: Collective Responsibility Scale 
















1. Our generation should not be 
held responsible for Japan’s 
military actions during the last 
war. 
[Reverse coded] 
63.6 0.6 35.8 M=3.43 
SD=2.0 
2. As Japanese, we should feel 
remorse for Japan’s military 
actions during the war. 
 
40.8 1.9 57.4 M=3.96 
SD=1.88 
3. We shouldn’t have to feel 
responsible for the actions of our 
forebears.  
[Reverse coded] 
66.0 0.6 33.4 M=3.4 
SD=1.95 
4. As Japanese, we should accept 
responsibility for Japan’s 
injustices in the last war. 
 
56.8 0 43.2 M=4.2 
SD=1.89 
5. I think as Japanese, we are 
accountable for what the other 
Japanese did in the past. 
47.5 0.6 51.9 M=3.92 
SD=1.97 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items 1 and 3 
were reverse scored, so that higher scale scores denote greater acceptance of 
collective responsibility. (N = 162) 
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To measure the degree of collective responsibility for the nation’s past 
transgressions, participants were asked to answer to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with the five items presented in Table 7. A major issue raised in the 
Japanese public debate about war memory and contrition is the question of ‘for how 
long current generations should continue to feel responsible for the actions of their 
ancestors.’ This question about the temporality of collective war responsibility was 
posed in the survey. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed 
with such statements as “our generation should not be held responsible for Japan’s 
military actions during the last war.” Survey results showed that 64 percent of 
respondents felt that they did not and should not have to bear any responsibility for 
what their forebears did during the war, while 36 percent felt that the current 
generation should assume some ongoing guilt and responsibility for the nation’s past 
actions.   
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Figure 1: Inherited Responsibility 
‘Our generation should bear responsibility for Japan’s military actions during 




Note: Scale ranges from 1 to 7, with higher numbers indicating greater agreement 
with the items. N=162. 
 
6.5  Qualitative Responses: Inherited Responsibility 
'Our generation should not have to feel guilty for the mistakes of our forebears.' 
The qualitative segment of this study explored the processes underlying participants’ 
perceptions of war memory and collective responsibility for Japan’s past atrocities. 
Following the regression analyses, which identified the key variables predicting 
participants’ collective responsibility, semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with two samples; 15 participants who had exhibited low levels of 
collective responsibility/CRLow (mean ≤ 2) and 10 who had demonstrated high levels 
of collective responsibility/CRHigh (mean ≥ 6). These in-depth interviews allowed the 
participants to clarify their reasons for feeling little if any responsibility, and also 














A dominant argument that emerged in the qualitative findings among CRLow 
respondents is the unreasonableness of demanding that today’s Japanese feel 
contrition for war crimes committed seven decades ago. These twenty-first century 
descendants wish to distance themselves from Second World War Imperial and 
military Japan. Their comments demonstrate the attitudes of a post-war generation 
that feels diminished responsibility for the ‘sins’ of its ancestors. They feel that 
modern Japan is a far cry from the regime that committed cruel atrocities during the 
Asia-Pacific War. Furthermore, they believe that they should not be held accountable 
for the crimes committed by a generation of Japanese (especially the Japanese 
military clique responsible for the war) with whom they cannot and would not wish 
to be identified.  Their emotional distance from the perpetrators of war crimes and 
human rights abuses leads them to question whether further apology—made after 
nearly three generations have passed—would seem disingenuous, insincere, and even 
absurd. Consistent with my survey and past poll data, respondents are frustrated that 
they are expected to share some collective blame for atrocities that they did not 
commit.  
 
Yuji: All these accusations by China have nothing to do with me. What 
happened during the war has nothing to do with my generation. We should 
not be held liable for what the Japanese did long time ago. 
 
Tatsuya: I don’t feel responsible for what happened during the war. I don’t 
see myself as part of the group of militarists who committed those horrible 
crimes. We are from entirely different generations. I cannot feel responsible 
for something I never took part in. I wasn’t even born then. And most of the 
people who committed the atrocities are dead.  
 
Satoko: Because I was not directly involved, even if I apologize to the 
Chinese, it wouldn’t be sincere. 
 
Kuniko: If a Chinese friend asked me to apologize, I probably might…but 
deep in my heart, I would question, “Does this apology have any meaning?” I 
acknowledge that the Japanese committed brutal acts in the past but I cannot 
feel any guilt or remorse for what these people did. I was never directly 
involved. That is why I wonder, would my apology have any significance? 
 
These verbatim comments help explain why this generation of students finds it 
difficult to feel responsibility for Japan’s past actions. The same participants also 
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scored high on the in-group identification scale (mean ≥ 6), indicating that their 
collective self-esteem is strongly associated with a positive conception of the nation. 
In the qualitative interviews, however, the majority of respondents expressed 
difficulty identifying themselves with those Japanese who committed atrocities 
during the war. These reactions support my assumption—based on social identity and 
social categorization theories—that high identifiers detach transgressors from their 
group in an attempt to protect the group’s positive identity. The issue of ongoing 
culpability is hotly debated among intellectuals not only in Japan but also in 
Germany; namely, whether post-war generations should be expected to continue to 
shoulder the burden of moral guilt for their nation’s past injustices (and if so, for how 
long). This is a fundamental ethical and political question of 'inherited responsibility': 
how should nations deal with perpetual collective guilt imposed upon them by the 
ancestors of their victims? 
 
6.6  Qualitative Responses: Apology Fatigue 
'Japan has apologized enough for its wartime past' 
Japanese perception of what constitutes a sufficient apology may be different from 
what the victimized nations think. The following survey results reveal that 'apology 
fatigue' is prevalent. Majority of today's descendants believe that their government 
has done enough and feel frustrated that 'no matter what they do, victims will never 
be satisfied.' My survey results (2014) revealed that 66 percent of participants felt 
that ‘Japan has apologized enough for its wartime past’ while 33 percent felt that the 




The majority of interviewed participants showed strong defensive responses to 
China’s demands for apology by insisting that the nation had apologized enough and 
wartime reparations had already been settled with both China and Korea. These 
participant perceptions seem to be profoundly influenced by discussions in the 
Japanese mass media that the Japanese government has already issued many 
apologies to China in the past and has therefore made sufficient atonement for past 
war crimes. These comments echo the official narrative of the Japanese government 
introduced in Chapter 3. The following qualitative perspectives shared by 
participants are consistent with the survey findings which demonstrate that the 
majority of Japanese participants feel that enough has been done to atone for the 
grievances of the victimized nations. 
 
Seijiro: I am not certain how many times Japan has offered apologies in the 
past but I feel it has done enough. How long do we have to continue 
apologising? Are these people [victimised nations] ever going to be satisfied?  
 
Shinji: I do accept that Japan has committed terrible war crimes. However, 
Japan has already offered numerous apologies and compensation for the 
damages incurred during the war. We signed a friendship treaty with China 
and both countries agreed that the war has ended and the two countries were 
ready to move on. Despite that agreement, why is China bringing out the past 
again and deliberately flaring up anti-Japanese sentiments amongst its 
people? Why now? 
 
Emiko: I am quite sure that Japan has already issued official apologies and 
paid necessary reparations. I am not aware of the details though. Are the 
Chinese people dissatisfied with the amount of reparation? Did they find our 
government’s apologies to be insufficient? If that is the case, then we should 
reconsider these matters but I am skeptical about the timing. Why are the 
Chinese suddenly angry now? It is strange that they are suddenly demanding 
apologies after all these years. 
 
Kuniko: We did commit horrible acts so I think their criticisms are justified. 
However, after the war, Japan had already atoned for its past by offering 
numerous apologies and compensation. I find it annoying that they are re-
enacting the whole issue today. What is their real objective? 
 
Toshiyuki: My honest reaction is who are they kidding? Based on the 
bilateral agreement, China said that they will not raise the war crimes as an 
issue. Japan offered and already paid war reparations. When China tells us to 
apologize, I would like to argue that the Chinese also killed many Japanese 
 131 
soldiers a long time ago during the Sui dynasty. This becomes an endless 
argument. I find their persistent demands to be frankly annoying.  
 
6.6  Summary 
The outcomes of the hierarchical regression identified the critical identity-related 
predictors of collective responsibility that will be further analysed in the subsequent 
chapters. One key finding from the regression analyses was that individuals who felt 
their moral identity was challenged in the face of China’s accusations about Japan’s 
lack of contrition avoided acceptance of collective responsibility. Threats to moral 
status were positively associated with competitive victimhood which also worked to 
diminish the participants’ willingness to acknowledge responsibility. This chapter has 
also illustrated the CRLow participants' perspectives on inherited responsibility; that 
their nation has done enough to atone for the past misdeeds. In the next Chapter, I 
will present the descriptive data and qualitative findings related to the three identity-
related predictors of collective responsibility—moral identity threat, competitive 
victimhood and in-group identification. The qualitative responses provide deeper 
insight into the dynamics that threaten participants’ conception of their in-group’s 







7.  Findings: Identity-related Factors 
 
7.1 Moral Identity Threat 
Social identity theory argues that individuals are driven to maintain a favourable 
evaluation of the social group with which they associate and that they do so primarily 
through a commitment to the shared values, norms and morality of that group. Any 
challenge to moral reputation, therefore, challenges individual and group esteem. 
When this happens, group members move into a defensive mode in order to bolster 
the group’s moral status and defuse the reputational threat (Branscombe, Ellemers, 
Spears, & Doosje, 1999). Drawing on this theory, my survey first assessed the 
importance of moral identity for Japanese participants’ perception of self using the 
moral identity scale developed by Aquino and Reed (2002). 
 
7.1.1 Morality is the most important trait on which individuals evaluate 
themselves and their in-group 
 
Participants were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the four 
statements in Table 8, Moral Identity Scale. As the results reveal, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents reported that values and morality were a critical element in 
their determination of positive self-identity. They also want to ensure that their own 
values and morality are reflected in and consonant with those of their group and 
country. The mean score on this scale was 6.34 and the Standard Deviation was .81. 
This finding supports previous research by Leach, Ellemers, and Barreto (2007) in 
which high moral repute was proven to be the most important dimension on which 
individuals evaluate their in-group. Their study showed that a group’s perceived 
moral status was more important than other qualities such as competence or 
sociability when asked to describe factors generating pride within their in-group. As 
the bar graph indicates, for all four items measuring the importance of moral identity, 
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more than 90 percent of respondents consistently agreed to statements that claimed 
that moral traits were important to their self and collective identity.  
 
Table 8: Moral Identity Scale 
Q: Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: caring, compassionate, fair, 
kind, honest and responsible. How much do you agree of disagree with the following 
statements? 
 
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics. 
 
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
 
3. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. [reverse coded] 
  
4. I want my own country to also have these characteristics. 
 
 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Item 3 was 
reverse scored, so that higher scale scores denote greater importance on moral 
identity. (N = 162) 
 
 


















7.2  Responses to In-group's Moral Identity Threat 
This study examined to what extent participants felt that their group’s moral status 
was threatened when facing China’s accusations about Japan’s invasion, occupation 
and war crimes in China. Threat to moral identity was measured with Tauber & 
Zomeron’s moral outrage scale (2013) which was adapted for the Japanese context. 
The scale assessed participants’ levels of annoyance and outrage when their moral 
status was threatened by accusations about the in-group’s historic injustices and 
current denial of the past. Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). Item 3 was reverse scored, so that higher scale scores denote greater degree 
of moral identity. The measures produced a reliable scale with Cronbach α = .90, 
n=162.  
 
As the data in Table 7.2 indicates, 61 percent of respondents consistently claimed 
that they had negative feelings when confronted with victim group accusations while 
37 percent were either indifferent or disagreed. This finding is consistent with the 
ratio of respondents reporting high versus low collective guilt and the regression 
analysis which showed that moral identity threat was the strongest predictor of 
collective guilt. These findings highlight that the majority of Japanese participants 
felt frustrated that their moral status was threatened by China’s accusations of their 
group’s past wrongdoing and supports my guiding hypothesis that individuals who 







Table 9: Moral Identity Threat Scale 
















1. As Japanese, I feel annoyed 
every time China demands Japan 
to apologize for its past actions. 
64.2 0.6 35.1 M=4.62 
SD=1.85 
2. I wish China would stop 
criticizing that Japan is 
unrepentant of its past evils. 
60.5 0.6 38.9 M=4.53 
SD=1.85 
3. I get annoyed when the 
Chinese blame Japan for making 
them suffer during the war. 
64.8 1.2 34.0 M=4.80 
SD=1.80 
4. I feel irritated when China 
attacks Japan for not facing up 
to the past. 
 
62.0 1.2 37.0 M=4.64 
SD=1.89 
5. I think Japan deserves to be 
criticized for its wartime actions. 
[reverse coded] 
 
46.3 3.7 50.0 M=4.22 
SD=1.92 
6. As a Japanese, I don’t want to 
hear about the cruelties 
committed by the Japanese 
soldiers in the past. 
 
66.7 2.5 31.0 M=4.58 
SD=1.68 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Item 5 was 
reverse scored, so that higher scale scores denote greater moral identity threat. (N = 
162) 
 
7.3  Qualitative Responses: When In-group's Moral Status is Threatened 
Previous studies by social psychologists have shown that groups have a variety of 
means available to them for avoiding accusations damaging to their individual or 
collective reputation (Branscombe, Doosje & McGarty, 2002). My interviews were 
aimed at exploring the kinds of emotions evoked when Japanese participants felt 
their moral status was threatened by China’s persistent accusations about war crimes 
committed by Japan in China. The purpose of this section is to reveal the various 
defensive responses aimed at protecting their positive individual and collective 
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esteem. The qualitative findings therefore will mainly focus on the reactions of the 
CRLow descendants. 
 
Ryutaro: I don’t want Japan to be accused and I don’t want to feel responsible 
for what happened. China is obsessed with its past. I am utterly fed up with 
their behaviour. 
 
Toshiyuki: I find China’s persistence to be annoying, frustrating and tiresome. 
 
Seijiro: I am not that knowledgeable about the Nanjing Massacre or the 
comfort women. However, I am not going to deny that these incidents did not 
happen. I am aware that they actually occurred in the past. I am just not 
aware about the details of what happened. My honest reaction to the Chinese 
and Korean people’s criticisms about our past is…why are you so persistent 
and stubborn about the past? I don’t get outraged every time I see the Chinese 
attack us on television, but I do find it detestable. 
 
Hiromi: I shouldn’t be blamed for what happened in the past. I find it 
suspicious that they are bringing out the issue now. Why now? I find their 
political tactics to be distasteful. 
 
The majority of the respondents were also repulsed by the aggressive nature of 
Chinese demands and wanted the issues to be dealt with more calmly and in what 
they perceived to be a more civilized manner. For those who believe that the 
Japanese government has already issued numerous apologies and paid compensation, 
China’s persistent criticism and demands were viewed as illegitimate and driven by 
ulterior motives. Other respondents like Ryutaro expressed their frustrations that no 
matter what they do, the victims will never be satisfied. 
 
Akemi: I don’t like it when the Chinese portray themselves to be the 
victimized heroines. If their demands were expressed in a different way, in a 
more rational and calm manner, I may feel differently. The fact that they are 
constantly stressing that they are the victims in a pushy, aggressive way is 
just annoying. They should calmly ask Japan to apologize and try to engage 
in a dialogue. They seem to be doing this to get the world media’s attention 
and their tactics are so political. 
 
Kyoko: I cannot feel guilty because China’s demand is so forceful. They 
come out so aggressively, unilaterally accusing us and portraying to the world 
that they are the ultimate victims. I just find that to be repulsive. 
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Rieko: If the actual victims came to me and asked me to apologize, I would. 
But when China relentlessly attacks us for being unremorseful, mixes this 
issue up with politics and territorial disputes, that dampens my willingness to 
apologize. I only feel resentment towards their demands and their motives 
start to appear ‘black and malicious.’ 
 
Ryutaro: No matter how many times we apologize, they will not stop 
attacking us. They will always come up with something to complain about. I 
am completely fed up with their incessant criticisms. I would be curious, 
what if we offer the most sincere apology to them…what would be their next 
move? Personally, I feel that no matter how many times we apologize, they 
are never going to be satisfied. They will always come up with something to 
accuse us… 
 
7.4  Defensive Reactions When Moral Status Becomes Threatened 
Previous studies by social psychologists have shown that groups have a variety of 
means available to them for avoiding the conclusion that their group’s history is 
immoral (Branscombe et al., 2002). My interviews were aimed at exploring the kinds 
of emotions evoked when Japanese participants felt their moral status to be 
threatened by China’s persistent accusations about war crimes committed by Japan in 
China. The interviewees revealed five types of defensive responses aimed at 
protecting their positive individual and collective esteem.  
 
Ryutaro: I don’t want Japan to be accused and I don’t want to feel responsible 
for what happened. China is obsessed with its past. I am utterly fed up with 
their behaviour. 
 
Toshiya: I find China’s persistence to be annoying, frustrating and tiresome. 
 
Seijiro: I am not that knowledgeable about the Nanjing Massacre or the 
comfort women. However, I am not going to deny that these incidents did not 
happen. I acknowledge that they actually occurred in the past. I am just not 
aware about the details of what actually happened. My honest reaction to the 
Chinese and Korean people’s criticisms about our past is…why are you so 
persistent and stubborn about the past? I don’t get outraged every time I see 
the Chinese attack us on television, but I do find it detestable. 
 
Hiromi: I shouldn’t be blamed for what happened in the past. I find it 
suspicious that they are bringing out the issue now. Why now? I find their 
political tactics to be distasteful. 
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The majority of the respondents were tired of hearing the emotional demands by the 
Chinese and desired the issues to be dealt with more calmly.  
 
Akemi: I don’t like it when the Chinese portray themselves to be the 
victimized heroines. If their demands were expressed in a different way, in a 
more rational and calm manner, I may feel differently. The fact that they are 
constantly stressing that they are the victims in a pushy, aggressive way is 
just annoying. They should calmly ask Japan to apologize and try to engage 
in a dialogue. They seem to be doing this to get the world media’s attention 
and their tactics are so political. 
 
Kyoko: I cannot feel remorseful because China’s demand is so forceful. They 
come out so aggressively, unilaterally accusing us and portraying to the world 
that they are the ultimate victims. I just find that to be repulsive. 
 
7.4.1.  (1) History issue is China’s political card 
 
Previous studies have shown that one way groups defend their positive moral identity 
is by acknowledging the occurrence of past harm-doing but placing the responsibility 
on ‘a few deviant group members’ (Wohl et al., 2006). Consistent with this 
conclusion, a large majority of the low-responsibility respondents rationalised the 
victims’ accusations and demand for apology as highly politicized and insincere. 
Their comments support the dominant discursive argument in the Japanese media 
that the history issue is essentially orchestrated by the Chinese government. 
According to this argument, Chinese demands for Japanese repentance are nothing 
but a political strategy of the Chinese Communist Party to shift public attention from 
internal grievances to outrage towards an external opponent. For this reason, the 
participants find government-manipulated demands for apology to be disingenuous 
and distasteful. 
 
Jiro: I find Chinese demands for apology to be questionable. Why now? Their 
plea seems quite un-genuine. It looks more like a diplomatic or a political 
tactic. That is why I feel annoyed. I can see their ulterior political motive to 
put pressure on Japan to gain better negotiating power. 
 
Rieko: I find their demands to be frankly annoying. They should get over it 
and move on. They are just using the anti-Japanese criticisms to shift their 
own people’s attention from domestic grievances to a diplomatic issue. So I 
honestly feel… “Again?! Haven’t you said enough to us already?” 
 
 139 
Hiromi: I am not denying that the Japanese army committed horrible acts 
during the war and the Chinese people’s anger is justifiable. However, I still 
feel that they are overdoing it. They are using criticisms against Japan for the 
past war as a diplomatic negotiating card. The criticisms were suddenly 
revived after all these years. It must be for a political purpose. The same 
could be said about the Korean criticisms involving the comfort women. If 
the actual victims who suffered in Nanjing raised the issue, then I could 
understand. However, for the state to revive the accusations after the issue 
was settled many years ago, can only be interpreted as a political move. I 
cannot understand how such accusations can lead to positive relations 
between the two countries. They don’t look to me like they are sincerely 
asking for an apology. I find that to be disrespectful towards the actual 
victims. 
 
7.4.2  (2) Chinese should move on and focus on the future 
 
In addition to questioning the persistence and transferability of collective war guilt 
other Japanese argued that since you cannot turn back the clock it is more 
constructive to focus on the future. Participants who endorse this pragmatic argument 
felt that focusing (some would say fixating) on the past will serve no purpose for 
Japan and China nor contribute to the betterment of bilateral relations. 
 
Kyoko: I feel frustrated every time they criticize Japan for the past war. I 
wish they would stop bemoaning what happened in the past. It is really about 
time they let go and move on. 
 
Yuji: China should try to look to the future and stop attacking us. Is this the 
kind of issue that needs to be addressed right now? Why now? Shouldn’t we 
focus our energies towards building a better relationship? 
 
Yumi: Every time I hear their criticism, I want to say, “Again??” I am tired of 
hearing the same thing repeated over and over. It is about time they get over 
their past and end this. 
 
Rieko: What happened to the Chinese people is tragic, but, again?? Can’t 
they put the past behind them and work towards improving the bilateral 
relationship between China and Japan? 
 
Satoko: I really don’t know much about what actually happened. I believe 
Japan did terrible things to them. But then, we were never involved in all that. 
They can continue to complain about what happened in the past but is that 




These temporal arguments have more traction with the current generation of under 
25-year-old Japanese than they do with the over 60s. This raises some interesting 
questions about the ways in which chosen traumas are transferred across generations 
while feelings of guilt for past transgressions are not transferred in the same way and 
willfully buried by the current generation of Japanese. 
 
7.4.3  (3) Justification for the atrocities: ‘It couldn’t be helped’ 
 
Survey participants tried to deny the veracity of historical events by making 
evidential arguments against the accusations and by reframing the motives for 
Imperial Japan in a positive rather than negative light. The respondents generated 
questions about the veracity of the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in two 
ways: first, by highlighting numerical differences between Japanese and Chinese 
over facts such as the death toll in Nanjing and elsewhere; and second by arguing 
that, among the range of motives for the war, few, if any, were intentionally aimed at 
massacring others or committing gross violations of human rights. In other words, 
atrocities that did occur were accidents of war. 
 
Kuniko: The Japanese soldiers did not massacre the people in Nanjing 
because they wanted to. They were forced to under the circumstances. In 
wars, things happen. The soldiers had no other choice but to follow the orders 
from the top and commit these acts. I agree that the massacre was inhumane 
and unpardonable. However, at the same time, these soldiers did not have any 
other option. This fact should be taken into consideration. 
 
Yumi: War comes with tragedies. Japan also suffered immensely from the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
 
Jiro: I am not a denier. I admit that the Nanjing massacre was an atrocious 
act. However, when I consider the circumstances under which the Japanese 
soldiers were placed in Nanjing, I can understand why this kind of conduct 
took place. It is not at all that surprising. Japanese soldiers were forced to 
engage in a guerrilla war. All the Chinese, including citizens, were suspected 
of being soldiers. They couldn't distinguish civilian from combatant, so they 
[Japan] felt compelled to kill them all. When reading about history, it is 
important to understand the mood of the times and circumstances surrounding 
the soldiers at that time. 
 
Shinji: People should feel guilty if their nation has started the war…but then, 
that applies to all other countries. Japan happened to lose the war, but why 
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should Japan be the only country that gets criticized for its war conduct? I 
just cannot accept that. It is not fair. 
 
7.4.4  (4) Facts are dubious 
 
Some participants echoed neo-nationalist conservative arguments in Japanese society 
questioning the horrors of the Nanjing massacre by emphasising scholastic 
differences about death tolls. The debate around death toll is aimed at mitigating the 
extent to which Japan should be condemned for its atrocities. If, for example, only 
110,000 instead of 300,000 Chinese were killed at Nanjing by Japan, then—
according to the proponents of this argument —the necessity for Japan to respond to 
war crime accusations is mitigated if not negated.  
 
Hiromi: First of all, we need to confirm whether China’s accusations are 
really accurate or not. I heard that the numbers are debatable. 
 
Kuniko: I think Japan has apologized too many times in the past. After all, the 
historical facts are not very clear. I don’t like to be unilaterally attacked when 
the facts are still so questionable.  
 
Jiro: I heard from my history teacher that “the Nanjing incident” could have 
happened but it was not the kind of enormous massacre Chinese 
exaggeratedly report about. 
 
 
7.4.5  (5) Indifference: ‘I don’t know and I don’t care’ 
 
The following comments reflect the indifference expressed by some of the 
participants about their country’s past. These responses support Seaton’s (2007, 23) 
categorization of ‘the don’t knows and don’t cares’ who represent the historical 
consciousness of Japan’s post-war generation, those born with little or no knowledge 
of war history. However, it should be noted that this does not mean that the younger 
generation is completely unaware of what occurred in the past. The Senkaku-Diaoyu 
Islands dispute and the recent rise of popular protests in China and South Korea have 
seen an increase in media coverage of the ‘history issue’, leaving few younger 
Japanese ignorant of their nation’s military history. Whether conscious or 
unconscious, indifference and apathy towards Japan’s history of transgression allows 
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individuals not only to associate themselves with a positive image of today’s 
peaceful and prosperous Japan, but also detaches them from their nation’s dark 
history and dispels any possible guilt for it. 
 
Seijiro: I am not that interested in understanding the criticisms of China and 
Korea. Even if these issues come up in the news programmes, I feel like it 
has nothing to do with me, but is someone else’s business. 
 
Satoko: I don’t know much about it and I don’t really care. I don’t even know 
what the Japanese soldiers actually did. It is difficult for me to feel any sense 
of responsibility or guilt. 
 
Tatsuya: I feel perplexed every time they attack Japan. I don’t know much 
about what actually happened and it is wrong to ask us to apologize for 
something we don’t even know about. I cannot argue back with facts either, 
so I just feel perplexed. 
 
These comments illustrate the diverse ways in which modern Japanese youth seek to 
dissociate themselves from painful reminders of Japan’s fractured unjustifiable 
history. 
 
7.5  Summary 
After investigating the possible factors that hinder Japanese participants’ feeling of 
collective responsibility, ‘moral identity threat’ emerged as the strongest negative 
predictor of collective guilt. This discovery was further analysed and confirmed both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Common arguments from in-depth interviews with a 
selected sample of 15 participants who scored low in collective responsibility were 
presented in this section. The findings of the interviews support my overarching 
hypothesis that when confronted with accusations about their nation’s past, 
individuals and groups will attempt to defend their positive identity by employing a 
range of different defensive arguments. The key responses of the CRLow participants 
can be summarised as follows: 1) history issue is China’s political card, 2) China 
should move on and focus on the future, 3) atrocities could not be helped, 4) facts are 
dubious, and 5) indifference.  
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The interviews also revealed that with limited awareness of their nation’s history in 
Asia, the present generation of Japanese are perplexed and frustrated by the 
persistent accusations of China attacking their country as unremorseful and 
unapologetic. It is noteworthy that one of factors that seemed to trigger strong 
negative reaction among the respondents was the vehemence or tone of the Chinese 
accusations. 
 
7.6  Competitive Victimhood 
The previous section examined how Japanese participants respond to moral identity 
threats when criticised about their in-group’s past harmdoing, and how these 
responses serve to diminish a sense of collective guilt and responsibility. The 
research data identified a number of defensive justifications developed by 
participants to ameliorate the threat to their positive identity. Sullivan and colleagues 
have demonstrated that one of the strategies a group employs to defuse the threat to 
moral identity is to engage in competitive victimhood (Sullivan et al., 2012, 779); 
one can lessen feelings of guilt by claiming that one’s own group has suffered as 
much as if not more than others.  
 
One of the hypotheses of this study is to examine the function of competitive 
victimhood in lessening Japanese participants’ sense of collective responsibility for 
past harm-doing. In this section, I examine in depth the phenomenon of Japanese 
competitive victimhood—the sources, dynamics and social processes that shape 
Japanese victim consciousness and memory of the war. Although some scholars have 
introduced the notion of Japanese victim consciousness following the war, there have 
been very few empirical and inferential studies of Japanese competitive victimhood. 
This chapter will first examine to what extent competitive victimhood exists within 
the Japanese mentality and then analyse how salient the victim trope is in shaping 
Japanese historical consciousness. Competitive victimhood has been identified as a 
significant negative mediator of collective guilt and it is therefore vital that the 




7.6.1  Competitive victimhood scale 
 
In order to assess the level of competitive victimhood amongst the Japanese, 
participants were asked to answer to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the 
five items in the competitive victimhood scale (see Table 10) on a seven-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree). As the data in Table 10 suggests, on 
average 74 percent of survey participants agreed that the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima was the most tragic event in war history, and that the Japanese were the 
victims of this inhumane catastrophe. A strong majority of survey participants 
indicated that atomic victimhood was salient in their consciousness. 
 
The survey results presented in Figures 1 and 2 show participants’ responses to the 
two items of the competitive victimhood scale: ‘atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was the most inhumane and immoral act in history’; and ‘the magnitude of 
the destruction wrought by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima cannot be compared to 
any other tragic event of war.’ The findings indicate that more than 70 percent of 
Japanese participants feel that the horrific suffering wrought by the atomic bomb was 
an experience unique to Japan which should not be compared to any other event in 
human history. There was no invidious comparison, however between the suffering 
of China and Japan. No one said that the Hiroshima catastrophe was far worse than 
the Nanjing Massacre. In fact, many respondents refused to compare the degree of 
suffering in the two tragedies as they were not certain about the actual death toll in 
China.  
 
In stark contrast to this, a survey conducted by Nanjing Normal University in 2004 
revealed that 93 percent of Chinese university students (N = 973) felt that the 
‘Nanjing Massacre in which 300,000 Chinese civilians were killed must never be 
forgotten’ and 88 percent believed that ‘China should continue to dwell on the 
history of Japanese invasion.’ These findings when considered together with those of 
this study, show that both victim and perpetrator nations assert that they were the real 
victims of the war. These two conflicting findings relating to the salience of Chinese 
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vs. Japanese victimhood shed an important light on why it is a huge challenge to 
resolve this prolonged conflict.  
 
Table 10: Competitive Victimhood Scale 
















1. Atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki was the most 
inhumane and immoral act in 
history. 
 
77.8 9.3 12.9 M=5.50 
SD=1.45 
2. The dropping of the atomic 
bomb was the most horrendous 
act perpetrated in human 
history. 
 
70.4 8.6 21.0 M=5.30 
SD=1.66 
3. Japanese people suffered as 
victims of the war. 
 
75.4 9.9 14.8 M=5.38 
SD=1.45 
4. As the only country in the 
world that has ever suffered from 
a nuclear bomb, we must never 
forget this history. 
 
75.3 9.3 15.4 M=5.67 
SD=1.60 
5. The magnitude of the 
destruction wrought by the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
cannot be compared to any other 
tragic event of war. 
 
71.0 13.6 15.4 M=5.31 
SD=1.48 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scale 
scores denote greater competitive victimhood. (N = 162) 
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Figure 3: Competitive Victimhood "Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 






7.6.2  Salience of Japanese victimhood  
 
As the mentality of competitive victimhood is difficult to self-report in 
questionnaires, the survey used a tested psychological scale. Added to this measure, 
the survey also tried to assess unconscious thoughts and perceptions using an implicit 
association question in which participants were asked to choose the first image that 
came to mind when they thought about the Asia-Pacific War. A majority of 60 
percent of participants answered that the first thing that comes to mind when they 
think of the War is the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The second-
most dominant image evoked in association with the Asia-Pacific War was that of the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour; and the third-most dominant image was that of the 
Tokyo air raids. In the latter two cases the percentage was much lower, less than 10 
percent. It should be noted that only 8 percent cited the Nanjing Massacre as their 
main association with the Pacific War. In sum, the survey results demonstrate that for 
75 percent of participants the Pacific War is automatically associated with the key 




















7.7  Qualitative Responses: Japanese Victimhood 
The psychological technique of free or spontaneous association was employed in the 
in-depth interviews when discussing participants’ victim mentality and war memory. 
This method entails eliciting words or thoughts that are inspired by a stimulus. 
Respondents were asked to share everything that came to mind when they think of 
the ‘last war’ (the expression commonly used in Japan to refer to the Pacific War or 
World War II), including words, thoughts and images. Their perceptions of the war 
should indicate to which the official narrative of Japanese victimhood is particularly 
salient amongst individuals who are reluctant to accept collective responsibility for 
the nation’s past. 
 
As explained in the context chapter, because of the salience of the victimhood trope 
in Japanese educational and political institutions, it is not surprising that the first 
thing that comes to mind for most respondents when considering the Pacific War is 













Seijiro: I thought of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when 
thinking of the war. It is the horrifying image of people suffering. 
 
Tatsuya: I feel sad and frustrated when I think about the tragedy of Japan as a 
vanquished nation. I also thought of the firebombs and air raids. 
 
Toshiyuki: Mushroom clouds of the atomic bombs. 
 
Hiromi: I associate the war with the suffering of Japanese civilians and the 
images of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and air raids. I have watched 
different television programmes on the war, but what really influenced my 
understanding of the war was what the teacher taught me in elementary and 
junior high school during history class. History of the Pacific War was all 
about Japanese war history. That is why to me the Pacific War is about the 
suffering of the Japanese people. That image is deeply embedded in my mind. 
It was only after I entered college that I learned for the first time that the 
Pacific War was not just about Japan’s suffering. 
 
7.7.1  Who are the victims of the war? 
 
Participants were further asked who they perceived as the victim and victimizer in 
the last war. All the CRLow respondents answered that ordinary Japanese people were 
the victims of the war and the Asia-Pacific War was automatically associated with 
scenes of civilian suffering. A majority of the CRLow respondents found the identity 
of the victimizer more difficult to determine; they believed the Japanese public to 
have had little choice regarding their mobilization into the war, with only a handful 
of military leaders implicated as culpable.  
 
Emiko: Majority of the people who supported Japan’s war efforts were forced 
to. It was a time when absolute obedience to the Emperor was demanded. 
Who was responsible for the war? It was the top political and military leaders 
of Imperial Japan and the elites who created the mood of the times. I don’t 
think ordinary Japanese people should be held responsible for what happened 
as they were clearly the victims. 
 
Naoki: Class A war criminals should be held accountable for all the evils 
committed. They were the bad guys.  
 
Jiro: The Pacific War was a war we shouldn’t have fought. The military 
leaders decided to fight a war that could not be won.   
 
Toshiyuki: It was just like Germany under the Nazis. The top leaders 
mobilized the people to believe that the war was sacred and just. Japanese 
soldiers were influenced by wartime propaganda and went to China, 
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massacred the Chinese and raped the women or used them as ‘comfort 
women.’ It was a top-down decision and the public was forced to obey the 
military regime. The soldiers were victims of the war, too. 
 
Although a majority of the respondents felt that the blame should be on the military 
leaders who started the war, there were a few who felt that the people should also be 
held accountable for having blindly followed the leaders. 
 
Tatsuya: The war was started by the military leaders of Imperial Japan and I 
feel they should be held responsible. However, I learned later that after the 
Great Depression, Japan as a nation suffered from extreme poverty. The 
victories of the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War enabled Japan to 
expand its colonial territories and feed its population. Japanese people 
benefited from the nation’s colonial expansion. I am sure there were those 
who supported the war because of these material interests. 
 
On the other hand, a majority of the CRLow respondents said that although they were 
initially exposed to war stories related to Japanese people's suffering, as they grew 
older they discovered facts about other victims of the war. They came to realise that 
Japan was not the only country that suffered from the consequences of the war.  
 
Hiromi: I thought that Japanese people were the victims of the war, but as I 
grew older, I later found out that our nation also caused a lot of harm to 
others. 
 
Shizue: My teacher in high school questioned how war history was taught in 
our textbooks. He repeatedly reminded us that our textbook only highlights 
the victimhood of the Japanese people, and this was not correct. He told us, 
this is about war; naturally, there were people who were victimized by the 
Japanese army. Since then, I remember that the Chinese people were also 





7.8  Information Sources Shaping Japanese Memory of the War 
To get a better understanding of the process with which the collective memory of the 
current generation of Japanese is shaped by Japanese society’s war narratives, 
participants were asked to choose which three sources they considered to be most 
important in influencing their views of the Asia-Pacific War. 88 percent of the 
respondents selected textbooks and school education (teachers) as the most 
prominent sources shaping their views on the Pacific War; 57 percent chose the 
medium of television (informational programmes and television dramas and 
documentaries); and 38 percent selected news programmes. 
 
 
Figure 5: Information Sources on War History 
 
 
7.9 Qualitative Responses: Sources of War Memory  
To discover how participants had become familiar with the public narratives of war, 
both CRHigh and CRLow interviewees were asked to elaborate on how and where they 














television programmes and films were found to be powerful sources for embedding 
images of Japanese civilian victimization. 
 
Namie: My family watches war-related television programmes that are aired 
every year in August commemorating the end of the war. Because of the 
images of the war-related television dramas and documentary programmes, 
when I think of the war, I immediately associate it with the suffering of 
Japanese civilians. Until I entered college, I strongly believed that Japan was 
a country that suffered as the victim of World War II. The war to me is about 
the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Japan becoming a 
defeated nation. I have no doubt that most Japanese think of themselves as 
the victims of the war. 
 
Emiko: My image of the war comes from television dramas and animated 
films like “Hotaru no haka"  (Grave of the Fireflies). I associate the war with 
images of people getting fire-bombed in air raids. People desperately running 
to seek safety in bomb shelters as the air raid sirens blasted. They are 
surrounded by fire and people around them are suffering and dying. When I 
think of the war, I can only think of the sight of these ordinary people 
suffering. 
 
Some participants had stories of wartime suffering and struggles related to them first 
hand by family members.  
 
Satoko: When I was in junior high school, we had to talk to someone who 
experienced the war first hand. I asked my grandmother about her war 
experience and that story left an indelible impression in my mind. She was 
still a small child but she remembers the horror of the American bombs 
falling from the skies and Tokyo turning into a hellish inferno. She told me 
that a young man next to her had his arm severed off. When I think of the 
war, I see images of ordinary citizens suffering. 
 
Ryutaro: Based on the stories my grandparents told me, Japanese people were 
clearly the victims of war. My grandparents never were convinced about the 
whole idea of revering the Emperor. They only talked about their own 
suffering and miseries during the war. They were starving. 
 
7.9.1  Memory of the atomic bombs  
 
Both CRHigh and CRLow respondents were asked how they came to learn specifically 
about the history of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Respondents 
of both samples revealed that the first time they were exposed to the information was 
through textbooks, but that it was other sources such as manga, books or animation 
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films that left an indelible impression of the tragic consequences of the A-bomb. It is 
interesting to note that many CRHigh and CRLow interviewees claimed that reading the 
manga or the book version of “Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen) in elementary 
school awakened them to the horrific realities of the atomic bomb and left a scarring 
image in their minds. The responses also show the role that museums play in 
contributing to this image of horror and destruction. 
 
Seijiro: When I think of the war, I immediately think of the atomic bombs on 
Hiroshima. I read the manga “Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen) when I was 
little. That is when I realized how horrible and destructive the atomic 
bombing was. And as I grew older, I gained more knowledge about it. I 
happened to find the manga book of “Bare-foot Gen” in the school library. 
That is how I learned about the horrors of war. 
 
Yuji: I learned general information on the atomic bombing through school 
textbooks. But I realized how horrible it was when I visited the Hiroshima 
atomic bomb museum and reading the manga “Barefoot Gen.” (Hadashi no 
Gen) 
 
Shinji: My war image is that of the atomic bomb. I think that comes from the 
book (not manga) that I read when I was in elementary school. It was called 
“Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen). That left a strong impression in my mind. 
 
Satoko: I visited Hiroshima with my family and we went to the atomic bomb 
museum. I also read the manga “Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen) when I 
was in elementary school and learned about the horrible tragedy of the 
children of Hiroshima. It was horrendous. 
 
Yuji: I read “Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen) when I was small. I also 
learned about what happened through interviews of the atomic bomb 
survivors that were featured on television. 
 
Naoki: I think 60-70% of my knowledge of Hiroshima is from school 
textbooks. I found the book “Barefoot Gen” (Hadashi no Gen) in the library 
when I was junior high school. I started reading it but stopped and never 
finished it because the descriptions were too vivid and it was too much for me 
to handle. 
 
Emiko: When I was in elementary school, we went on an excursion to visit 
the Hiroshima atomic bomb museum and the Dome. I also got to listen to the 
experiences of the bomb survivors. I also learned about the tragedy through 
watching various television dramas about the atomic bombs. I have a close 
friend who is from Hiroshima and she told me in great detail what actually 
happened to the victims. 
 
 153 
7.9.2  The role of the United States in atomic victimhood 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative findings indicate that a sense of victimhood arising 
from the Hiroshima atomic bombing is deeply embedded in Japanese historical 
consciousness. This then raises a question as to why Japanese, unlike the Chinese 
victims, do not harbour the same degree of anger towards the Americans. During my 
interviews, I probed into the role of the United States as perpetrator in terms of the 
bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo. Surprisingly, a large majority of the 
respondents felt no negative feelings towards America and chose to justify the US 
decisions as inevitable. In fact, some respondents even expressed positive emotions 
and aspirations towards the United States. Only two of the 25 respondents felt that 
the United States should reflect on its own crime against humanity. 
 
Hiromi: I don’t feel any anger because the United States did so much for 
Japan after the war. Without the United States, we wouldn’t have been able to 
reconstruct our country this quickly. Japan gained a lot of positive benefits 
from the United States. 
 
Akihiro: I am so glad that it was the US that was involved in Japan’s postwar 
reconstruction and not the Soviet Union. Imagine what Japan would have 
been like? 
 
Namie: When I was still in elementary school and I heard for the first time 
that the United States was Japan’s enemy and dropped the atomic bombs, I 
did feel some anger. However, as I grew up, I learned later that it was a 
tactical decision in order to save more human lives. If the US had not 
dropped the bomb, the war would have been prolonged further and we could 
have been colonized by the Soviet Union. 
 
Kuniko: I don’t feel any anger because it was a necessary move to end the 
war early. I found this explanation to be convincing. Without the United 
States’ support we would not have recovered this quickly after the devastating 
defeat. 
 
As the above comments demonstrate, young Japanese today feel appreciation 
towards the United States for its involvement in postwar Japan. As much as a sense 
of atomic victimhood is highly salient in Japanese society, so is the US led postwar 
narrative about its contribution  toward  helping Japan get back on its feet. I 
investigated further, asking respondents what kind of information sources shaped 
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their views regarding America’s strategic decision to drop the atomic bombs in order 
to prevent the loss of more lives.  
 
Hiromi: I heard it from my history teacher in high school. To stop the Soviet 
invasion of Japan through Tsushima, the United States had no choice but to 
drop the atomic bombs. United States wanted to help Japan recover quickly 
after the occupation so that our country would not be occupied by the 
Russians. I believe the US wanted Japan to become its strong ally because the 
two Cold War superpowers were already eyeing each other with suspicion. 
 
Kuniko: I had to do this research project for my junior high school history 
class. I read about that in one of the books in the library as well as the 
supplementary material that was distributed in class. The argument which 
convinced me most was that the dropping of the atomic bombs minimized the 
casualties from the war. As a result, there were fewer Japanese civilian 
deaths. Otherwise, if the US troops fought the war on Japanese land, there 
would have been many more Japanese civilian deaths. I feel sorry for the 
people of Hiroshima whose lives were sacrificed but as a result, total death 
toll was minimized. 
 
7.10  Summary  
In this section I have demonstrated that this thesis' survey data substantiates the 
assumption that a competitive victimhood mentality exists amongst the majority (70 
percent) of Japanese participants. The survey data also reveals that a majority of 
Japanese automatically associate the Asia-Pacific War with the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Further, findings from the competitive victimhood scale 
showed that a majority believe that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima is ‘the most 
inhumane event in human history,’ and a ‘uniquely Japanese tragedy’ that should not 
be compared with other war atrocities. Consistent with these results, participants of 
the qualitative interviews also predominantly viewed the Pacific War as one in which 
Japan was the victim.  
 
This section also examined the process by which Japanese victim mentality is 
constructed via exposure to various societal channels. Findings revealed that the top 
three sources shaping participants’ understanding of the war were: 1) 
textbooks/school education; 2) television programmes (dramas, documentaries, 
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information programmes); and 3) news programmes. This research reveals that the 
process is more complex, and involves a variety of cultural channels. Although the 
survey data showed that textbooks and school education are  the dominant sources 
for  learning about Japanese war history, the interviews revealed that the narratives of 
civilian suffering disseminated through popular cultural channels such as television, 
books, and films have also been influential in promoting the salience of victimhood 
in Japanese mentality. 
 
7.11  In-group Identification 
Nationalism or Patriotism? 
 
This section seeks to understand another identity-related predictor of collective 
responsibility, in-group identification. In-group identification has been studied as an 
important antecedent of collective guilt and responsibility, prejudice and competitive 
victimhood. However, past studies have revealed a paradoxical element to the 
relationship between in-group identification and individual responses to moral 
transgressions within the group. One strand of research (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears 
& Manstead, 2006) has demonstrated that, since collective guilt is a group-based 
emotion, salient self-categorisation with the perpetrator group could generate high 
levels of collective guilt. Conversely, other studies (Doosje et al., 1998) have 
demonstrated that high national-identifiers are prone to feel less collective guilt 
because they are driven to defend their group’s esteem. Therefore, high-identifiers 
may deny or reject the notion that their group has committed immoral acts in the 
past. In-group identification in the context of moral challenges is a nuanced 
phenomenon and is the kind of topic that will benefit from a close examination of 
contextual information obtained from qualitative interviews.   
 
Social identity theory posits that the degree to which an individual identifies with the 
collective—whether it be an ethnic, religious group or a nation—can become a 
source of individual pride and self-esteem. In this study, I hypothesize that 
individuals who identify strongly with the nation are likely to ‘forget’ or ‘justify’ its 
past transgressions and feel less guilt and responsibility. Using the collective self-
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esteem scale developed by Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) I assessed the extent to which 
Japanese participants identify with the nation and how much of their esteem hinges 
on the positive identity of Japan. If a high level of national identification is likely to 
reduce an individual’s willingness to feel remorse for the nation’s wrongful past 
(Doosje et al., 2004), it is important to determine what triggers these attitudes. The 
regression analysis revealed that Japanese   national identification predicted lower 
feelings of collective guilt. To further understand the nature of Japanese in-group 
identification, I adapted Karasawa’s nationalism scale (2002) to investigate whether 
the mode of Japanese attachment to the nation is closer to patriotism or right-wing 
glorification of the nation.  
 
As I described in Chapter 4, post-war Japan has sought to discard the negative 
identity of wartime imperialist aggressor and shift to a new, twofold national identity 
as the victim of the atomic bomb and peacemaker. Within the context of Japan’s 
shifting national identity, the qualitative results of the CRLow participants with high 
levels of in-group identification sheds light on how the high identifiers’ attachment to 
national identity impacts their reactions when faced with accusations about Japan’s 
past.  
 
7.12  Collective Self-Esteem 
As described in Chapter 5, Luhtanen and Crocker’s collective self-esteem scale 
(1992) was used to measure in-group identification. Participants were asked to rate, 
on a 7-point scale (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree), their level of agreement 
to four categories and measures of self-esteem:  
1) private collective self-esteem—how good one’s in-group is 
2) public collective self-esteem—how one believes others evaluate their own in-
group 3) importance of identity—how important one’s in-group is to one’s self-
concept 
4) membership esteem—how worthy a member of the group one is. 
The measures produced a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .93, n=162) with mean = 
5.38 and SD = 1.20.  
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The descriptive data in Table 11 and Figure 6 reveal that a large majority of Japanese 
participants reported an extremely high degree of collective self-esteem. Findings 
showed that 85 percent are glad to be Japanese, 80 percent feel that Japan is 
respected in the world, 83 percent feel that the nation they belong to is an important 
reflection of who they are, 81 percent are proud to be Japanese, and 77 percent feel 
they are worthy citizens of the nation. Highly identified individuals define 
themselves in terms of the social group and perceive its membership as an important 
part of their sense of 'who they are.' The collective self-esteem findings reveal that a 
large percentage of Japanese participants identify strongly with the nation and feel 
that Japan’s image is important for their positive self-concept and self-worth. 
 
7.13  Qualitative Responses: High Identifiers 
In past studies, collective self-esteem has been found to influence how individuals 
respond when their in-group’s positive identity is threatened (Doosje et al., 2006; 
Branscombe 2004; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992). Consistent with these findings, 
interviewees who reported high in-group identification with Japan and collective 
Japanese self-esteem, reacted self-protectively to threats to their moral identity and 
showed less responsibility when confronted with accusations about the nation’s past 
misdeeds. The following comments are consistent with the qualitative analysis of the 
interviewees’ responses to moral identity threats. Interviewees who identified 
strongly with the nation expressed strong resistance to Chinese accusations and 
chose to defend Japan’s position. 
 
Yumi: I don’t like the way China and Korea accuse us about the past. I wish 
they would calm down and try to approach this in a more civilised manner. 
After all, we have already taken necessary diplomatic actions to atone for the 
past. 
 
Toshiyuki: I am disgusted with China’s belligerent claims. Japan has already 
done everything it can, and has apologised. War reparations were settled 
between the two countries. Under these circumstances, their sudden demands 
seem nothing more than spurious. 
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Yoko: I am extremely uncomfortable with China’s unilateral accusations. I 
think the government is using ‘the history issue’ as a political tool. I don’t 
understand why both China and Korea keep on fabricating the truth. If those 
at the top continue to inventing new truths to the people, I guess it is only 
natural that they would come to hate the Japanese. 
 
The above comments suggest that individuals who identify highly with their nation 
tend to accept the nationalist discourse in Japanese society that denies the 'so-called 
Nanjing Massacre' and believe it to be a fabrication. It should be noted that in-group 
identification emerged as a negative predictor of collective responsibility but also 
significantly correlated with negative out-group attitude (r = .64, p < .01) and 
competitive victimhood (r = .67, p < .01). As identification can also be manifested in 
the perception that the in-group is better and more worthy than other groups 
(Kosterman & Feshback 1989), high identification can lead to in-group favouritism 
and out-group bias. Similarly, high identifiers are likely to feel motivated to defend 
their group’s esteem in the face of accusations about their immoral past by engaging 





Table 11: Collective Self-Esteem Scale 

















1. I am glad to be a Japanese. 
(private) 
 
85.2 4.3 10.5 M=5.70 
SD=1.3 
2. Japan is a country highly 
regarded by people around the 
world. (public) 
 
79.6 5.6 14.8 M=5.30 
SD=1.24 
3. The nation I belong to is an 
important reflection of who I am. 
(identity) 
83.3 6.8 9.9 M=5.42 
SD=1.18 
4. I am proud to be a Japanese. 
(private) 
 
81.5 4.3 14.1 M=5.46 
SD=1.36 
5. I am a contributing/worthy 
citizen of Japan. (membership) 
 
76.6 14.2 9.2 M=5.35 
SD=1.23 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scale 
scores denote greater collective self-esteem. 
 


















7.14  Nationalism 
A number of Japanese scholars have raised concerns over the increasing numbers of 
youth endorsing Prime Ministerial visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and 
the upsurge in racist comments exchanged on the Internet (Takahara, 2006; Honda, 
2007). These scholars have warned that the Japanese, and in particular Japanese 
youth, are shifting rightward and becoming increasingly nationalistic. Opinion polls, 
however, have revealed that patriotism is decreasing amongst young Japanese. 
Nationalism and patriotism is a controversial issue that has been a subject of active 
social debate. In this study, an attempt was made to understand the nature of national 
identification amongst the surveyed sample to assess whether the nationalism 
exhibited by the Japanese is closer to patriotism or to a glorified nationalism. 
Japanese nationalism was assessed with an adapted measure based on Karasawa 
(2002) and Kosterman-Feshbach’s (1989) nationalism-patriotism scale. 
 
Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) defined ‘nationalism’ as a view that one’s nation is 
superior and should be dominant and   differentiated from ‘patriotism’, which was 
defined as a feeling of attachment to one’s nation. To a subscale item measuring 
patriotism towards one’s country, “I love this country Japan,” an overwhelming 
majority of 94 percent agreed with this statement. The percentage of participants who 
agreed was also high (86 percent) for a subscale for nationalism which implied 
Japan’s national superiority, “In view of Japanese economic superiority, it is only 
right that we should have a bigger say in the United Nations.” For another 
nationalism subscale question, “The remarkable growth of Japan after the war is 
mainly due to the excellence of the people,” a lower majority of 60 percent agreed. 
To a cruder statement of nationalism, “Japan is the best country in the world,” only 
50 percent agreed. These findings indicate that although an overwhelming majority 
of participants feel attached to and patriotic towards Japan, glorification of the nation 
remains discomfiting. There is demonstrable unease, too: 50 percent of participants 
did not agree to items 3 and 5 of the scale, which represented blind nationalism and 
Japanese racial superiority. However, for the other two scales representing national 
superiority, participants reported moderately high scores. 
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7.14.1 Qualitative responses: Nationalism vs. Patriotism 
 
In the qualitative interviews, all but one of the CRLow respondents (14) showed 
strong patriotic attachment to their nation and answered that if they were to be born 
again, they would choose to be born Japanese. By way of explanation, participants 
cited various positive traits and qualities that they find appealing about Japan. 
 
Seijiro: I like Japan simply because it is my country. I feel a sense of security 
and safety living in Japan. There is really nothing to complain about. 
Japanese people are always polite and courteous, they are responsible and 
have high moral values. We place importance on cleanliness and we are 
resilient in face of crises as was demonstrated in the 3.11 Tohoku 
earthquakes. 
 
Yuji: I like Japan because it is so safe and everything is so convenient. You 
can walk along the streets at night without having to worry about getting 
mugged. Japan is one of the safest nations in the world. There are not many 
countries like that. 
 
Tatsuya: I love Japan. It is clean, safe and so convenient. I would rather be 
born Japanese than any other country. We are peaceful and respect ‘wa’ 
[harmony] in this country. That’s why the crime rate is very low and we can 
walk along the streets at night feeling completely safe. But the main reason is 
because it is stable, comfortable, the food is great and the overall quality of 
products and services is excellent compared to other countries, so I heard. I 
am also proud that Japan rose from the ashes as a major economic power 





Table 12: Nationalism Scale 

















1. I love this country of Japan. 
(PAT1) 
96.3 0.6 3.1 M=6.07 
SD=1.0 
2. In view of Japanese economic 
superiority, it is only right that 
we should have a bigger say in 
the United Nations. (NAT1) 
86.4 8.0 5.5 M=5.46 
SD=1.11 
3. The Japanese people are 
among the finest in the world. 
(NAT2) 
45.7 8.0 46.2 M=4.16 
SD=1.47 
4. The remarkable growth of 
Japan after the war is mainly due 
to the excellence of the people. 
(NAT3) 
60.5 3.1 36.3 M=4.43 
SD=1.56 
5. Japan is the best country in the 
world. (NAT4) 
50.6 6.8 42.6 M=4.21 
SD=1.54 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scale 
scores denote greater degree of nationalism. PAT=item to measure patriotism, 
NAT=item to measure nationalism. 
 
 


















All the interviewees in the qualitative strand of the research (100 percent) answered 
that they were proud to be Japanese. Five of the interviewees cited Japan’s economic 
superiority as a principal reason for their national pride, and offered China’s rise as 
an economic and military power as a source of anxiety. However, it should be noted 
that despite the realistic threats they feel from China’s expansion, the majority of the 
high-identifiers interviewed were not wholly in support of Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s recent efforts to revise the constitution and expand Japan’s military role 
abroad.  
 
Yumi: When I first saw the leaked video [from the Japanese coast guard] of a 
Chinese ship colliding with a Japanese coast guard vessel, I felt seriously 
alarmed. We have been too complacent with peace [heiwa boke]. I am proud 
that Japan has risen from the ashes of the war and became one of the biggest 
economic powers of the world. I also love the pacifist values that we uphold. 
However, the Senkaku Islands dispute made me realize that we cannot just 
remain passive. I hope the government will seriously consider how we should 
respond to China’s threats. However, I do not agree with Prime Minister Abe 
or the other nationalist leaders’ belief that we are taught ‘masochistic’ history 
in school and are inhibited from feeling proud of Japan. I also don’t support 
his agenda to revise the Japanese Constitution and enable Japan to militarise. 
We should avoid war at all costs. 
 
The survey results in Table 13 (Support for Prime Minister Abe’s Security Policies) 
also show that participants’ attachment to the nation is not a driver for any extreme 
reactions which might endorse Japanese leaders’ nationalistic moves to revise the 
post-war constitution. Prime Minister Abe’s plans to amend the constitution are 
increasingly divisive for Japan and have sparked demonstrations from both 
supporters and opponents alike. International opposition is especially vocal from 
China and Korea, who view the change in Article 9 of the constitution as Japan’s 
return to its militarist past and cause for concern for the security of the Asian region. 
As the findings in Table 13 reveal, although scoring high on the nationalism scale, a 
strong majority of participants are still opposed to revising the constitution, 
















1. We should revise the Japanese 
Constitution in the face of future 
security threats. 
 
23.8 2.0 74.2 
2. Japan should bolster its self-
defense force in the face of future 
security threats in Asia. 
 
32.1 2.5 65.4 
3. Whatever happens we must 
avoid war with China.  
 
88.3 3.0 9.0 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scale 
scores denote greater degree of support for government’s security policies. 
 
7.15  Summary 
This section sought to gain a better understanding of Japanese participants’ in-group 
identification and the nature of Japanese nationalism. This study revealed that 
Japanese participants’ in-group identification was one of the key predictors reducing 
their willingness to accept collective responsibility. Both the regression analysis and 
qualitative interviews in Chapters 6 and 7 revealed that high-identifiers felt 
diminished remorse and tended to defend the moral status of their in-group by 
rationalising China’s accusations as a politically orchestrated tactic and therefore 
disingenuous in nature. Another common defensive reaction of high-identifiers was 
‘identity discontinuity’ (Augoustinos & Le Couteur, 2004). These interviewees 
strongly identified with and found pride in a modern, peaceful Japan that emerged as 
a major economic power, but distanced themselves from the perpetrator group that 
committed atrocities in China.  
 
This study attempted to measure Japanese nationalism using Karasawa’s (2002) and 
Kosterman & Feshbach’s nationalism-patriotism scales, which differentiated between 
patriotic attachment and glorification (overall mean = 4.86, SD = 1.34). While 93 
percent of participants in my study reported patriotism, participants also scored 
moderately high on nationalism subscales. However, half of the participants were 
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reluctant to agree with statements that crudely glorified the racial superiority of the 
Japanese. 
 
The findings revealed that an extremely high percentage of Japanese participants’ 
self-esteem is associated with the positive conception of the nation. That attachment, 
however, cannot be simply categorised as right-wing nationalism. These participants 
seem to be deeply in love with their country but are at the same time rational enough 






8.  Findings: Knowledge, Prejudice, and Contact 
 
8.1  Awareness of In-group Transgressions 
“Forgetfulness, and I would even say historical error, are essential in the creation of a 
nation. …Yet the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in 
common, and also that they have forgotten many things.” 
Ernest Renan (1822) 
 
After 'Moral identity threat,' the second strongest predictor of collective 
responsibility identified in the hierarchical regression analysis was ‘Awareness of in-
group transgressions,’ or the extent to which participants were knowledgeable about 
the atrocities committed by Japan against China and its other Asian neighbours 
during the Second World War. There is consensus among scholars of protracted 
conflicts that groups deliberately forget uncomfortable knowledge of their past. This 
practice is defined by some as ‘chosen amnesia,’ a mode of forgetting by which a 
society deliberately excludes unwanted or unsavoury aspects of their national past 
(Buckley-Zistel 2006, 133-4 in MacDonald). Nations and groups have histories that 
are remembered through cultural narratives, rituals and memorials. Collective 
“forgetting” is likely to occur if the group does not want to be reminded of the 
shameful history of wrongs committed (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). If historical 
narratives of wartime atrocity are not salient in society, then it is difficult for 
individuals to feel any remorse or responsibility for that past. In the previous chapter, 
I demonstrated that the Japanese collective remembrance of the Asia-Pacific war 
primarily focused on its history of victimization and selectively downplayed its 
history of aggression. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that regression analysis 
revealed that those with little knowledge of the harms committed in China felt less 
guilt and responsibility for Japan’s past transgressions.  
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This section aims to understand the degree to which ‘historical amnesia’ is prevalent 
amongst the Japanese people. To begin, however, it is important to ask whether 
‘historical amnesia’ can be diagnosed as a complete loss of memory, or more 
accurately partial or selective amnesia? To answer this question there is a need to 
assess the extent to which the Japanese are aware of the history of their nation’s 
atrocities and the sufferings inflicted on China and other Asian neighbours during the 
war, and to consider how this catalogue of transgressions is expressed in national 
historical narratives. To begin, this section introduces the survey results to provide a 
snapshot of Japanese knowledge and awareness of the history of the Nanjing 
Massacre. This will be followed by qualitative data revealing the processes by which 
respondents came to learn (or not learn) about Japan’s wartime transgressions. This 
research is particularly interested in discovering respondents’ sources of information 
about the war and whether these were influential in shaping their views about 
national history and responsibility for suffering inflicted by the Japanese army on the 
peoples of China and Korea.  
 
8.1.1  Historical awareness of the Nanjing Massacre 
 
Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they were aware of the history of 
the Nanjing Massacre and other wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese 
Imperial Army. A majority of 60 percent answered that they were somewhat aware of 
the incident while a combined 32 percent were unaware of the historical 
circumstances. The survey results highlight fundamental gaps in the participants’ 
awareness of Japanese military’s transgressions during the Second World War, with 
the majority simply answering that they are ‘somewhat aware.’ This indicates only 
minimal levels of consciousness and at least some desire to forget or gloss over what 
is known. It does indicate, however, that most Japanese have some awareness of 










8.2  Qualitative Responses: Historical Awareness of Japan's Transgressions 
The following comments from the qualitative interviews demonstrate what CRLow 
respondents meant when they answered 'somewhat aware' in the survey. Both Satoko 
and Tatsuya, like many who admitted they are ‘somewhat aware,’ explained that the 
Nanjing Massacre was briefly mentioned in history classes but not in any depth and 
quickly glossed over by the teacher. 
 
Satoko: I really don’t know much about the history of what the Japanese 
soldiers did in Nanjing. I did learn about it briefly in junior high and high 
school through history textbooks. The number of deaths from this incident 
that the Chinese claim is far greater than what we think it is. In class, the 
teacher quickly breezed through it and refrained from explaining anything in 
depth. He just said such an incident happened. So I do accept that horrible 
war crimes were committed but I still think China’s demand for apology is a 
political tactic. 
 
Tatsuya: I answered ‘somewhat aware.’ I first learned about the Nanjing 
incident in my history class in junior high and high school. The teacher at that 
time added that it is doubtful that the so-called “Nanjing Massacre” actually 













such an incident occurred and never discussed the matter in depth. So, to this 
day, I don’t really know much about what actually happened. 
 
It should be noted that a major difference that emerged between the two samples 
with high and low collective responsibility was in the degree of awareness and 
knowledge about the historical injustices that were committed by their in-group 
during the war. Several of the CRHigh respondents described their awakening 
experience when they visited a war museum in Nagasaki, a city that suffered from 
the American atomic bombing in 1945. Already at an early age, both Hayato and 
Haruko were exposed to the history about the Nanjing Massacre from the 
information introduced in the war museum. 
 
Hayato: I learned about the atrocities committed by the Japanese army at an 
early age....I was in fifth or sixth grade. There is a war museum in Nagasaki 
that introduces not only about Japanese victimization but also the history of 
the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731 and the comfort women. I saw these vivid 
photographic panels that described what the Japanese did when we colonized 
our Asian neighbours. I think it is such an important museum but 




In the quantitative survey, respondents were asked to select the top three information 
sources from which they learned about the Nanjing Massacre. The results revealed 
that 84 percent learned about the massacre through history textbooks at school, 
followed by 31 percent who learned about it through Japanese news programmes and 
25 percent who cited television programmes (including information programmes, 
dramas and documentaries). These results show clearly that school textbooks are the 









8.2.1  Qualitative responses: How I learned about the Nanjing Massacre 
 
In the follow-up interviews, almost all the CRLow respondents claimed that they first 
learned about the Nanjing Massacre through history textbooks but admitted that their 
knowledge was extremely sparse. Participants were further asked to describe how the 
Nanjing Massacre was introduced in the textbooks and what their reactions were 
when exposed to information about it. Interviewees explained that because the 
Japanese education system focuses on the rote learning of a massive number of 
historical dates in preparation for high school or university entrance exams there is 
little time to delve into controversial historical incidents like the Nanjing Massacre.  
The respondents also indicated that references to the Nanjing Massacre in the history 
textbooks were extremely brief and hardly noticeable, a single one-line footnote 
stating that ‘a massacre took place when Japanese armies invaded Nanjing.’ The 
ambiguity of this statement should be noted: the use of the passive voice means that 
no perpetrator is identified. 
 
Jiro: For your information, the Genpei War between the Genji and Heike 
clans is described in much more detail in history textbooks than the Nanjing 













footnote. That made me think that this piece of information is not that 
important for us to learn in history. I first read about it when I was in sixth 
grade but I felt nothing. I remember the incident was introduced together with 
a photo of a soldier on a horse and there was one line that said, “the surrender 
of Nanjing.” I have no doubt that the massacre must have happened but 
nobody really knows how many were actually killed. In wars things like that 
happen. It is all part of a war. Also, I recall the reference on Nanjing was 
written like it was some kind of a heroic act. 
 
Tatsuya: The Nanjing Massacre was only mentioned briefly at the bottom of a 
page of my history textbook as a footnote. Even in the supplementary 
material, it was a short account and the only thing I can remember is the 
photo of the soldier on a horse. At school, we spent much more time studying 
older Japanese history because it appears in the entrance exams. That was 
more important for us. 
 
Toshio: The Nanjing Massacre was mentioned as a footnote in my textbook. 
There was no explanation of what kind of conflict it was. Although we 
learned about it through history textbooks, I cannot say it is a good source. 
And the teacher avoided discussing the topic in depth because he needs to 
cover a lot of history in such a short time. 
 
The following comments by CRLow respondents show that, following the recent 
territorial dispute between China and Japan and the increase in media coverage of the 
history issue, uninformed members of the younger generation have taken to the 
Internet in an effort to learn more about Japan’s past. With cyberspace flooded with 
Japanese revisionist accounts of war history denying that the massacre took place, 
there is a possibility that any ignorance is as likely to be compounded by dominant 
nationalist war narratives which aim to expunge Japanese responsibility for suffering 
inflicted upon others. 
 
Toshiyuki: Most Japanese students who took history in school must have 
heard about the Nanjing Massacre in class or have read about it briefly in 
history textbooks. So I am not surprised why many would say they have 
‘some knowledge’ but are not sure of the details. I first learnt about it in the 
textbook but I later did my own research using the Internet.  
 
Researcher: Why did you decide to do a search on the Internet? 
 
Toshiyuki: I learned on the news that Japan was being virulently attacked by 
the Chinese about the Nanjing Massacre. I was perplexed by their emotional 
behaviour. So I became interested to find out more about this incident. What I 
read on the Internet were explanations that represented the pro-Japanese 
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perspective defending Japan’s position so I cannot say it was entirely 
objective. 
 
Yuji: I heard about the Nanjing Massacre for the first time after I entered 
college. It was featured on a television news programme. This triggered my 
interest and I wanted to know more about it so I decided to do my own 
research. I also took a course on post-war Japanese history in my university. I 
went through several books on what happened in China during the war. My 
conclusion after having studied the incident is that nobody really knows the 
truth. The university professor who studied this history in depth told us that 
“the incident probably did take place, but China is exaggerating the number 
of deaths.” I sort of believe that must have been the case. 
 
Although the survey indicated that the primary source of information on Japan’s 
history of military actions is school textbooks, the following comments highlight the 
integral role teachers play in shaping Japanese people’s interpretation of history. 
Teachers may opt to spend only minimal amounts of time on Second World War 
history—thereby implicitly reinforcing a denialist interpretation—or they may 
choose to go beyond the textbook, attending to contending accounts of the massacre, 
the various explanations for it, and its consequences. The following cases show the 
ways in which two teachers viewed the material through contrasting ideological 
lenses:  
 
Toshio: I cannot say I am knowledgeable about the history of Nanjing but I 
did learn about it in junior high and high school history classes. Yes, I am 
aware that these incidents happened. But I still find it annoying that the 
Chinese are so persistent in their criticism that we’re not apologetic enough. 
In our history classes, we only briefly went over the history of the so-called 
Nanjing Incident and never really discussed it in depth. The same thing can 
be said about the comfort women. I didn’t know about the ongoing debate 
until I learned about it through the television news. I do remember that our 
history teacher mentioned in class that it is doubtful that a systematic 
massacre called Nanjing Massacre, as the Chinese describe it, actually 
happened. 
 
Ryutaro: I first learned about the Nanjing Massacre through textbooks that 
were used for exam preparation at the cram school. The teacher at my cram 
school was quite passionate about this topic and discussed this in depth. He 
said that the number of deaths may be still debatable but some scholars say 
that there were more Chinese deaths than from the atomic bombing of 




Hiromi: In our class [university], the professor made us watch a documentary 
film about what the Japanese army did in the Philippines during the war. I 
was utterly shocked. It was just horrifying. I have to admit that it is indeed a 
shameful past…a sad page in Japanese history. War comes with tragedies but 
we should reflect on the past and make sure this kind of mistake is never 
repeated again. 
 
I probed those respondents who revealed that they had conducted their own 
investigations into the Nanjing Massacre. I was particularly interested in 
understanding how they felt when they were made aware of the full scope of the 
incident. All three respondents wanted to distance themselves from the event and 
despite their increased awareness they blocked or had no particularly empathetic 
feelings for the victims. When seen through the lens of social identity theory, these 
participants’ responses could be taken as a defensive reaction aimed at protecting 
their in-group’s positive moral status. 
 
Tatsuya: I cannot feel any remorse because they’re debating about numbers of 
deaths. It is a historical event that happened in the distant past. If you told me 
that 8000 people were killed in Tokyo today, that would really shake me up. 
But if you told me 8000 people were killed 100 years ago in China, that 
doesn’t really grab my attention. To me, the Nanjing Massacre is like that—
an incident that happened in the distant past. 
 
Jiro: Nanjing Massacre is an incident of the past. It is like hearing, “Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi [Shogun] invaded Korea and killed thousands of Koreans.” It is 
just another historical fact. The Imperial Army of the Pacific War and Shogun 
Hideyoshi’s army are the same in my mind. It is all part of history, something 
that happened in the distant past. 
 
Ryutaro: It has nothing to do with me personally. But if you showed me 
details of how Chinese women and children were actually raped and killed, I 
would feel very sorry. I would feel sympathy towards the victims. But I 
cannot associate today’s bellicose Chinese with the poor victims. 
 
8.3  Was the Asia-Pacific War a War of Aggression? 
Another question that was asked in the survey was whether respondents thought that 
the Asia-Pacific War (1931-45) was a war of aggression or not. This is an issue that 
sits at the heart of Chinese and Korean criticisms against Japan’s ‘historical 
amnesia’—i.e. whether Japan admits that the war from 1931-45 was a war of 
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aggression or not. Nearly 70 percent of respondents agreed that the last war was a 
war of Japanese aggression. These responses support the survey’s findings that 
majority of the Japanese interviewed do know that Japan engaged in aggressive acts 
during the war, but that they wish to deal with this knowledge at an abstract and 
general rather than specific and concrete level.   
 




8.4  Qualitative Responses: War of Aggression? 
Similarly, in the qualitative interviews, all twenty-five interviewees acknowledged 
that the Asia-Pacific War was a war of aggression. Particularly for those respondents 
who expressed low collective responsibility, this acknowledgement resulted in 
neither expressions of sympathy for the victims nor feelings of guilt. Japan’s 
victimhood trope seemed to inhibit interviewees from feeling any remorse for 
Chinese victims as they felt that ‘everyone suffered in the war.’ 
 
Satoko: Yes, I think it was a war of aggression. I am not too knowledgeable 
about this history but I believe we were taught that Japan occupied other 
countries in Asia. But that didn’t really make me feel sorry because in a 
similar sense, Americans also wrought horrifying damages and sufferings to 
the Japanese during the war. I felt they were similar incidents in history…it is 















Toshiyuki: Yes, I learned from history textbooks that Japan did invade China. 
But we suffered from the atomic bombs, too. Do we still bombard America 
with criticisms for dropping the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? No! We 
moved on, letting bygones be bygones. We lost the war but we were positive 
in our attitude and focused our energies on preventing the same tragedy from 
happening again. China, on the other hand, is still living in the past. 
 
 
8.5  Summary 
Historical memories are embedded in people’s minds through different kinds of 
educational, social and political sources. The findings of the survey indicated that the 
current generation of young Japanese is not entirely ignorant about the specifics of 
the war, with 60 percent claiming that they are ‘somewhat’ aware of the war 
atrocities committed in Nanjing and a combined 32 percent (‘not aware at all’ and 
‘not really aware’) unsure of what happened. My qualitative interviews shed light on 
some of the ways in which Japan’s historical transgressions are downplayed in the 
Japanese education system.  
 
As for the Japanese participants’ perception of the last war (1931-45), a strong 
majority of 70 percent agreed that it was a war of aggression. However, the 
interviews show that while students know that Japan invaded Asia, war narratives in 
textbooks and other media still emphasize the suffering inflicted on the people of 
Japan. In qualitative interviews CRLow respondents reinforced the forgetfulness of 
atrocity by arguing for Japan’s suffering and victimisation to be given as much 






8.6  Negative Out-group Attitude 
Prejudice and stereotyping are inextricably linked. Both phenomena involve a 
preconceived negative evaluation of a group and its members. Prejudice is, an 
antipathy based upon faulty and inflexible generalizations (Allport, 1954, 9) and can 
become a determinant of inter-group conflicts. Past research has demonstrated that 
negative out-group attitudes can also be a significant predictor of diminished 
collective guilt and responsibility (Hewstone et al., 2004). The hierarchical 
regression analysis presented in my study supported this finding by showing that 
Japanese prejudice towards the Chinese was the third strongest negative predictor of 
collective responsibility acceptance. Consistent with recent poll results conducted by 
various institutes, my survey results also showed that a large percentage of Japanese 
harbour negative attitudes towards the Chinese. As prejudice is a critical factor in the 
protraction of conflict and hinders efforts at reconciliation, it is crucial to explore the 
socio-political dynamics that generate this increasing antipathy towards the Chinese. 
Japanese prejudice towards China and the Chinese reflects some deeply held national 
stereotypes. The present study will draw on Stephan et al.’s integrated threat theory 
to explore the extent to which the prejudice of Japanese participants is driven by 
negative stereotypes, symbolic threats, inter-group anxiety and realistic threats. The 
aim is to understand the drivers of negative out-group attitudes which reduce 
Japanese willingness to accept responsibility for past injustice. The qualitative data is 
based on interviews conducted with survey participants who reported low levels of 
collective responsibility and high levels of prejudice towards the Chinese. 
 
8.6.1 Descriptive Data: Perception of the out-group 
 
Participants were asked to indicate their image/perception of the Chinese on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (favourable) to 5 (unfavourable). Higher scores 
denote greater negative perception of the out-group. Findings showed that 77 percent 




Figure 11: Perception of the Out-group 
 
 
8.6.2  Qualitative responses: China vs. Chinese 
 
Although the survey questions specifically asked respondents to think about the 
Chinese, I reconfirmed in the qualitative interviews that their impressions were 
driven in the main by their feelings towards China as a state, as opposed to the 
Chinese as a people. Qualitative interviews revealed a difference in perception: 
participants’ views on China as a state or system were distinct from their views on its 
people. Namie’s statement reveals that her image of the Chinese is more positive 
than that of the state. The majority of my interviewees shared this perspective. 
 
Namie: The Chinese in mainland China seem to be violent, unruly and out of 
control. So my image of China is quite negative. However, the Chinese 
people I am acquainted with are actually quite friendly and cheerful.  
 
Researcher: If you were to choose a colour/shade in the range of black-grey-






















Namie: Black for my overall image of China, grey for the Chinese people in 
China, and whitish grey for Chinese individuals I have met here in Japan. 
 
8.7  Prejudice 
Past research based on integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan 1996; Stephan et 
al., 1999) has investigated the underlying sources and predictors of prejudice and 
identified four key variables—realistic threats, symbolic threats, inter-group anxiety, 
and negative stereotypes. Integrated threat theory posits that ‘realistic threats’ or 
threats to the very existence of the group, ‘symbolic threats’ or threats that challenge 
the worldview and traditional values of the group, ‘inter-group anxiety’ or feelings of 
threat that arise out of concern about negative outcomes from interactions with the 
out-group and ‘negative stereotyping’ all contribute to significantly heightened 
prejudice towards the ‘Other.’ 
 
A modified out-group attitude scale based on integrated threat theory was employed 
to measure the participants’ level of prejudice towards the Chinese. Participants were 
asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with different 
evaluative and emotional reactions towards the Chinese on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A recognized way of 
operationalising prejudice is to identify items that typify stereotypes found amongst 
the out-group (Madon et al., 2001). Negative stereotyping was measured by 
assessing to what extent the Chinese were perceived to possess such negative traits 
as ‘un-trustworthy (reverse-scored),’ ‘aggressive,’ ‘self-centred’ and ‘un-friendly 
(reverse-scored).’ Symbolic threats were assessed with the item ‘the Chinese don’t 
follow rules’, which poses a challenge to Japanese moral values that place 
importance on ‘conformity to law and order.’ Past studies have demonstrated that 
when these negative traits are attributed to an out-group, in-group members are likely 
to have negative expectations concerning their interaction with out-group members, 
leading them to fear negative outcomes in the course of inter-group interaction. This 
fear may then lead them to hold negative attitudes towards the out-group (Stephan & 
Stephan, 1996). Findings have demonstrated that a high level of negative 
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stereotyping can increase the perception of threat from out-groups and a as well as 
the likelihood of prejudice. Lastly, an item related to ‘China’s military threat’ was 
included to measure participants’ attitudes towards realistic threats posed by China. 
Realistic threats were also evaluated using a separate measure which will be later 
analysed in depth. 
 
Findings showed that on average 50 percent of the participants (M = 3.16, SD = 
1.12) associated negative traits with the Chinese. At 56 percent, more than half felt 
that the Chinese cannot be trusted, 46 percent found the Chinese to be aggressive, 49 
percent felt that the Chinese do not conform to rules, 50 percent found them to be 
self-centred and 66 percent did not find them to be friendly. In sum, the descriptive 
data suggests that negative stereotyping is salient amongst the Japanese, resulting in 
moderately high levels of prejudice towards the Chinese. The following sections will 
explore the underlying sources that may be contributing to different threat 
perceptions.  
 


























8.7.1  Realistic threats 
 
Realistic threats are threats that are perceived to jeopardize the very existence of the 
group. To understand the extent to which the Japanese perceive China as a realistic 
threat, a scale was adapted based on Stephan et al.’s realistic threat model with 5 
items representing China’s political, economic, military and health-related threats 
(See Table 14). Participants responded on a 7-point scale from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (7). As the figures in Table 1 suggest, an extremely high percentage 
of Japanese feel anxious about China’s realistic threats (M = 5.57, SD = .90). 
However, when compared with ‘moral identity threat,’ ‘realistic threats’ showed 
weaker correlation with ‘negative out-group attitude’ (r = .18, p < .05) and did not 
emerge as a significant predictor of collective guilt. It should be noted that 
participants’ relatively high scores for realistic threats may owe much to the heavy 
concentration of media coverage related to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute and 
the air pollution problem prior to the survey. 
 
Table 14: Realistic Threats 

















1. I feel anxious when I see 
Chinese vessels entering 
Japanese territorial waters. 
90.2 2.5 7.4 M=5.67 
SD=1.17 
2. China establishing its ADIZ 
over Senkaku Islands is 
worrying. 
84.6 5.6 9.8 M=5.56 
SD=1.20 
3. China’s actions to secure 
energy resources seem selfish. 
87.0 2.5 10.4 M=5.6 
SD=1.31 
4. China’s military build-up is 
a threat to our security. 
81.5 2.5 16.1 M=5.43 
SD=1.40 
5. China’s pollution is 
affecting Japanese people’s 
health. 
84.6 1.9 13.6 M=5.60 
SD=1.42 
Note: Items are scored from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scale 




8.7.2  Qualitative responses: Realistic threats 
 
Past polling data has revealed that Japanese esteem of the Chinese declined around 
the time a Chinese fishing boat collided into a Japanese coast guard vessel in 2010, 
and in 2012, when the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands dispute increased tension between 
the two countries. During this period, coverage of Chinese military threats increased 
in the Japanese media. The following interviewees’ comments reflect a widely-held 
view amongst the Japanese public that ‘China acts unilaterally in international 
affairs.’ The majority of respondents felt anxious about China’s aggressive and self-
interested moves to claim natural resources in Asian territories in contravention of 
international norms and the interests of other countries. 
 
Yumi: China unilaterally designated an air defense identification zone over 
the Senkaku Islands. Who does that in this day and age? They don’t play by 
international rules. China is trying to build security in Asia with China as the 
centre whereas Japan finds peace and security based on US-Japan and US-
South Korea relations. I am not sure about the politics of all this, but Chinese 
behaviour to me looks unilateral and aggressive. For this reason, my image of 
China is black. I find the Chinese to be intimidating. 
 
Kuniko: I was recently shocked by the news about China expanding its claim 
in the South China Sea and digging up undersea resources in the Philippines. 
They are so self-centred and greedy. 
 
News about China’s toxic air pollution having a negative impact on Japanese health 
generated considerable media attention in Japan before the interviews were 
conducted. The interviewees felt that China’s hazardous air pollution affects the 
safety of people in neighbouring countries and is yet another example of China’s 
self-centredness and irresponsible behaviour. 
 
Emiko: I have never been to China so my impression is purely shaped by 
what I see and hear in the media. I don’t have a good impression of China or 
the Chinese. It is worrying that their air pollution of over PM 2.5 is affecting 
the Japanese environment. I was appalled by the illegal copying of theme 
park characters. It was obvious to anybody’s eye that it was a knock-off of 
Disney’s characters but they were so blatantly unashamed as to present them 
as their original creations. In terms of cleanliness, I heard that Japanese 
business travellers are advised not to swallow water when taking a shower in 
China. It is definitely not a country I want to visit in the future. 
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The following comments mirror increasing apprehension amongst the Japanese 
public towards China’s continuous military assertiveness as the geopolitical power in 
the Asian region. The comments indicate that China’s military expansion and 
maritime border disputes are posing realistic threats and exacerbating Japanese 
anxieties. The high concentration of media coverage of the Senkaku Islands dispute 
has caused the participants’ perception of China to deteriorate rapidly. Fifteen 
interviewees mentioned that they found their aggressive behaviour to be ‘irrational’, 
‘scary’ and ‘difficult to understand.’ 
 
Yuji: The news on the islands dispute really reinforced my negative image of 
China. I found their moves to occupy our islands to be ‘irrational.’ I just 
couldn’t understand their behaviour. Why can’t they settle this issue 
diplomatically?  
 
Hiromi: When the world in general is making efforts to build peace, I find it 
very alarming and scary that China is expanding its military and posing a 
threat to its neighbouring countries, especially Japan. I find it difficult to 
understand. I find them to be scary. 
 
Kuniko: China is a fast-growing economy but instead of investing in military 
expansion there are other things they should be spending their money on. The 
Cold War is over. I don’t understand what they are after.…what is the point of 
strengthening its military power now? For what purpose? Based on what I see 
on the news, it seems like China is trying to compete with and become more 
powerful than its rival, Japan. I find that scary and difficult to understand. 
 
Rieko: China is trying to compete with Japan militarily. Their move into 
Japanese territorial waters is a sign of their rivalry. If they want to compete so 
much, why not compete in terms of economic power or technology? That 
should be the posture of a mature, developed country. They are countering the 
world’s trend towards building peace and security. 
  
As shown in Section 8.1, because Japanese participants have limited knowledge 
about Japan’s past misdeeds during the war, belligerent attacks by Chinese protestors 
on television (for example) appear perplexing and uncivilized.  
 
Ryutaro: My impression of the Chinese is negative. I see them as a group of 
aggressive people unilaterally attacking us and flaring up anti-Japanese 
sentiments. I guess it comes from the television images of angry Chinese 
bashing Japanese cars and destroying Japanese shops in China. Their violent 
behaviour seems so irrational and uncivilised to me. 
 183 
 
Yumi: I have an impression of the Chinese as forceful and high-handed. I 
don’t understand their logic. Their angry claims about Japan not facing up to 
the past are irrational and difficult for Japanese to understand or accept. I 
want to ask them to please calm down and try to talk about this in a cordial 
manner. I find the heavy-handed statements that the Chinese leaders make on 
television to be particularly shocking. It makes me wonder if they genuinely 
want to resolve this issue or not. 
 
Shinji: My negative perception of the Chinese stems from the fact that I 
cannot understand or trust them. Why does the country go out of its way to 
purposefully generate hatred towards the Japanese? I understand that their 
anti-Japanese sentiments are rooted in what happened during the war. But I 
cannot agree with the Chinese government’s move to constantly play the 
'victim of the tragedy' card. They play dirty. Of course, Japan should reflect 
on its wrongdoing in the past but I thought this issue was resolved based on a 
bilateral agreement signed by two countries. It is a settled issue. We need to 
focus more on creating a better relationship for the future. Hatred is not going 
to produce any beneficial results. 
 
8.7.3  Symbolic threats 
 
Japanese negative attitudes towards the Chinese are shaped by the interplay of 
various complex factors. Drawing on Stephan et al.’s integrated threat theory, another 
possible factor that may be contributing to increasing Japanese antipathy towards the 
Chinese is ‘symbolic threats’, threats posed by perceived differences in cultural 
values and beliefs (Stephan et al., 2002). As Japanese cultural values tend to attach 
considerable importance to qualities such as ‘harmony,’ ‘conformity’ and ‘adherence 
to law and order,’ media portrayals of rude and uncivilised Chinese behaviour, 
coupled with negative contacts with Chinese, led many interviewees to experience 
aversive emotions towards them. ‘They don’t play by fair rules’ was a common 
observation voiced by the interviewees. Examples included China’s counterfeit 
culture, Chinese lack of social moral behaviour, and a lack of good public manners. 
 
Seijiro: My impression of China is based on what I hear on the television 
news or read on SNS [social network]. I don’t have any good images of the 
country. It is still underdeveloped, dirty and environmentally backward. 
Chinese people don’t play by fair rules; they copy and steal ideas and sell a 
lot of counterfeits. I don’t have any friends who are Chinese so a lot of my 
perception is shaped by what I see on television and the Internet. 
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Yuji: I studied in England last year for one year and met many Chinese 
exchange students there. My overall impression is that they are self-centred 
and unwilling to conform to rules. They do their own thing and did not try to 
accommodate other people’s needs especially when we tried to organize 
group activities amongst the international students.  
 
Even in Tokyo, I see a lot of Chinese tourists walking on the streets and they 
are so noisy. Also, they never wait in line. Why do the Chinese always cut in 
line? This is unthinkable. They are rude, with no manners or consideration for 
others. 
 
Rieko: When I went to Chinatown in Yokohama, I was stunned by how pushy 
and greedy the Chinese merchants were. That image was further reinforced 
when I saw the Chinese political leaders’ belligerent statements criticizing 
Japan on television. 
 
8.8  Qualitative Responses: Why China Cannot be Trusted 
One of the anxieties expressed was about China’s dishonesty. Recent scandals 
involving the recall of Chinese food products were widely publicized in Japanese 
news programmes. Interviewees’ comments reveal that these scandals generated a 
strong perception that the Chinese cannot be trusted. Awareness of unreliable 
Chinese products was found to be extremely high amongst the Japanese. According 
to the Pew Research Center’s survey conducted in 2008, a near-unanimous 96 
percent of the Japanese said that they were aware of the recalls of food products and 
other goods manufactured in China. The news about tainted and toxic food being 
supplied to the Japanese market came as a shock to the Japanese, who value integrity 
and conformity to rules and regulations. 
 
Satoko: My perception of the Chinese people became negative after hearing 
the news about frozen dumplings made in China containing a high 
concentration of toxic herbicides. And they were sold to Japan! I don’t 
personally know any Chinese people but because Chinese products cannot be 
trusted, my general impression is that the Chinese are untrustworthy as well. 
 
Hiromi: I find the Chinese to be irresponsible and dishonest. Recently, on the 
television news, I heard about the McDonald’s chicken nugget scandal in 
which tainted meat was supplied by a Chinese company to McDonald’s. The 
Chinese supplier was completely irresponsible and failed to manage the 
quality of food products. I find it absolutely appalling that rotten meat was 
supplied to make chicken nuggets that we eat. I was shocked by how these 
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Chinese companies are self-serving, with no concern for customers’ health 
and well-being.  
 
8.9  Sources of Information About the Out-group 
Information provided by societal channels and institutions exert considerable 
influence in shaping stereotypes about out-groups (Bar-Tal, 1997, 505). In order to 
understand which sources are influential in forming Japanese negative attitudes 
towards the Chinese, participants were asked to choose the top three sources of 
information they rely on for their knowledge of China and the Chinese people. The 
results were largely consistent with Genron NPO’s survey results (2014), in which 95 
percent of the respondents cited Japanese news media as the primary source of 
information, followed by 25.2 percent who chose Japanese television programmes as 
the second largest source of information on China. 
 























8.9.1  Do you trust Japanese media coverage on China? 
 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they trusted the information 
on China that was released in the Japanese media. Close to 50 percent of the 
Japanese believe that domestic media provide trustworthy coverage of China and the 
Chinese while 28 percent answered that they do not trust the objectivity of coverage 
of China in the Japanese media.  
 
Figure 14: Credibility of Domestic Media Coverage on China 
 
 
8.10  Summary 
For this study, a number of approaches were used to examine the sources underlying 
Japanese negative attitudes toward the Chinese. As the earlier regression analyses 
revealed, negative out-group attitude is an important predictor of diminished 
collective guilt. A straightforward question in the survey asked whether the 
respondents had a favourable or an unfavourable impression of the Chinese and a 
strong majority of 77 percent answered that their perception was unfavourable. 
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As prejudice is an attitude that participants normally wish to hide, various implicit 
measures were employed to assess the extent to which prejudice is consciously or 
unconsciously salient among the participants. The Negative out-group attitude scale 
attempted to measure participants’ responses to negative stereotype traits frequently 
attached to the Chinese (trustworthy [reverse coded], aggressive, self-centred), and 
symbolic threat (won’t follow rules). Results showed that about 50 percent of the 
respondents associated these negative stereotype traits with the Chinese (M = 3.16, 
SD = 1.12).  
 
Of particular relevance to this research is the salience of identity-related factors in 
driving both prejudice and the lessening of collective responsibility. This study’s 
findings showed that, as societal channels work to suppress Japanese people’s war 
memory, the threat to Japanese moral identity from China’s accusations about 
Japan’s past injustices significantly heightens negative emotions toward the Chinese, 
diminishing feelings of remorse and guilt for the past and hindering possibilities for 
reconciliation. 
 
8.11  Intergroup Contact 
Ignorance about the out-group is known to engender negative stereotyping and 
prejudice. Past scholarship on intergroup contact has shown that quality contact with 
the out-group can provide individuals with enhanced knowledge about the other, help 
them take the perspective of the out-group, reduce their feelings of anxiety, and 
combat prejudice. Intergroup contact therefore has played an important mediating 
role in reducing intergroup anxiety and prejudice. The intergroup contact hypothesis 
first proposed by Allport (1954), suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact 
are generated when contact occurs under four key conditions: equal status, intergroup 
cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. 
Various studies have been conducted which aim to understand the effects of different 
types of contact – direct and indirect – in mediating and moderating intergroup 
prejudice, with recent work demonstrating that intergroup contact yields the most 
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effective positive outcomes when contact takes the form of cross-group friendships 
(Pettigrew, 1997; Davies et al., 2011).  
 
This section determines what kind of contact conditions exist between the Japanese 
and Chinese, and whether they are sufficient to influence the former's perceptions of 
the latter, or to encourage Japanese descendants to view their own war history 
through the lens of Japan's victims. This study’s hierarchical regression analysis 
indicated that high levels of contact with the out-group was not only correlated with 
a decrease in prejudice but also predicted higher levels of collective responsibility 
among Japanese participants. The aim of this section is to explore the nature of the 
contact participants have with the Chinese both in terms of quantity and quality. 
Qualitative interviews were conducted with both CRLow and CRHigh respondents to 
further understand at what level they interact with the Chinese, and to assess whether 
instances of contact are adequate in terms of frequency and closeness to allow 
meaningful relationships to develop between the two groups. I will explore whether 
there is a relationship between Japanese individuals’ limited contact experiences with 
the out-group and their diminished sense of collective responsibility for the nation’s 
past harm-doing. 
 
8.11.1  Contact with the out-group 
 
In the survey, participants were asked to indicate the type of contact settings they 
have with the Chinese. Participants’ level of contact was measured on a 5-point scale 
(1: no contact, 2: no personal acquaintance but have contact with the Chinese, 3: 
tourist visit, 4: having a work- or schoolmate(s) who is Chinese, 5: having a close 
friend(s) who is Chinese), with higher scores denoting greater quality of contact. 
Respondents were asked to choose one of the five contact settings that best described 
their engagement with the Chinese. 
 
Descriptive data in Table 15 indicates that only 22 percent of the participants 
reported having close friends who are Chinese, 26 percent meet with Chinese 
regularly at work or at school, 51 percent have no Chinese personal acquaintances 
but have contact with the Chinese in their immediate environment, only 1 percent 
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have visited China in the past, and 25 percent have had no contact with the Chinese. 
With a steady increase in the number of Chinese students enrolled in universities in 
Japan, Japanese students must surely be presented with more opportunities for 
interactions with the Chinese compared to the general public. And yet, despite the 
recent increase in multi-dimensional exchanges between the two countries, these 
findings show that a significant majority of 76 percent do not have any substantive 
interaction with the Chinese. Intergroup contact can become a starting point for 
reducing out-group bias, and distrust and facilitating better relations. However, 
certain prerequisite conditions must be present for contact between groups to be 
successful. In the current sample, participants share an equal status with the Chinese 
as fellow students but whether that relationship is cooperative or not depends on the 
proximity that they share. Further, weak or negative contacts with the out-group are 
unlikely to be effective in reducing prejudice and improving the individual’s 
perception of the ‘other.’ 
 
In evaluating the quantity of out-group contact, participants were asked to indicate 
how frequently they met with Chinese. As seen in Figure 16, 14 percent of 
participants have daily interactions with the Chinese, 35 percent have weekly contact 
and 14 percent have monthly contact. The remaining 37 percent have no contact or 
their contact is less frequent than once a year. Overall, most Japanese participants’ 
interactions with the Chinese are insufficiently frequent for the fostering of close, 
interpersonal relationships that have the potential to lead to cross-group friendships. 
This may be considered a wasted opportunity, as Japanese university students have 
more opportunities than the general public to interact closely with Chinese students 
and engage in equal-status contacts that have the potential to affect a reduction in 
prejudice. The interviews explore the nature of the contact between CRLow and 
CRHigh participants and the Chinese and investigate if there are any factors making 




Table 15: Contact with the Out-group 




Number of Respondents Percent 
I have a close friend who is 
Chinese 
36 22% 
I have a Chinese 
school/workmate whom I 
regularly see 
42 26% 
I have visited China before 
(tourism) 
2 1% 
I have no personal 
acquaintance who is Chinese 
(but I meet Chinese in my 
immediate environment) 
41 25% 
I have no contact with the 
Chinese 
41 25% 






















8.12  Qualitative Responses: Contact with the Out-group 
During the interviews, CRLow participants were asked to describe their relationships 
with the out-group. All fifteen interviewees who reported low levels of collective 
guilt said that they have no friends who are Chinese, let alone close friends. Although 
some participants regularly see Chinese students on campus, their interactions are 
extremely sporadic and not intimate enough to enhance their knowledge or shift their 
perception of the ‘other.’ Even for those interviewees who have reported their 
encounters with the Chinese to be neutral, these experiences seem not to be strong 
enough to counter the negative images of the Chinese that have been salient in the 
Japanese media. This finding is consistent with past contact studies that have 
revealed passive contacts between groups have very little effect in lowering prejudice 
toward the out-group (Pettigrew, 1997). The following comments of the CRLow 
interviewees were indicative of their lack of quality contact with the out-group. 
 
Shinji: There are two Chinese exchange students in our department but they 
always hang out together and hardly ever talk to us. 
 
Naoki: There are Chinese students enrolled in my department but I think I 
















because they are Chinese. I don’t have anything negative to say about these 
students. Chinese students in Japan are more educated and objective about 
what is happening so they don’t really express strong anti-Japanese 
sentiments. It is the mainland Chinese who are brainwashed by the Chinese 
government and the media and are aggressive in their attacks. My negative 
image is shaped by ‘those Chinese.’ 
 
Emiko: There are two Chinese exchange students in my university. I do talk 
to them sometimes. I don’t find them to be unpleasant at all. I have nothing 
bad to say about them. But I still have a very negative impression of the 
Chinese and it is not because of these students. It is because of what I see and 
hear in the media. 
 
Although interviewees may hold an opinion of Chinese acquaintances that is not 
generally negative, if they observe in their encounters certain cultural traits which 
seem to oppose Japanese traditional values then these instances of negative contact 
may work to reinforce existent stereotypes, pose symbolic threats and reconfirm 
anxieties toward the Chinese. 
 
Yumi: I currently live in the university dormitory and there are many Chinese 
students there. They are very loud, talkative and not very considerate of 
others. They are basically cheerful people so I don’t have any negative 
impressions of them. But they are quite demanding and assertive and I just 
find that to be a bit overwhelming. My negative image of the Chinese is 
shaped by how they behave and what I see on television. I find them to be a 
bit scary.  
 
Recent research on intergroup contact and prejudice reveals that the affective 
dimensions are critical for reducing negative feelings towards the out-group. 
'Feelings of closeness' have been shown to strongly affect the group’s positive 
emotions toward the out-group. Studies have shown that while intergroup contact 
typically reduces prejudice, it is most effective for reducing prejudice when it 
consists of close, high-quality intergroup relationships such as those afforded by 
cross-group friendships (Davies et al., 2011). It is therefore concerning to discover 
that only 22 percent of Japanese participants engage in ‘high quality contact’ with the 
Chinese while an overwhelming majority of almost 78 percent have passive or no 
contact that fails to provide them with opportunities for a more personalized 
interaction and cognitive learning of the ‘other.’ 
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Past research on the effects of contact has demonstrated that general knowledge 
about the out-group may not in itself be enough for contact to induce positive 
mediating effects and reduce prejudice. Both the quantitative and qualitative results 
of this study showed that the majority of the participants who felt reduced guilt for 
their group’s past injustices lack any kind of substantial contact with members of the 
out-group, the kind of engagement that is likely to increase trust and understanding. 
 
8.12.1 When intergroup contact fails: Negative contacts 
 
This study revealed that even if the interactions are frequent, not all intergroup 
contact leads to positive outcomes that induce better understanding of the ‘other’ and 
reduce prejudice. However, when a negative contact occurs, it has been found to 
increase threat perception and anxiety. When there is limited contact and a salient 
stereotyped image of the out-group in society, a lack of cultural understanding of the 
other results in negative contacts reconfirming respondents’ existent negative 
evaluation of the out-group. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Japanese culture 
places particular importance on conformity to rules and politeness. The interviewees’ 
observations of Chinese behaviour in their everyday environment only confirmed 
their anxiety about and exacerbated their negative opinion of the Chinese. 
 
Satoko: I don’t have any personal acquaintances who are Chinese. However, I 
am working part-time at a bakery and I meet with Chinese customers perhaps 
three to five times a week. There are polite ones and rude ones. There are 
Chinese customers who are polite and don’t forget to say, “Thank you” to me. 
On the other hand, there are other Chinese customers who do unbelievable 
things like touch the bread with their bare hands before buying it. They are 
supposed to use tongs! I was appalled by their irresponsible behaviour!  
 
Rieko: I went to Chinatown in Yokohama. I was overwhelmed by the 
pushiness of the Chinese people. I did hear that they are quite aggressive in 
their sales tactics but I saw firsthand how greedy and pushy they are. The 
Chinese students at my university are also pretty brash and overbearing and at 
times, I feel uncomfortable with their 'in-your-face' behaviour. I get the same 
image when I watch Chinese political leaders speaking on the news. They are 
so direct and aggressive. In reality, my actual contact with Chinese people is 




8.13  Summary 
Contact emerged as one of the significant positive predictors of collective guilt and 
negatively correlated with participants’ prejudice towards the Chinese. This section 
explored the nature of Japanese participants’ interaction with the Chinese. An 
important finding of this study highlights that out of 162 survey participants, only 22 
percent reported having close friendships with the Chinese. Further, and consistent 
with survey results, none of the fifteen interviewees with low collective 
responsibility indicated that they had any intimate, friendly relationship with a 
Chinese.  
 
Although Japanese university students have more opportunities than the general 
public to interact with Chinese students in classroom settings or even participate in 
cooperative group activities on campus, less than 30 percent answered that they have 
regular contact with Chinese school- or workmates. Further, the qualitative 
interviews with the participants revealed that even if participants engage with the 
Chinese on campus, (two interviewees said they participate in extracurricular 
activities with Chinese students), their contact with each other does not develop into 




9.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
9.1  Summation of Key Findings and Revisiting the Research Questions 
The previous chapter presented the findings of both the quantitative and qualitative 
phases of the research and focused on the analyses of factors that may be standing as 
inhibitors to Japanese descendants’ acceptance of collective responsibility for their 
nation’s past injustices. The purpose of this chapter is to interpret these findings by 
revisiting the thesis' central research questions and by providing a more holistic and 
integrated understanding of the study in relation to the existent literature on 
collective guilt, responsibility, collective memory and positive identity needs. This 
section will present qualitative data that compares and contrasts the perceptions of 
CRLow participants with those of CRHigh participants who, although much smaller in 
proportion, were willing to accept responsibility and redress the past. Their 
experiences help augment the present study’s understanding of why some Japanese 
are unable to accept responsibility for the nation’s past misdeeds and raise some 
normative questions about what needs to be transformed for deeper contrition to take 
place amongst descendants of the perpetrator group. 
 
Research Question 1) To what extent are contemporary Japanese willing to accept 
inherited responsibility for the injustices committed by their forebears? 
 
9.1.1  Finding 1: The majority of Japanese participants felt that they should not 
be blamed for their ancestors' past mistakes 
 
The first research question sought to assess the extent to which the contemporary 
Japanese are willing to accept responsibility and express repentance for the harm 
committed by their ancestors. This study examined the survey’s statistical data and 
considered it together with qualitative interview results in order to understand why 
some Japanese feel collective responsibility when confronted with accusations about 
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their nation’s negative past and why others do not. The findings revealed that the 
majority of participants felt that they should not have to assume responsibility for 
their ancestors' past mistakes. Five items of the collective responsibility scale 
employed in this study were designed to measure to what extent the participants felt 
that 'the present generation should bear ongoing responsibility for Japan’s military 
actions during the war [inherited collective responsibility] and to what extent 'they 
felt remorse for these actions [collective guilt].' Survey findings showed that 64 
percent of the respondents felt that they did not and should not bear any 
responsibility for what past generations did during the war while 36 percent felt that 
the current generation should assume some ongoing guilt for the nation's past 
actions. 
 
One of the most contested issues in Japanese public debate on wartime history 
revolves around the question of how long each generation should continue to bear 
responsibility for the actions of their forebears. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe's official statement on 14 August, 2015 marking the seventieth anniversary of 
the end of World War clarifies his position regarding the issue of the present 
generation's ongoing responsibility for the war by stating that, "Japan has repeatedly 
expressed the feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology for its actions during 
the war....We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations 
to come, who have nothing to do with the war, be predestined to apologize." While 
he implies that Japan has apologized enough and future generations should not have 
to continue apologizing, the statement continues, "Even so, we Japanese, across 
generations, must squarely face history. We have a responsibility to inherit the past, 
in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future" (Abe, 2015). This ambiguity of 
'inheriting the past without the need to apologize' seems to be reflected in divided 
Japanese public opinion on the issue. NHK's survey of May 2000 (Makita, 2000) 
assessing the attitudes of the Japanese public towards their nation's war history asked 
the following question, 'Do you think the post-war generation should still bear 
responsibility for Japan's actions during the last war?' Results showed that 50 percent 
of the Japanese agreed that the post-war generation should assume responsibility for 
Japan's actions during the war, while 27 percent denied Japan's continuing 
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responsibility and 5 percent felt that Japan did not have any responsibility for the war 
in the first place (Makita 2000, 19). 
 
Question: Do you think the post-war generation should still bear responsibility 
for Japan’s actions during the last war? 
 
Figure 17: NHK Opinion Poll (May, 2000) Post-war Generation's War 
Responsibility 
 
Source: Makita 2000, 19. 
Note: No responsibility=those who believe that Japan lacked any responsibility for 
the outbreak of the war. N= 2,143 
 
As this study is the first to assess Japanese inherited war responsibility using a 
multiple-item psychological measure, direct comparison with past studies' data sets 
may be problematic. In an attempt to explore whether Japanese descendants' 
willingness to accept inherited responsibility has increased or diminished over time, 
the results of this study were compared with previous NHK opinion poll data of 
2000. Although the samples are not identical, compared to 14 years ago, the findings 
of this study indicate that the proportion of Japanese descendants who feel that 
present generations should bear responsibility for their ancestor's past misdeeds 
decreased by 14 percentage points while the number of Japanese who reject the 














(from 32 percent [which includes 5 percent who deny any responsibility in the first 
place] to 64 percent).  
 
This study's results were further compared with a research conducted by Sven Saaler 
(2005) with a similar but larger sample of Japanese university students (n = 816) 
from 2002-2004. In Saaler's study, 66 percent of the respondents answered that the 
postwar generation bore ongoing responsibility for the war, while 8 percent 
disagreed with 3 percent claiming that Japan did not have any responsibility for the 
war in the first place. When compared with Saaler's study, this study's findings show 
that Japanese university students' willingness to assume responsibility for the actions 
of their forebears fell by 28 percentage points since 2004. The primary finding of this 
study therefore is that there is a diminished sense of collective responsibility amongst 
the current generation of educated Japanese youth. 
 
The qualitative segment of this study further explored the processes underlying the 
participants' perceptions of inherited war responsibility. The dominant argument that 
emerged in the comments of CRLow respondents [low collective responsibility] 
centred around the temporal and emotional distance they felt with the original 
perpetrators of the in-group who committed the atrocities. They insisted that present 
generations cannot be blamed for the crimes committed by their ancestors and that 
they should not be held accountable for the mistakes of a generation of Japanese with 
whom they cannot identify. As represented in Tatsuya's comments, most CRLow 
participants felt frustrated that they were expected to assume responsibility for 
something that they were never part of.  
 
 Tatsuya:  I don't feel responsible for what happened during the war. I don't 
see myself as part of the group of militarists who committed those horrible 
crimes. We are from entirely different generations. I cannot feel responsible 
for something I never took part in. I wasn't even born then. And most of the 
people who committed the atrocities are dead. 
 
For the CRLow respondents, the war history of Imperial Japan and the perpetrators 
who committed the injustices are something from the remote past and disconnected 
from the collective that they refer to as Japan. As is also evident from the comments 
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presented in the previous chapter, the notion of 'inherited responsibility' for the 
mistakes of past generations is clearly denied by participants of this sample.  
 
9.1.2  Comparing perspectives on Japanese 'inherited responsibility' 
 
In contrast, while the CRLow respondents attempted to sustain a positive image of the 
in-group by denying inherited responsibility for the nation's past injustices, CRHigh 
respondents [high collective responsibility] insisted that accepting moral 
responsibility was an integral part of feeling positive esteem and respect for their 
nation. The following comments represent their key arguments about why today's 
Japanese descendants must shoulder some ongoing responsibility for the mistakes of 
their forebears. Shizue, like majority of the CRHigh respondents, feels that by 
accepting responsibility, she and the other Japanese can feel proud of being a 
Japanese. Many of the CRHigh respondents were therefore critical of Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe and other nationalist politicians' rationale to build a 'proud Japan' by 
making sure that the successive generations do not have to be exposed to a 
'masochistic history' they would be ashamed of. 
 
Shizue: Although we were never directly involved in the atrocities committed 
during the war, as a citizen of Japan, we have to acknowledge our injustices. 
Unfortunately, other Japanese in my generation strongly feel that what 
happened in the past is somebody else's business. But I think it is 
irresponsible for the Japanese to ignore the past. The victims in these [Asian] 
countries will never forget. Japan has to continue apologizing to China and 
Korea until they are satisfied; instead of pretending like this is a finished 
business. We will feel more proud as a nation only when we have the courage 
and morality to accept our mistakes and reach out to the victimized countries. 
I think Prime Minister Abe's wish to protect younger Japanese generations 
from this shameful past is absurd. 
 
CRHigh respondents feel concerned that unless the past is properly acknowledged, 
there will be no reconciliation or healthy foundation for future Sino-Japanese 
relations to flourish. Satoru argues that it is important to be regretful and she 




Satoru: The Japanese public criticizes China for over-exaggerating the 
number of deaths from the Massacre. So what if the numbers are 
exaggerated? The Massacre did occur! It is an undeniable historical fact that 
the Japanese soldiers committed cruelties in China and other Asian countries 
during the war. Only by accepting that responsibility can we reconcile, our 
generation and build a healthy relationship with China and Korea. Unless we 
build that foundation, we would never be able to interact with them on an 
equal basis. I would feel more proud of my country if we can accept our sins 
and reach out to them to build a friendly relationship. 
 
 
Another dominant characteristic of CRHigh respondents which distinguishes them 
from CRLow respondents is the degree of self-awareness about the historical injustices 
that had been committed and the frustrations they feel about the ways in which the 
Japanese government has been mishandling this matter.  
 
  Satoru: Japan needs to apologize specifically for two things; first, for 
colonizing the countries and secondly for starting a war of aggression. The 
Japanese government has been offering apologies and reparation to Western 
POWs who are mainly European, American or Australian for the past 
twenty years. However, they have always been reluctant to be as apologetic 
towards the Asian victims. What is worse, our Prime Minister wants to deny 
that it was a war of aggression. This really bothers me.  
 
  Kaori: If the Chinese want me to apologize, I would readily apologize. The 
reason is because it is an undeniable fact that Japan invaded China. And as 
Japanese, we have to accept that responsibility. If you were to look at things 
from the victims' standpoint, their demands are completely understandable. 
 
Satoru and Kaori represent an overwhelming majority of the CRHigh sample who are 
convinced that Japan is guilty of atrocities committed during the war and it would be 
morally wrong to forget them. These comments show that the respondents display 
high levels of willingness to reflect on the past and view the picture from the 
perspective of the 'other.' 
 
9.1.3  Finding 2: Majority of Japanese participants believe that 'Japan has 
apologized enough'  
 
In an attempt to further understand the phenomenon of inherited war responsibility, 
Japanese participants' experience of 'apology fatigue' was also explored in this 
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survey. The study revealed that 66 percent of the respondents felt that 'Japan has 
apologized enough for its wartime past' while 33 percent felt that Japan has not 
offered sufficient apology to the victims. Again, although the samples are not 
identical, the findings of this study were compared to those of the Pew Research 
Center's global attitude survey of 2016 in which the respondents were asked if they 
thought 'Japan has apologized sufficiently for its military actions during the 1930s 
and 1940s.' 53 percent of the Pew survey respondents indicated that Japan had 
apologized enough and a further 17 percent believed that there was no need for Japan 
to apologize in the first place. When the two scores are combined 70 percent of 
Japanese believe that there is no need for Japan to apologize for the nation's past 
actions. Pew survey's results mirror the findings of this study which showed a 
majority of 66 percent feeling that Japan has sufficiently atoned for its past. When 
Asahi Shimbun's 1994 survey asked the public if 'Japan had offered sufficient war 
compensation to its victims,' 26 percent answered that Japan had offered sufficient 
compensation while 62 percent felt that Japan had not provided enough redress to its 
victims. Although the data sets are not identical, when compared to survey results 
conducted in the 1990s, the findings of this study has confirmed that the proportion 
of Japanese who believe that Japan has apologized enough for the nation's wartime 




Figure 18: Pew Research Survey 2016  ‘Japan has apologized enough’ 
 
 
The data on whether Japan has apologized enough was also compared with data from 
surveys conducted in China, the victimized nation. This comparison revealed that 
while a majority of Japanese felt less contrition than in the past, an overwhelming 
majority of Chinese felt that Japan’s acknowledgement and atonement was 
insufficient. Pew studies from 2006-2016 indicate that the Chinese perception 
towards 'sufficient apology' continues to be incompatible with that of the Japanese; 
2016 study showed that only 10 percent of the Chinese were satisfied with Japan's 
apologies. Related to this, other opinion polls (see the 2005-2014 survey by Genron 
NPO) have also indicated that the key reason behind the Chinese public’s 
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unfavourable perception of Japan is ‘Japan’s lack of proper apology and remorse 
over the history of invasion of China.’ Japan's growing resistance to apology and 
reparation incenses Chinese victims and helps to explain why historic antagonisms 
persist in Northeast Asia. This study confirms that continuing hostility between 
China and Japan has its basis in this discrepancy in perception; for most Japanese, 
the past is behind them and need not be contended with, while for an overwhelming 
majority of Chinese, there are unresolved historical grievances requiring immediate 
attention. The results of this study seem to mirror the state of deteriorating relations 
between the two countries; the Japanese are feeling less remorse than in the past, 
making it more important than ever to investigate what factors may be working to 
prevent their acceptance of collective responsibility. 
 
9.1.4  Comparing perspectives on Japanese 'apology fatigue' 
 
An overwhelming majority of the CRLow respondents were annoyed with China's 
constant demands for apology stressing that Japan has apologized enough. The 
following comments seem to echo what is frequently argued in the Japanese 
mainstream media as well as the official stance of the Japanese government (See 
Chapter 3) that 'Japan has properly dealt with the issues of reparations, property and 
claims, in accordance with the San Francisco peace treaty, the bilateral peace treaties, 
agreements and instruments' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005, cited in Seaton, 
2007, 66).  
 
 Shinji: How long do we have to continue apologizing? Are these people 
[victims] ever going to be satisfied? I do accept that Japan has committed 
terrible war crimes. However, Japan has already offered numerous apologies 
and compensation for all the damages incurred during the war. We signed a 
friendship treaty with China and both countries agreed that the war has ended 
and the two countries were ready to move on....why is China bringing up the 
past again and deliberately flaring up anti-Japanese sentiments amongst its 
people? Why now? 
 
Ryutaro: No matter how many times we apologize, they won't stop attacking 
us....I am completely fed up with their incessant criticisms. 
 
CRLow respondents perceptions seem to reflect the majority of the Japanese public 
who are tired of having to listen to the victims' seemingly endless accusations. Not 
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only are they convinced that their genuine efforts to apologise would never satisfy 
the victims, they also believe that China has  ulterior motives  for repeatedly bringing 
up the past.  
 
Conversely CRHigh respondents insist that the only people who can determine 
whether an apology is sufficient or not are the victims, and not the perpetrators. 
Hence, they argue that it is not up to the Japanese to decide whether they have 
'apologized enough' or not. 
 
Kaori: Japan may have apologized many times in the past. However, an 
apology would not be sufficient unless it satisfies the victims' desires. I don't 
think there is an international model that determines what a sufficient 
government apology is. So we need to ask the victims what would satisfy 
their needs and we should make every effort to satisfy them. 
 
Furthermore, CRHigh respondents who felt that 'Japan has not apologized enough' 
seemed to view the Japanese politics of apology objectively and question the 
sincerity of the government's past gestures. 
 
Satoru: I am aware that the Japanese government has issued numerous 
apologies to China and Korea in the past. However, the wording is carefully 
chosen and deliberately made vague so that the politicians will not antagonize 
their domestic constituency. The government formed the Asian Women's 
Fund, a non-profit organization to distribute the monetary compensation to 
the comfort women instead of making it official. Of course the victims are not 
going to accept it as sincere gesture of apology or reparation. I find it 
understandable why the victims express their dissatisfactions. 
 
Kaori: We have issued numerous apologies but it is also a fact that our Asian 
neighbors have dismissed these apologies as insincere. Instead of arguing that 
'we have done enough and the Chinese and the Koreans will never be 
satisfied,' shouldn't we look into the reasons why they were not accepted? 
 
As such, compared to the CRLow sample, CRHigh respondents displayed high levels of 
willingness to reflect on the inherited responsibility of present-day Japanese and take 




Research question 2) What are the social psychological factors impeding current 
Japanese  acceptance of inherited responsibility for their nation's past misdeeds? 
 
Social identity theory posits that individuals attain a sense of self-esteem and self-
worth not just from their identity as an individual, but also from their membership in 
social groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Individuals are therefore driven to maintain a 
positive evaluation of their social group. The possibility that one’s group has 
perpetrated an unjust act can pose a threat to the in-group’s positive moral identity 
(Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). 
When confronted with accusations of in-group malevolence, individuals will try and 
bolster the in-group’s moral status in order to defuse real or potential reputational   
threat (Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012, 778). One strategy   
groups employ to restore positive esteem and moral status is competitive victimhood. 
This enables the accused group to claim that they have suffered more than those who 
are being critical (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor et. al., 2012). This study 
hypothesized that Japan’s lack of repentance, which is at the heart of the Sino-
Japanese conflict, is driven by a need to defend and protect a positive national 
identity. Based on the aforementioned theories, this thesis examined the extent to 
which identity-driven responses such as ‘moral identity threat,’ ‘competitive 
victimhood,’ and ‘in-group identification (degree of national identity)’ may be 
affecting Japanese feelings of guilt and remorse. 
 
Consistent with the hypotheses, the hierarchical regression analysis identified the 
three identity-driven variables as significant predictors of collective responsibility. 
One key finding from the regression analyses was that individuals who felt that their 
in-group’s moral status was threatened when confronted with accusations of past 
injustices defended their in-group's positive identity by avoiding acceptance of 
collective responsibility. As previous studies have shown, threats to moral identity 
and esteem were positively associated with competitive victimhood which also 
emerged as a negative predictor of collective responsibility. The regression analysis 
further indicated that participants who strongly identify with their nation experience 
less collective responsibility, while those with high levels of contact with the out-
group are likely to feel more remorse. Those with less salient knowledge and 
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awareness about their nation’s transgressions were less likely to feel responsible 
about their ancestors’ misdeeds.  
 
Research Question 2a) Do the Japanese descendants feel that their moral identity 
is threatened when confronted with criticisms from the victimized nations about 
the nation’s immoral past? To what extent do threats to Japanese moral status 
affect their acceptance of collective responsibility for their nation’s past 
transgressions? 
 
9.1.5  Finding 3: Threats to the participants' moral identity were negatively 
associated with their acceptance of collective responsibility for the nation's past 
transgressions. 
 
After investigating the possible factors hindering Japanese participants’ feeling of 
collective responsibility, ‘moral identity threat’ emerged as the strongest negative 
predictor of collective responsibility. This discovery was further analysed and 
confirmed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Previous empirical studies have 
indicated that because morality is an important attribute to individuals and groups, 
being reminded of the group's immoral past can be an aversive experience that can 
lead individuals to respond defensively (Monin, 2007).  Consistent with prior 
research (Sullivan et al., 2012), an overwhelming majority [more than 90 percent] of 
respondents reported that values and morality are a critical element in the 
determination of their self and collective identity. One of the key aims of this study 
was to examine the extent to which Japanese participants felt that their group's moral 
identity was threatened when confronted with China's accusations about Japan's 
wartime aggression. Common arguments from in-depth interviews with 15 CRLow 
participants provided strong support to my overarching hypothesis that when 
confronted with accusations about in-group's transgressions which challenge current 
moral status, individuals will attempt to defend their in-group's positive identity by 
employing a range of different defensive measures. Previous studies have shown that 
defense of the in-group's moral status may result in individuals   denying collective 
responsibility, placing the blame on the victimizing group or distorting past injustices 
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(Dresler-Hawke, 2005). Other common defensive reactions revealed in past literature 
include 'placing the blame on a few deviant group members' (Wohl, Branscombe, and 
Klar, 2006), 'legitimising the immoral act,' 'temporal and social distancing' (Peetz, 
Gunn, and Wilson, 2010; Fry, 2006) and ‘minimizing the severity of the harm 
committed’ (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). A number of these defensive responses 
were revealed in the discourses of this study's interviewed participants. First, the 
CRLow respondents rationalised China’s accusations as disingenuous, state-
manipulated tactics using history disputes as a political foil for China’s internal 
grievances. Second, temporal arguments emerged in which respondents stressed that 
they were not born when the atrocities took place and that present generations should 
not be blamed for the mistakes of their forebears. Third, participants chose to isolate 
the ‘Japanese Imperial Army’ as the responsible party for the wrongdoing and 
stressed their moral detachment and social distance from that group. Fourth, while 
acknowledging that transgressions occurred, participants challenged death toll 
numbers and problematised the lack of objectivity of the victims’ claims. Fifth, 
participants defended the moral status of their nation by stressing that countless 
apologies and war reparations have already been offered and that the issue was 
officially settled between the two countries a long time ago, with China only reviving 
the history problem as a political strategy to boost internal unity. Sixth, some 
participants justified the massacre of the Chinese as self-defence and therefore a 
necessary evil during war. Seventh, there was a strong belief that since one cannot 
undo the past, China should ‘move on,’ as it is more constructive to focus on the 
future than to be mired in a traumatic past.  
 
The interviews also revealed that with limited awareness of their nation’s past 
transgressions in Asia, the present generation of Japanese are perplexed and 
frustrated by the persistent accusations of China and South Korea attacking their 
country as unremorseful and irresponsible. Findings in this study indicate that 
Japanese ‘amnesia’ about the war should not simply be defined as 'ignorance.' None 
of the CRLow respondents denied the occurrence of historical misdeeds. However, 
behind a superficial willingness to acknowledge the occurrence of the injustices, 
majority of survey respondents [more than 60 percent] demonstrated strong 
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defensive emotions to China’s persistent reminders about Japan’s unapologetic 
attitude [See Table 3: Moral Identity Threat Scale Results]. It is especially 
noteworthy that one of the factors that triggered strong negative reaction among the 
CRLow respondents was the vehemence of Chinese accusations. 
 
 Akemi: If their demands were expressed in a different way, in a more rational 
and calm manner, I may feel differently. The fact that they are constantly 
stressing that they are victims in a pushy, aggressive way is just annoying. 
 
 
9.1.6  Comparing perspectives on moral identity threat  
 
In contrast to the CRLow respondents who expressed anger and irritation towards 
victimized nations' reminder of their in-group's immoral past, CRHigh respondents 
expressed remorse and guilt when confronted with the same accusations. Hayato, 
like other CRHigh respondents showed not only a willingness to accept ongoing 
responsibility for the nation's transgressions but he acknowledged and defined the 
specific mistakes his own generation should be blamed for. He distinguishes his 
generation's 'sins' from that of the original perpetrators. 
 
 Hayato: I don't get annoyed or angry when my Chinese or Korean friends 
remind me about what Japan committed during the war. I believe that 
different generations have to bear different forms of responsibility and guilt. 
The original perpetrators of Imperial Japan are guilty for actually committing 
the atrocities. Our parents' generation is guilty for not having passed on the 
sense of responsibility to the next generations. And our generation is guilty 
for continuing to ignore and deny that responsibility. If the Chinese were to 
ask me to apologize, I will say, 'I cannot apologize for the actual killing, but if 
you want me to apologize on behalf of my own generation who continues to 
ignore this history, I would willingly accept that guilt and apologize.' 
 
Another dominant theme that emerged from the responses of the CRHigh respondents 
was their willingness to view the conflict from multiple perspectives, in particular 
the out-group's perspective. There is extensive body of evidence that has shown 
'perspective-taking' or ability to imagine the Other's perspective in a conflict to be a 
critical factor in reducing prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000) and increasing 
empathy towards the out-group (Leith & Baumeister, 2008). CRhigh respondents’ 
comments illustrate the importance of perspective-taking. 
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 Haruko: I feel bad and uncomfortable when the Chinese people express their 
frustrations about the way we have dealt with war history. It is understandable 
if you try to see things from the victims' perspective. Their anger is 
justifiable. No matter how many times the government apologizes, these 
apologies lack substance and integrity. We are not walking the talk [jittai ga 
tomonatte inai].  
 
Hayato says one good example of a government apology without substance is the 
recent agreement (2016) between the Japanese and South Korean governments 
regarding the 'comfort women' dispute which seems to ignore the victims' needs.  
 
 Hayato: This is how I see the recent agreement between Japan and Korea to 
settle the 'comfort women' issue. Japan apologized and offered payment to 
satisfy their own political agenda; they wanted to see those shameful comfort 
women statues to be removed for eternity and the Koreans to shut up for 
good.....I have a good analogy. Let's say I got into a fierce fight with my 
friend and hurt him real bad. I refuse to apologize and we were in a deadlock. 
But my parents didn't want this incident to go public so they approached my 
friend's parents and settled this dispute with some money. My friend's parents 
accepted the money and promised to keep quiet without consulting my friend 
who was the real victim. His parents kept most of the money themselves, and 
the mother bought him a 60-yen Gari-gari-kun [popsicle] just to appease him. 
Of course, my friend would be frustrated with the outcome. When you try to 
see things from the victims' perspectives, you understand why they criticize 
Japan's actions to be insincere. 
 
Studies have shown how individuals living in societies engaged in protracted 
conflicts tend to accept and adopt the shared in-group narratives (Bar-Tal, 2007). 
Adherence to in-group's narratives about the conflict have been found to hinder 
individuals from taking multiple perspectives. The perceptions of the CRLow 
participants have illustrated this tendency. Conversely, CRHigh participants who were 
willing to accept collective responsibility were more empathetic towards and inclined 
to view the conflict from the victims' perspectives. 
 
Research question 2b: Do contemporary Japanese engage in competitive 
victimhood? To what extent does the salience of Japanese victimhood during 
World War II affect the descendants' willingness to accept collective responsibility 
for their nation’s past transgressions? 
 210 
 
9.1.7  Finding 4: The majority of survey participants [70 percent] felt that 'the 
atomic bombing was the most inhumane and immoral act in human history.'  
Salient victim consciousness among Japanese participants was negatively 
associated with their acceptance of collective responsibility for the nation's past 
transgressions. 
 
Scholarship drawing on social identity theory has demonstrated that when confronted 
with shameful episodes in history, the group will remember the past in ways that 
lessen the humiliation and maintain the positive image of the group (Sullivan et al., 
2012). Studies have shown that a sense of competitive victimhood—the belief that 
one’s group has suffered more than others—protects group members’ self-esteem and 
positive identity (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). When the in-group's victimization is salient, 
individuals were found to feel less collective guilt and responsibility for the 
injustices perpetrated by the in-group (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). Sullivan and 
colleagues’ (2012) research revealed that the key motivation leading groups to 
engage in competitive victimhood was defending threatened moral identity. 
Consistent with existing literature, this study showed that competitive victimhood 
amongst Japanese participants served to lessen their sense of collective responsibility 
for harms done to the out-group. 
 
While many scholars have noted the prevalence of Japanese victim mentality 
concerning the war there has been a dearth of empirical evidence evaluating this 
phenomenon. The statistical data garnered from the survey's competitive victimhood 
scale substantiated the assumption that victimhood mentality is salient amongst the 
majority (70 percent) of Japanese participants. The descriptive data further revealed 
that a majority (60 percent) of survey respondents automatically associated the last 
war [Asia-Pacific War] with the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki while 
less than 8 percent cited the Nanjing Massacre as their predominant association with 
the Asia-Pacific War. Further, findings from the competitive victimhood scale 
showed that a majority believe that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima is ‘the most 
inhumane event in human history,’ and a ‘uniquely Japanese tragedy’ that should not 
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be compared with other war atrocities. Consistent with these results, participants of 
the qualitative interviews also predominantly viewed the Pacific War as one in which 
Japan was the victim. When implicit questions were used to explore participants’ 
spontaneous association with the Pacific War, all 15 CRLow respondents automatically 
associated the war with the atomic bombs and the 'horrifying images of Japanese 
people suffering.' These results are also compatible with past annual surveys 
conducted in the 1990s by the Association of History Teachers in Japan (n = 4000) in 
which majority of students age six to 18 claimed that the atomic bombing was ‘one 
of the worst tragedies in the war.’  
 
Scholarship on intractable conflicts shows that groups encode significant experiences 
in their collective memory, especially experiences of victimization, and pass them on 
to successive generations (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). Because of this, groups engaged 
in protracted conflict compete over their victim status by developing ongoing 
narratives that establish that the suffering they have been subjected to is unique, 
distinctive and worse than their opponents (Noor et al., 2008). Although the data sets 
are not identical, the following comparison of perceptions amongst the Japanese vs. 
Chinese university students on historical victimization shed light on how collective 
memories of in-group's victimhood become maintained by successive descendants 
who never experienced the harm-doing. In my survey, 75.3 percent of the Japanese 
respondents agreed that 'as the only country in the world that has every suffered a 
nuclear bomb, we must never forget this history.' A survey conducted by Nanjing 
Normal University with a larger sample of Chinese university students (n = 973) in 
2004 revealed that 93 percent of Chinese university students believed that 'the 
Nanjing Massacre in which 30,000 Chinese civilians were killed must never be 
forgotten.' These findings in Japan and China reveal that both societies are 
determined to sustain the salience of the history of wartime victimization for many 





Figure 19: Never Forget Memory of Hiroshima (N=162) 
‘As the only country in the world that has ever suffered from a nuclear bomb, 
we must never forget this history.’ (Data from this study with Japanese 





Figure 20: Never Forget Memory of Nanjing Massacre (N=973) 
 
‘Nanjing Massacre in which 300,000 Chinese civilians were killed must never be 
forgotten’ (Data from survey with Chinese university students, Nanjing Normal 
University, 2004) 
 































This study expanded on the regression findings by further exploring the process by 
which Japanese victim mentality is constructed via exposure to various societal 
channels. The top three sources shaping participants’ understanding of the war were: 
1) textbooks/school education; 2) television programmes (dramas, documentaries, 
information programmes); and 3) news programmes. The issue of textbooks and 
school education shaping Japanese war memories has been critical to the frequent 
accusations of Japan’s ‘historical amnesia.’ This research reveals that the process is 
more complex, and involves a variety of cultural channels. As part of NHK’s survey 
of Japan’s 1995 50th anniversary commemorative programming, Germany and other 
countries analysed the contents of Japanese television programmes and the impact of 
war-related television on Japanese war memories. The poll results showed that 
television broadcasting in Japan focuses on victimhood and only to a lesser extent its 
wartime aggression (Seaton 2007, 115). This point was also validated in my 
interviews. Although the survey data showed that textbooks and school education are 
the dominant sources for learning about Japanese war history, the interviews revealed 
that the narratives of civilian suffering disseminated through popular cultural 
channels such as television, books, and films have also been influential in 
homogenizing the salience of victimhood in Japanese mentality. 
 
9.1.8  Comparing perspectives on competitive victimhood 
 
The qualitative responses of CRLow participants presented in the previous chapter 
illustrated how their remembrance of the Pacific War is exclusively about the 
victimization of the Japanese people, one that glosses over the history of Japanese 
aggression in Asia and colonization of Korea, China and other Asian countries. In 
contrast, findings showed that despite the exposure to the society's narratives of 
Japanese war victimhood, CRHigh respondents felt less need to protect their in-group's 
moral image and engage in competitive victimhood. On the contrary, their responses 
indicated an 'inclusive victim consciousness' (Vollhardt, 2010, 2012) or a common 
identity that 'we are both victims of the conflict.'  
 
 Hayato: My grandparents were victims of the atomic bombing in Nagasaki so 
my understanding of Japanese war history initially was shaped by the stories 
of A-bomb victims I heard as a child. However, when I was in 5th or 6th 
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grade, I went to a war museum in Nagasaki. There I learned about the history 
of the Nanjing Massacre, Unit 731 and comfort women. The visual panels 
described what the Japanese did during the war. That is when I realized that 
we caused massive suffering to other Asians and that we were not the only 
victims of the war. 
 
Asako recounts the time when she was first exposed to the history of Chinese 
victimization through a friend whose family members were massacred in Nanjing. As 
these comments reveal, exposure to the out-group's victimization can lead to 
perspective-taking, positive affective responses like empathy and above all, to 
acknowledgement of responsibility for the nation's transgressions. 
 
 Asako: There was a Chinese girl in our class whose grandparents were 
massacred by the Japanese in Nanjing. She repeatedly told me about the 
horrifying stories of what the Japanese did. I felt empathetic towards her grief 
and anger. Our history teacher briefly explained about the Nanjing incident in 
class saying, "This incident occurred as Japan tried to expand its influence in 
Asia, however, the actual number of people killed is unknown." The teacher 
hoped to breeze through it because we had to focus on other contents for the 
entrance exam. However, my Chinese friend didn't let him. She stood up and 
showed us a book about her family's victimization in Nanjing. When she told 
the entire class, "Japan has not issued sufficient apology to the Chinese 
victims," majority of the class angrily retaliated saying, "Stop blaming us! 
You need to move on!" I felt terrible seeing most of my classmates   show no 
sympathy towards her or the Chinese victims. It was terrible. How would they 
feel if their own family members were massacred like that? 
 
The comments of the CRHigh respondents reveal that victim beliefs when 'inclusive' 
and not 'exclusive' can lead to positive emotions and pro-social responses. Although 
this research has shown that victim mentality is often problematic and stands as a 
major impediment to the perpetrator group's acceptance of collective responsibility 
for its past transgressions, qualitative findings also revealed that when exposed to 
diverse perspectives about out-group suffering, some individuals are able to 
acknowledge the victimization of the other party, experience empathy and feel some 
responsibility for the mistakes committed by their forebears. 
 
Research question 2c: Do contemporary Japanese identify with their nation? To 
what extent does in-group identification affect Japanese descendants' willingness 
to accept collective responsibility for their nation's past transgressions? 
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9.1.10  Finding 5: A large majority of Japanese participants reported a high 
degree of collective self-esteem and strong identification with the nation. Those 
who highly identified with their nation felt increased resistance to accept 
collective responsibility for their nation's immoral past. 
 
In-group identification has been studied as an important antecedent of collective 
guilt, prejudice and competitive victimhood. However, past studies have revealed a 
paradoxical element to the relationship between in-group identification and 
individual responses to moral transgressions within the group. One strand of study 
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 2006) has demonstrated that, since 
collective guilt is a group-based emotion, salient self-categorisation with the 
perpetrator group could elicit members’ collective guilt. Conversely, other studies 
(Doosje et al., 1998) have demonstrated that high national-identifiers are prone to 
feel less collective guilt and responsibility because they are driven to defend their 
group’s self-esteem. Therefore, high-identifiers may deny or reject the notion that 
their group has committed immoral acts in the past. As in-group identification is a 
complex phenomenon, a careful and nuanced analysis was conducted with Japanese 
qualitative interviews to determine how CRLow respondents who were also high 
identifiers would react to the victims’ accusations.  
 
Social identity theory posits that the degree to which the individual identifies with 
the collective—whether it be an ethnic, religious group or a nation—can become a 
source of pride and self-esteem. In this study, it was argued that individuals who 
identify strongly with the nation are likely to ‘forget’ or ‘justify’ its past 
transgressions and acknowledge less responsibility. Using the collective self-esteem 
scale developed by Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) this study assessed the extent to 
which Japanese participants identify with the nation and how much of their esteem 
hinges on the positive identity of Japan. If a high level of national identification is 
likely to reduce an individual’s willingness to feel remorse for the nation’s wrongful 
past (Doosje et al., 2004), it is important to determine the nature of Japanese national 
attitude. The regression analysis of Chapter Seven revealed that Japanese 
participants’ national identification predicted lower acceptance of collective 
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responsibility. To further understand the nature of Japanese in-group identification, 
an adapted version of Karasawa’s nationalism scale (2002) was used to investigate 
whether the mode of Japanese attachment to the nation is closer to patriotism or 
right-wing glorification of the nation.  
 
Postwar Japan has sought to discard the negative identity of wartime imperialist 
aggressor and shift to a new, twofold national identity as the victim of the atomic 
bomb and as peacemaker. Within the context of Japan’s shifting national identity, the 
results of my in-depth interviews with CRLow participants explored the emotional 
impact of high identifiers’ attachment to national identity when facing accusations 
about Japan’s past.  
 
This study sought to gain a better understanding of Japanese participants’ in-group 
identification and the nature of Japanese nationalism. In-group identification has 
produced conflicting results in relation to collective guilt. In previous studies, 
attachment to one’s group led to an enhanced sense of responsibility for the moral 
violations of the in-group and elicited collective guilt (Doosje et al., 2006). In other 
studies (Branscombe 2004; Doosje et al. 1998; Castano & Giner-Sorolla 2006), 
findings showed that a high level of national identification was likely to undermine 
individual willingness to accept guilt for the group’s past injustices due to a need to 
protect   group  esteem from being shamed by immoral acts. Past studies have 
shown, therefore, that national identification can both increase and decrease feelings 
of collective guilt. 
 
This study revealed that Japanese participants’ in-group identification was one of the 
key predictors reducing their willingness to accept collective responsibility. In-group 
identification was measured using Luhtanen and Crocker’s collective self-esteem 
scale. Results indicated that Japanese participants reported high levels of in-group 
identification, implying that their own esteem was closely associated with a positive 
image of their nation. Both the regression analysis and qualitative interviews in 
Chapter 7 revealed that high-identifiers felt diminished remorse and tended to defend 
the moral status of their in-group by rationalising China’s accusations as a politically 
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orchestrated tactic and therefore disingenuous in nature. Another common defensive 
reaction of high-identifiers is ‘identity discontinuity’ in which the members of the 
perpetrator group disconnect the present-day generation from the original 
perpetrators (Augoustinos & Le Couteur, 2004). The CRLow interviewees strongly 
identified with and found pride in a modern, peaceful Japan that emerged as a major 
economic power, but distanced themselves from the original perpetrators that 
committed atrocities in China.  
 
Yuji: What the Japanese soldiers committed in China has nothing to do with 
me. What happened during the war has nothing to do with our generation. I 
therefore feel frustrated every time China and Korea blame us for the 
militarists' past crimes.  
 
A majority of the CRLow respondents stressed the social and temporal distance they 
felt from the 'immoral' collective called Japan which outraged the Chinese. From a 
social identity perspective, it seems plausible that those individuals whose self-worth 
is closely tied to the positive conception of the nation would more likely reject the 
claims about the nation’s negative history.  
 
9.1.10  Comparing perspectives on national identity 
 
Roccas and colleagues' study (2006) distinguished two modes of national 
identification—glorification of the national group versus a liberal form of in-group 
attachment—in order to explain the complex effects of in-group identification on 
acceptance of guilt and responsibility. Consistent with their findings, CRHigh 
respondents showed a more healthy attachment to their nation and a willingness to 
see their nation in a critical light. Gaertner and Dovidio's research (2000, 2012) on a 
Common Identity Model suggests that when members of conflicting groups develop 
a common 'superordinate identity' instead of attaching to separate identities, more 
harmonious intergroup relations can be expected. In support of this theory, Satoru 
and Kaoru state that they feel no attachment to their identity as a Japanese but 
associate themselves more with a cosmopolitan identity. 
 
 Satoru: I like my country but I have no special attachment to being a Japanese 
national. I see myself more as an Asian and moreover, as a global citizen, or 
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even a resident of the planet earth. I find nationalities to be an unwanted 
hindrance to peaceful coexistence of people. I started thinking like that when 
I faced life and death; when I lost the most important people in my life.  
 
Kaoru: I have never lived abroad but I don't strongly identify with Japan. I 
see myself more as a world citizen. My friend who is a staunch nationalist 
once asked me if there were two people drowning, one being Japanese and 
the other non-Japanese, who would I save first. My nationalist friend said she 
would definitely save the Japanese first. I said I would reach out to the one 
whom I can save first. Although I like Japan, I have difficulty relating to her 
kind of nationalism. 
 
Adherence to superordinate identity has been associated with individual willingness 
to acknowledge out-group's suffering and reduce competitive victimhood (Shnabel et 
al., 2013). Compared to CRLow respondents, CRHigh respondents displayed less 
attachment to being a Japanese and a stronger inclination to transcend their national 
identity. 
 
Research question 3a: How is the history of in-group transgressions presented to 
contemporary Japanese? To what extent does the descendants' awareness of their 
nation's past transgressions affect their willingness to accept collective 
responsibility? 
 
9.1.11  Finding 6: The majority of participants (60 percent) indicated that they 
were 'somewhat aware' about Japan's past transgressions while 32 percent 
answered that 'they were not aware at all.' Lack of awareness and knowledge of 
in-group transgressions was found to reduce the descendants' acceptance of 
collective responsibility. 
 
A strong predictor of collective responsibility identified in the hierarchical regression 
analysis was ‘awareness of in-group transgressions,’ or the extent to which 
participants had knowledge about the sufferings Japan caused to China and other 
Asian neighbours during the Second World War. The insight among some scholars is 
that groups deliberately forget uncomfortable knowledge of their past (Baumeister & 
Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Sahdra & Ross, 2007). This practice is 
defined by some as ‘chosen amnesia,’ a mode of forgetting by which a society 
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deliberately excludes unwanted or unsavoury aspects of their national past (Buckley-
Zistel, 2006; Rotella & Richeson, 2013). Nations and groups have histories that are 
remembered through cultural narratives, rituals and memorials. Collective 
‘forgetting’ is likely to occur if the group does not want to be reminded of the 
shameful history of wrongs committed (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). If historical 
narratives of the in-group's injustices are not salient in society, then it is difficult for 
individuals to feel any remorse or responsibility for that past. The findings on 
competitive victimhood presented in   Chapter Seven demonstrate that the Japanese 
collective remembrance of the Asia-Pacific war primarily focuses on its history of 
victimization and downplays its history of aggression. It is perhaps not surprising, 
then, that regression analyses revealed that those with little knowledge of the harms 
committed in China felt less responsibility for Japan’s past transgressions. The data 
presented in this study illuminates an important issue that continues to protract the 
conflict between China and Japan: the disparate memories of war that continue to 
divide victims and perpetrators.  
 
Historical memories are embedded in people’s minds through different kinds of 
educational, social and political experiences.  As described in Chapter Four, Japanese 
textbooks are at the centre of an ideological tug of war between conservative and 
progressive elites regarding which interpretation of the war should be taught to future 
generations. The debates over what should or should not be included in Japanese 
textbooks about Japan’s wartime conduct have gained much attention in both the 
international and domestic media. The textbook issue is also at the heart of the 
frequent criticism of Japan’s 'historical amnesia.'  
 
The findings of the survey indicate that the current generation of young Japanese is 
not entirely ignorant about the specifics of the war, with 60 percent claiming that 
they are 'somewhat aware' of the war atrocities committed in Nanjing and a 
combined 32 percent (‘not aware at all’ and ‘not really aware’) unsure of what 
happened. However, it should be noted that the majority who reported that they were 
'somewhat aware,' revealed in the qualitative interviews that 'somewhat' meant that 
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they have heard about the 'Nanjing Incident' but lacked any knowledge of the 
specifics.  
 
 Satoko: I answered 'somewhat aware' but I really don't know much about the 
history of what the Japanese soldiers did in Nanjing. I did learn about it 
briefly in junior high and high school through history textbooks. The number 
of deaths from this incident that the Chinese claim is far greater than what we 
think it is. In class, the teacher quickly breezed through it and refrained from 
explaining anything in depth. 
 
Although a direct comparison is difficult due to different data sets, this study's 
finding seems to support the results of the Asahi Shimbun opinion poll conducted 
from March to April of 2015 (n = 3000 adults) in which Japanese respondents were 
asked if they believed they received sufficient instruction about World War II at 
school. According to the poll, only 13 percent of Japanese answered that ‘they were 
taught sufficiently about the war’ and 79 percent said that 'their war education was 
insufficient.' The Asahi Shimbun poll also compared its results to a similar survey 
conducted in Germany in March 2015 (n = 1000 adults) in which Germans were 
asked if ‘they were sufficiently taught about the Nazi era.’ Findings showed that 48 
percent of Germans claimed that they had been given sufficient knowledge about 
Nazi war history. The Asahi Shimbun poll data supports the findings of my survey: 
the current Japanese education system provides students with very little knowledge 
about Japanese wartime aggression and systematically draws a veil over the suffering 
inflicted on those who experienced Japanese occupation during the war. There is a 
definite knowledge gap in both the formal education system and in popular 
awareness regarding the conduct of Japan during the war. This facilitates both 
collective amnesia and moral distancing from sufferings inflicted on the Chinese 
during the war.  It makes it challenging for the current generation of Japanese 
descendants to empathize with those who were victims of Japanese aggression. 
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Figure 21: Comparison of German vs. Japanese Education of WWII 
 
Source: Asahi Shimbun opinion poll (March-April 2015, n=3000 adults) 
 
The qualitative interviews with the CRLow respondents in Chapter 8 shed light on 
some of the ways in which Japan’s historical transgressions are downplayed in the 
Japanese education system. The scant educational attention to Japan's wartime 
actions generates a lack of salience in popular consciousness and awareness. 
Japanese textbook content can thwart a deep awareness of historical events that can 
generate feelings of regret and remorse. What makes it even more challenging is the 
way in which the education system prioritises rote learning of ‘historical facts,’ a 
practice which places pressure on teachers to cover the entirety of Japanese history in 
one year. It is easy to see why controversial issues like the Nanjing Massacre, 
therefore, would not figure prominently in the pressured curriculum.  When this is 
added to teacher bias it is clear that much historical amnesia is generated by the way 
this history is taught in most Japanese schools. When curious students want to find 
out more information on their own, Internet searches more often than not lead to 
right wing nationalist history. This once again prevents the development of a 
comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the ways in which Japan committed 
atrocities during the war. 
 
The survey finding revealed that a strong majority of 70 percent agreed that the 'last 












that while students know that Japan invaded Asia, war narratives in textbooks and 
other media still emphasize the suffering inflicted on the people of Japan. The 
qualitative responses reinforced this study's assumption that Japan’s suffering and 
victimisation during the war is given more weight than the suffering of its victims. 
 
When asked about the first thing that was associated with the 'last war,' the images 
shared were all related to the sufferings of the Japanese civilians. The following 
comments show that the stories of Japanese victimization are passed on to them at a 
relatively young age through visual sources such as animations, films and 
photographs. 
  
Satoru: I associate the last war with the hideous images of people burning in 
the air raids. I think it is because of the film I watched as a child called 
'Hotaru no haka' [Grave of the Fireflies] which was produced by Studio 
Ghibli. It was tragic and sad. 
 
 
The visual images of Japanese civilians' victimization during the war have been 
disseminated widely in popular cultural media and seem to have left a strong imprint 
on the collective conscience of today's Japanese descendants.  
 
9.1.12  Comparing perspectives on history of in-group transgressions 
 
Although today's descendants are predominantly exposed to war narratives that focus 
on the suffering of the Japanese people, qualitative findings showed that respondents 
who were willing to accept collective responsibility were exposed to alternative 
narratives of out-group suffering through various channels besides official textbooks 
such as teachers, films and museums. 
 
 Haruko: I went to the Oka Masaharu Memorial Peace Museum in Nagasaki 
which chronicles the atrocities of the Japanese Imperial Army against the 
Chinese and the Koreans. It was a school field trip. I was shocked to find out 
so much information about Japan's actions which were not really taught in 
our history textbooks. I think our generation should all go to this museum. 




 Kaoru: Our history classes were designed to prepare us for the entrance 
exams. My junior high school teacher went over dry facts that the Nanjing 
Incident occurred while adding that the death toll is contentious and nobody 
knows the actual number of Chinese who were killed. On the other hand, my 
high school teacher was passionate and frustrated that our textbooks only 
focused on Japanese victimization. He showed us films on other people's 
victimization like the Holocaust, the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese Imperial 
Army's atrocities committed in Singapore and other parts of Asia. So I think it 
all depends on the teacher. 
 
Knowledge and awareness of the in-group's transgressions and out-group's suffering 
is a basic and critical condition for the members of the perpetrator group to 
acknowledge collective responsibility. Awareness of the out-group's victimization 
have been found to transform perceptions of the conflict and negative attitudes 
towards the out-group.  
 
Research question 3b) To what extent does the descendants' negative out-group 
attitude affect their willingness to accept collective responsibility? 
 
9.1.13  Finding 7: The majority of participants (77 percent) indicated that they 
had an unfavourable perception of the Chinese. Negative attitude towards the 
out-group was found to reduce the descendants' acceptance of collective 
responsibility. 
 
Prejudice and stereotyping are inextricably linked. Both phenomena involve a 
preconceived negative evaluation of a group and its members. Prejudice is as an 
antipathy, based upon faulty and inflexible generalizations (Allport, 1954, 9) and can 
become a determinant of inter-group conflicts. Past research has demonstrated that 
negative out-group attitude can also be a significant predictor of diminished 
collective guilt (Hewstone et al., 2004). The hierarchical regression analyses 
presented in this study supported this finding by showing that Japanese negative 
attitudes towards the Chinese was a strong negative predictor of acceptance of 
collective responsibility. Consistent with various polling data collected in the same 
year as this study, this thesis' survey results also showed that a large percentage (77 
percent) of Japanese harbour negative attitudes towards the Chinese. This study's 
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survey results (2014) mirrored the findings of Pew Research Center’s Global 
Attitudes and Trends Survey (released July 2014; n = 1000) and a poll by Genron 
NPO (released September 2014; n = 1000) in which a similar question was asked. To 
make a direct comparison, two scores for ‘somewhat favourable’ and ‘favourable’ / 
‘somewhat unfavourable’ and ‘unfavourable’ were combined. Results from both the 
Pew Research Center and Genron NPO’s polls revealed that an overwhelming 
majority of more than 90 percent of the Japanese have an unfavourable opinion of 
China. This study's result was slightly lower, with 77 percent reporting unfavourable 
impressions. This difference may have resulted from the wording of the question, 
which specifically asked for participants’ views of ‘the Chinese’ whereas the other 
two polls asked for participants’ opinions of ‘China.’ The qualitative interviews 
revealed that participants have a stronger negative image of China as a state than of 
Chinese individuals. Nonetheless, all three surveys clearly indicate that the Japanese 
public’s perception of the Chinese and China is alarmingly negative. 
 
Figure 22: Perception of the Out-group: A Comparison (2014) 
 
 
As prejudice is a critical factor in the protraction of conflict and hinders efforts at 
reconciliation, it is crucial to explore the socio-political dynamics that generate 
Japanese antipathy towards the Chinese. Japanese prejudice towards China and the 















et al.’s integrated threat theory to explore the extent to which the prejudice of 
Japanese participants is driven by negative stereotypes, symbolic threats, inter-group 
anxiety and realistic threats. The aim of this research was to understand the sources 
of negative out-group attitudes which reduce Japanese acceptance of guilt and 
responsibility. 
 
For this study, a number of approaches were used to examine the sources underlying 
Japanese negative attitude toward the Chinese. As the earlier regression analyses 
revealed, negative out-group attitude was revealed to be an important predictor of 
diminished collective responsibility.  
 
Negative out-group attitude scale 
The Negative out-group attitude scale attempted to measure participants’ responses 
to negative stereotype traits frequently attached to the Chinese (trustworthy [reverse 
coded], friendly [reverse coded], aggressive, and self-centred), and symbolic threat 
(won’t follow rules). Results showed that about 50 percent of the respondents 
associated these negative stereotype traits with the Chinese (M = 3.16, SD = 1.12).  
 
Of particular relevance to this research is the salience of identity-related factors in 
driving both prejudice and the lessening of collective responsibility. This study’s 
findings showed that, as societal channels work to suppress Japanese people’s war 
memory, the threat to Japanese moral identity from China’s accusations about 
Japan’s past injustices significantly heightens negative emotions toward the Chinese, 




The CRLow participants’ comments suggest that their negative out-group perception is 
fuelled by ‘symbolic threats,’ which jeopardize their beliefs in the moral correctness 
of their cultural values. As mentioned earlier, Japanese values attach much 
importance to politeness, harmony and conformity to law and order. They feel their 
standards are challenged by what they see as immoral Chinese behaviours such as 
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‘cutting in lines,’ ‘lack of consideration for others’ needs,’ ‘irresponsible actions 
jeopardising consumers’ health by selling risky food products’ and ‘producing 
counterfeit products.’ Major television stations in Japan have frequently featured 
news on ‘toxic dumplings,’ ‘tainted chicken nuggets’ and ‘Chinese counterfeits.’ 
Hence, it is not surprising that the wide media coverage of China-related scandals 
has fed into anti-Chinese sentiments amongst the Japanese. 
 
Realistic threats 
With the outbreak of the territorial dispute surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, 
and the repeated television images of Chinese vessels encroaching into Japanese 
territorial waters, Japanese anxieties about realistic threats have increased 
considerably. This is clearly indicated in the descriptive results of this study, with an 
overwhelmingly high percentage of respondents feeling anxious about realistic 
Chinese threats: 90 percent expressed anxiety about Chinese vessels entering 
Japanese waters, 84 percent were worried by China’s unilateral declaration of an air 
defense identification zone, 81 percent felt threatened by China’s military expansion 
and 85 percent were concerned about Chinese pollution affecting their health.  
 
Japanese prejudice towards the Chinese is an outcome of multiple factors. Of 
particular relevance to this research is the salience of identity-related factors in 
driving both prejudice and the lessening of collective responsibility. My study shows 
that, as societal channels work to suppress Japanese people’s war memory, the threat 
to Japanese moral identity from China’s accusations about Japan’s past injustices 
significantly heightens negative emotions toward the Chinese, diminishing feelings 




Research question 3c) To what extent does the descendants' contact with the out-
group affect their willingness to accept collective responsibility? 
 
9.1.14  Finding 7: Quality contact with the out-group was found to facilitate 
acceptance of collective responsibility. 
 
Past studies on intergroup contact have shown that positive contact with the out-
group   provides individuals with enhanced knowledge about their own group, helps 
them to develop a positive perspective of the out-group, reduces feelings of anxiety, 
and combats prejudice. Ignorance about the out-group is known to engender negative 
stereotyping and prejudice, and contact has played an important mediating role in 
reducing intergroup anxiety and prejudice. The intergroup contact hypothesis first 
proposed by Allport (1954), suggests that positive effects of intergroup contact are 
generated when contact occurs under four key conditions: equal status, intergroup 
cooperation, common goals, and support by social and institutional authorities. 
Various studies have been conducted which aim to understand the effects of different 
types of contact in mediating and moderating intergroup prejudice, with recent work 
demonstrating that intergroup contact yields the most effective positive outcomes 
when contact takes the form of cross-group friendships (Pettigrew, 1997; Davies et 
al., 2011). Contact emerged as one of the significant positive predictors of collective 
responsibility and negatively correlated with participants’ prejudice towards the 
Chinese. The present study explored the nature of Japanese participants’ interaction 
with the Chinese. An important finding of this study highlights that out of 162 survey 
participants, only 22 percent reported having close friendships with the Chinese. 
Consistent with survey results, none of the 15 interviewees who reported low 
collective responsibility said that they had any intimate, friendly relationship with a 
Chinese.  
 
This is an important finding in relation to intergroup reconciliation as past contact 
research has shown that cross-group friendship lessens feelings of anxiety towards 
the out-group and diminish negative emotions about them. In a longitudinal study of 
students’ contact experiences conducted in UCLA, Levin, van Laar, and Sidanius 
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(2003) revealed that a greater number of cross-group friendships during college years 
predicted both significant reductions in intergroup anxiety and intergroup prejudice 
by the end of college. Although Japanese university students have more opportunities 
than the general public to interact with Chinese students in classroom settings or 
even participate in cooperative group activities on campus, less than 30 percent 
answered that they have regular contact with Chinese school- or workmates. Further, 
the qualitative interviews with the CRLow participants revealed that even if 
participants engage with the Chinese on campus, (two interviewees said they 
participate in extracurricular activities with some Chinese students), their contact 
with each other does not develop into inter-group friendship. These regular contacts 
do not satisfy the key conditions that make contact effective in reducing negative 
preconceptions of the out-group. Several interviewees stressed that the image of the 
Chinese they encounter in their own environment is not necessarily negative. 
Nonetheless, the cognitive and affective results of their contact are not strong enough 
to challenge the pre-existing stereotypes and prejudices shaped primarily by the 
Japanese media. 
 
Today, the Japanese public is exposed to a high concentration of negative 
information about China. As the findings presented in earlier chapter on moral 
identity threat have revealed, an extremely high percentage of Japanese feel 
threatened not only by frequent news on realistic threats of a rising China, but their 
moral identity is also challenged by persistent Chinese accusations about Japan’s 
immoral history and lack of repentance. These factors all contribute to a heightened 
negative perception of the Chinese and reduce feelings of remorse for Japan’s 
historical injustices. While sources driving negative attitudes towards the Chinese 
continue to intensify, it is clear that current levels of intergroup contact are not 
powerful enough to counter the legacy of historical trauma and the ongoing 
dynamics of the schism in Sino-Japanese relations. Notwithstanding these 
pessimistic results, it should be noted that qualitative findings of the CRHigh 
participants revealed that those who accepted collective responsibility for Japan’s 
past all reported to have close friendships with the members of the out-group. 
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9.1.15  Comparing experiences of intergroup contact 
 
All ten CRHigh respondents indicated that they have close friendship and frequent 
quality interaction with the members of the out-group. The respondents who showed 
willingness to accept responsibility were given opportunities to engage in in-depth 
dialogue about the history issue with the members of the out-group.  
 
 Saki: My older sister studied in Korea on an exchange programme. Through 
her, I became close friends with Korean people. We talked a lot about the 
'comfort women' issue. We may never agree on a common history. I knew we 
couldn't be friends if I ignored this issue. I felt that engaging in a dialogue 
with them was the necessary step. One of them asked me how I felt about the 
Japanese leaders denying history. I explained that these politicians do not 
represent the entire Japanese population. There are also Japanese individuals 
who are willing to accept responsibility for what we did during the war. I told 
them about Kono statement and the apologies made by other Japanese leaders 
in the past. I think what made them most happy was the fact that I 
acknowledged that the Japanese army did use comfort women and it was not 
an imagined history. The same applies to my Chinese friends. 
 
The CRHigh respondents recounted important interactions with the out-group 
members that led to a transformation in their perception about the history issue. For 
some it was an eye-opening experience that made them realize how skewed their 
knowledge of war history had been. 
 
 Satoru: My grandfather went to the battlefield in China as a doctor. He often 
told me not to believe all the negative things about the Chinese on television. 
He told me stories about good-hearted Chinese people who helped him out. 
After I entered college, I had the opportunity to become close friends with 
Chinese and Koreans. We went out drinking at a pub. They got drunk and a 
heated discussion about the history issue started. I was taken back by the 
outburst of strong emotions from them. They were relieved to learn that there 
were young Japanese who were willing to acknowledge responsibility for the 
war atrocities. This was a moment of reconciliation between myself and my 
Chinese and Korean friends. They seemed happy and I felt great afterward. I 
realized the importance of apology and it was a memorable moment when our 
friendship deepened. 
 
Hayato: I have a Chinese friend I hang out with. We normally avoid the topic 
of the history problem but when we went out to dinner, he asked me how war 
history was taught in Japanese classrooms. I am glad we were able to talk 
about this so openly. My Chinese friend is very understanding and he assured 
me that the past is past, and he had no intention to blame the present Japanese 
 230 
generations. He wanted China to let go of the past, forgive Japan and move 
on. This was such an eye-opening experience for me. 
 
Saki also stated that the initial talk with her Chinese and Korean friends over a drink 
started with an emotional argument and debate. However, she recounted later that it 
was a moment when she realized how ignorant she had been about the suffering of 
the Chinese and Koreans. She said it was an enlightening moment. 
 
 Saki: Out of drunkenness, I jokingly said, 'Hey, you Koreans are erecting too 
many statues of comfort women in the States, what is going on?' My usually 
cheerful Korean friends suddenly became outraged and an emotional history 
debate began. I couldn't respond to any of their criticisms. I was completely 
ignorant about these issues. This is when I realized that the war history we 
had been taught in classrooms had been carefully tailored with many 
historical facts deleted. 
 
Existing scholarship on intergroup conflict suggests that the most effective form of 
intergroup contact is that which is based on cross-group friendships (Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006). Contact that has the potential of developing into friendship is likely to 
generate most positive attitude change (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Consistent with a 
study conducted by Cehajic and Brown (2010), the findings that emerged from the 
qualitative interviews with CRHigh respondents showed participants with quality 
contact and deep personal friendships with out-group members express greater 












Impediments to Japanese 
Collective Responsibility 
[Exemplar quotes]  
 
Inherited responsibility: 
To what extent are the 
contemporary Japanese 
willing to accept ‘inherited 
responsibility’ for 




The majority of the participants 
[60 percent+] felt a diminished 
sense of inherited responsibility 
and felt that they should not be 
blamed for their ancestors’ past 
mistakes. 
 
Supports theory of ‘identity 
discontinuity’ and collective guilt 
(Branscombe 2004; Augoustinos 
& LeCouteur, 2004) 
 
Temporal and emotional 
distancing seen in participants: 
CR-low respondent: “I don’t 
feel responsible for what 
happened during the war. I 
don’t see myself as part of the 
group of militarists who 
committed those horrible 










The majority of the participants 
[66 percent] were experiencing 
‘apology fatigue,’ convinced that 
the Japan has done enough to 
redress the past. 
 
Data supports Pew Research 
Center survey of 2016: “Japanese 
are increasingly likely to believe 
they have apologized enough for 
actions during WW II” (p. 213) 
‘We have apologized enough’: 
CR-low respondent: “How 
long do we have to continue 
apologizing? Are these people 
[victims] ever going to be 
satisfied?...Japan has already 
offered numerous apologies 
and compensation for the 
damages incurred during the 
war.” 
Moral identity threat: 
[Identity-driven variable] 
 
Do the Japanese feel that 
their moral identity is 
threatened when 
confronted with criticisms 
from victimized nations 
about the nation’s immoral 
past?  
To what extent does moral 
identity threat affect the 







Moral identity threat emerged as 
the strongest negative predictor of 
collective responsibility. 
Replicated prior research (Sullivan 
et al., 2012). 
 
Morality was considered an 
important component of the 
participants’ positive group 
identity. Victims’ constant 
accusations and reminders of the 
in-group’s immoral harm-doing  
during WWII led to denial or 
defensive reactions particularly 
from high in-group identifiers. 
 
Participants reported defensive 
reactions and frustrations with 
China’s aggressive demands 
for contrition: 
CR-low respondent: “I cannot 
feel guilty because China’s 
demand is so forceful. They 
come out so aggressively, 
unilaterally accusing us and 
portraying to the world that 
they are the ultimate victims. I 






To what extent does the 
salience of Japanese 
victimhood [during WWII] 
affect the participants’ 
This study provided the first 
statistical evidence demonstrating 
the salience of competitive 
victimhood with a contemporary 
Japanese sample. 
The majority of participants [70 
percent] expressed that ‘the atomic 
Asia-Pacific War was 
immediately associated with 
the suffering of Japanese 
civilians: 
CR-low respondent: “I 
associate the war with the 
suffering of Japanese civilians 
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willingness to accept 
collective responsibility? 
 
bombing was the most inhumane 
and immoral act in human history.’ 
 
Study revealed that the history of 
atomic victimhood is collectively 
remembered in Japanese society. 
Salient victim consciousness was 
negatively associated with the 
participants’ willingness to accept 
collective responsibility for their 
nation’s past transgressions.  
 
Data substantiated claims 
regarding Japanese victim 
mentality after WW II (Orr, 2001; 
Yoshida, 2005; Seaton, 2007; 
Bukh, 2007) 
 
and the images of the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and air 
raids.” 
“Majority of the people who 
supported Japan’s war efforts 
were forced to. It was a time 
when absolute obedience to the 
Emperor was demanded. Who 
was responsible for the war? It 
was the top political and 





To what extent does in-
group identification affect 







A large majority of participants 
reported high degree of collective 
self-esteem and strong 
identification with the nation. 
Those who identified highly with 
the nation felt increased resistance 
to accept collective responsibility 
for their nation’s immoral past. 
Data replicated previous research 
by Doosje et al. (2004). 
 
Data also challenged numerous 
Japanese scholars’ concerns over 
rise of youth nationalism in Japan 
(Takahara, 2006; Honda, 2007). 
Japanese national identification 
was found to be more ‘patriotic’ 




High national-identifiers found 
pride in modern, peaceful 
Japan that emerged as a major 
economic power after WWII 
and distanced themselves from 
the cruel perpetrators who 
committed atrocities in China 
[identity discontinuity]. 
 
CR-low respondent: “I love 
my country, Japan. It is safe, 
clean, and convenient…. We 
are peaceful and respect ‘wa’ 
[harmony] in this country. 
Crime rate is very low….am 
proud that Japan rose from the 
ashes as a major economic 





How prevalent is 
‘historical amnesia’ 
amongst the participants? 
To what extent does the 
participants’ awareness of 
the nation’s past 
transgressions affect their 










After moral identity threat, the 
second strongest predictor to 
collective responsibility was 
‘Awareness of in-group’s 
transgressions’ or the extent to 
which participants were 
knowledgeable about Japan’s 
wartime atrocities in China. Lack 
of knowledge of in-group 
transgressions was found to 
diminish participants’ acceptance 
of collective responsibility. 
 
The majority of participants [60 
percent] answered that they were 
‘somewhat aware’ of the history of 
the Nanjing Massacre while 32 
percent said they were ‘not aware 
at all.’  
Partial amnesia: Current 
generation of young Japanese 
is not entirely ignorant. 
However, 60 percent who 
answered ‘somewhat aware’ 
meant that they have heard 
about the ‘Nanjing Incident’ 
but lacked any knowledge of 
the specifics. 
CR-low respondent: “I really 
don’t know much about the 
history of what the Japanese 
soldiers did in Nanjing. I did 
learn about it briefly in junior 
high and high school through 
history textbooks. The number 
of deaths from this incident 
that the Chinese claim is far 
greater than what we think it 
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Findings supported previous 
research (Buckley-Zistel’s, 2006; 
Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; 
Sahdra & Ross, 2007) on 
‘collective forgetting,’ that groups 
do not want to be reminded of the 
shameful history of wrongs 
committed in the past. Data 
substantiated prevalence of ‘partial 
amnesia’ amongst contemporary 
Japanese. 
is. In class, the teacher quickly 
breezed through it and 
refrained from explaining 
anything in depth.” 
Negative out-group 
attitude/Prejudice: 
To what extent does the 
participants’ negative out-
group attitude affect their 










The majority of participants [77 
percent] indicated that they had an 
‘unfavourable’ perception of the 
Chinese.  
Negative out-group attitude was 
found to reduce the participants’ 
acceptance of collective 
responsibility. 
 
Findings replicated previous 
research (Hewstone et al., 2004) 
which demonstrated prejudice to 
be a significant predictor of 
reduced collected guilt for in-
group’s transgressions.  
 
Data was also consistent with Pew 
Research Center and Genron 
NPO’s 2014 polling data that 
revealed more than 90 percent of 
the Japanese to have an 
unfavourable opinion of China. 
With limited knowledge of 
Japan’s past atrocities, Chinese 
accusations threaten Japanese 
moral status and increased the 
participants’ negative emotions 
towards the Chinese, reducing 
feelings of remorse and guilt. 
CR-low respondent: “My 
negative perception of the 
Chinese stems from the fact 
that I cannot understand or 
trust them. Why does the 
country go out of its way to 
purposefully generate hatred 
towards the Japanese?” 
Intergroup contact: 
To what extent does the 
participants’ contact with 
the out-group affect their 










Quality contact [cross-group 
friendship] with the out-group was 
found to facilitate participants’ 
acceptance of collective 
responsibility. 
 
Contact emerged as a significant 
positive predictor of collective 
responsibility and was negatively 
correlated with out-group 
prejudice. Findings replicated 
previous research (Levin et al., 
2003; Cehajic & Brown, 2010; 
Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
 
 
All ten respondents who felt 
high levels of collective 
responsibility reported that 
they have close friendship and 
frequent quality interaction 
with members of the out-
group. 
CR-high respondent: “I have a 
Chinese friend I hang out 
with….when we went out to 
dinner, he asked me how war 
history was taught in Japanese 
classrooms. I am glad we were 
able to talk about it so openly. 
My Chinese friend is very 
understanding and he assured 
me that the past is past and he 
had no intention to blame 
present Japanese 
generations…this was such an 







9.2  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Many protracted conflicts have their roots in memories of past violence. How the 
perpetrator acknowledges responsibility and makes an effort to redress past injustices 
has been found to be critical in healing the victims’ psychological wounds and 
advancing the process of reconciliation. On the other hand when past injustices are 
left unaddressed, feelings of victimization, shame and humiliation can prolong the 
conflict between the transgressor and the transgressed. This has been the case with 
the friction between Japan, China and South Korea in East Asia. While the 
victimized nations continue to demand a sincere apology and contrition, the Japanese 
public seems to be experiencing ‘apology fatigue,’ a feeling of frustration that no 
matter what they do, the victims will never be satisfied. Debates about historical 
injustices have revolved around whether responsibility and guilt for past wrongs 
should be passed on from the original perpetrators to generational descendants. Is 
intergenerational responsibility for ancestral wrongdoing both an inherited and 
national responsibility for citizens?  
 
The present study aimed to provide empirical data on why some descendants are 
unwilling to accept ‘inherited responsibility’ for the acts of their ancestors and the 
processes that shape their attitudes and behavior.  The research was designed to 
identify the key impediments to contemporary Japanese participants’ acceptance of 
collective responsibility for the nation’s wartime harmdoing. Because of the 
protracted nature of this conflict, this study hypothesized that identity-related needs 
may emerge as potential impediments to Japanese acceptance of war responsibility. 
 
A mixed methods approach employing sequential explanatory design involving two 
phases of data collection was utilised in this study. The quantitative phase using a 
survey was carried out to guide a broad understanding of the contextual factors that 
shape present-day Japanese descendants’ perceptions and behaviours (n=162). 
Measures were used to gauge the participants’ acceptance of ‘inherited 
responsibility,’ and other potentially impeding factors such as 1) moral identity 
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threat, 2) competitive victimhood, 3) in-group identification, 4) collective memory or 
level of knowledge of in-group’s transgressions, 5) negative out-group attitude, and 
6) contact with the out-group. This was followed by the next phase of qualitative 
research comprised of in-depth interviews with a purposive sampling of survey 
respondents who reported low vs. high levels of ‘inherited responsibility’ (n=15 low-
responsibility, 10 high-responsibility respondents). The qualitative findings enabled 
the researcher to also gain a comprehensive, and nuanced understanding of the 
complex real-life phenomena of how societies disseminate narratives and how these 
cultural products and discourse affect citizens’ acceptance of collective 
responsibility. 
 
The results of this study provided evidence that majority of the participants felt that 
their generation should not have to feel guilty for the mistakes of the past generations 
of Japanese. Those who reported low levels of collective responsibility demonstrated 
temporal and emotional distancing with the group of militarists who committed war 
crimes and stressed that they ‘belong to an entirely different generation.’ The survey 
results also revealed that ‘apology fatigue’ was indeed prevalent amongst majority of 
the Japanese participants [66 percent]. Interviews with the CRLow respondents 
highlighted that they genuinely believe that the Japanese government has done 
enough to redress the past and expressed frustrations for the victims’ endless 
demands for sincere apology. Majority of the CRLow participants wished to distance 
themselves from the perpetrators of the Second World War and believed they should 
not be held accountable for the sins of their ancestors that they were never directly 
involved in. 
 
As for identity-related variables, the results of this study added evidence to past 
scholarship on collective guilt and moral identity threat. When the positive identity 
of the in-group was threatened by constant accusations about their forebears’ 
immoral actions, high identifiers in particular moved into a defensive mode and 
expressed their annoyance, stressing that China’s criticisms are illegitimate and even 
driven by ulterior motives. These results replicated previous analyses by 
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Branscombe, Doosje and McGarty (2002) that groups employ various strategies to 
defend their in-group’s esteem in the face of accusations about its shameful history.  
 
Second identity-driven variable that seemed to hinder Japanese descendants’ 
acceptance of collective responsibility was competitive victimhood. The results 
provided one of the first pieces of empirical evidence demonstrating the salience of 
competitive victimhood amongst contemporary Japanese. This study attempted to 
assess unconscious perceptions using an implicit association question in which the 
respondent was asked to choose the first thing that came to mind when they thought 
about the victims of the Asia-Pacific War. The majority of the participants associated 
the last war with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. CRLow 
respondents reported that when they thought about the victims of the war, they 
immediately thought of ordinary Japanese citizens. The present research results 
substantiated various scholars’ claims about Japan’s dominant atomic victimhood 
trope and that post-war narratives encouraged a victimhood mentality that enabled 
the Japanese people to identify themselves as victims of the war and divert their 
attention from their nation’s wartime aggression (Orr, 2001; Yoshida, 2005; Bukh, 
2007; Seaton, 2007).  
 
The third identity-driven variable, in-group identification, also emerged as a negative 
predictor of Japanese participants’ collective responsibility. Past scholarship revealed 
that in-group identification can lead to two different pathways; in one strand of 
research, because collective guilt being a group-based emotion, salient identification 
with the perpetrator group generated strong collective guilt among the high national 
identifiers (Doosje et al., 2006). The results of the present research replicated the 
study of Doosje and colleagues (1998) by demonstrating the high national identifiers 
to defend their collective esteem by rejecting the notion of or justifying the nation’s 
past transgressions. Data showed that high levels of national identification 
significantly reduced the participants’ willingness to accept responsibility for their 
in-group’s historical harmdoing. Although the survey findings revealed that a high 
percentage of Japanese participants associated their self-esteem with a positive 
conception of the nation, the qualitative data showed this attachment to be more 
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nuanced and patriotic than what can be simply categorized as ‘glorifying’ right-wing 
nationalism. These findings challenged the claims of various Japanese scholars on 
the rise of youth nationalism today (Takahara, 2006; Honda, 2007). 
 
The present study also provided empirical evidence on how current generations of 
Japanese ‘remember’ the history of their ancestors’ misdeeds and to what extent 
these ‘collective memories’ affect their acceptance of responsibility to redress that 
past. Collective memory can be transmitted via historical narratives in official 
textbooks, commemorations, mass media and through interpersonal story-telling. The 
findings affirmed that Japan’s policy of chosen ‘historical amnesia’ or downplaying 
the information about the Japanese acts of aggression in its public discourse has led 
many participants’ to have limited knowledge about the Nanjing Massacre and 
coercion of ‘comfort women’ (1930s-1945). A strong negative predictor of collective 
responsibility identified in this research was therefore ‘awareness of in-group 
transgressions.’ However, the present research findings further revealed that 
contemporary young Japanese are not entirely ignorant about Japan’s war history 
with 60 percent claiming that they were ‘somewhat’ aware of the atrocities 
committed in Nanjing while 32 percent reported that they were not sure of what 
happened. Added to this finding, a strong majority of 70 percent of the participants 
admitted that the last war (1931-45) was a ‘war of aggression.’ Nonetheless, this 
study demonstrated that Japanese collective memory and public discourse of the 
Asia-Pacific war focusing on its own people’s victimhood combined with suppressed 
knowledge of Imperial Japan’s past transgressions are together diminishing the 
participants’ willingness to acknowledge guilt and responsibility for the historical 
harms committed in China. This study’s data substantiated various scholars’ claims 
that ‘divisive memories of the war’ is the critical factor that is protracting the conflict 
between China and Japan (Clements, 2017; Kim, 2016; He, 2007b; Hein & Selden, 
2000; Jager & Mitter, 2007). 
 
Findings of this study also replicated previous scholarship that showed how negative 
out-group attitude can become a significant predictor of reduced collective guilt and 
responsibility (Hewstone et al., 2004). The present research attempted to probe into 
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the possible socio-political sources that may be contributing to Japanese participants’ 
negative evaluation of the out-group. 95 percent of the respondents cited the 
domestic news media as the primary source of information they rely on for their 
knowledge of China and the Chinese. The second largest source of information 
reported to be influencing their perception of China was the television media, and 
nearly 50 percent of the participants reported to trust their domestic media’s coverage 
of China and the Chinese to be objective. The study’s findings additionally 
demonstrated that while China’s accusations about Japan’s immoral past threaten 
participants’ positive identity, these negative emotions were further reinforced by the 
Japanese media’s narratives about China’s realistic threats, particularly when the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute led to heightened bilateral tensions.  
 
Lastly, this research’s regression analysis provided an important finding relevant to 
future bilateral reconciliation; that the Japanese participants’ high levels of contact 
with the out-group was not only correlated with reduced prejudice but it was also 
associated with increased levels of collective responsibility. The study’s data was 
consistent with previous scholarship on effects of contact in reducing intergroup 
conflict (Levin et al., 2003; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000; Hewstone et al., 2006) and 
increasing acknowledgement of in-group responsibility (Cehajic & Brown, 2010). 
The qualitative data of the CRHigh respondents in this study advances the existent 
literature on contact and in-group responsibility by defining the type of ‘quality 
contact’ that can facilitate increased levels of collective responsibility and empathy 
towards the out-group. CRHigh respondents who showed willingness to accept 
responsibility indicated that they have close friendship and frequent quality 
interaction with the members of the out-group in which they have engaged in in-
depth dialogue about the ‘history issue’ dividing their countries. These close 
interactions proved to be vital in leading to transformative perspective-taking and 
promoting empathetic understanding of the experience of the other. This study 
highlighted the importance of positive affective processes of effective contacts in 
advancing intergroup reconciliation. 
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Japan’s lack of contrition for the nation’s wartime transgressions continues to lie at 
the heart of the Sino-Japanese divide. Although many scholars have analysed 
contentious war narratives between China and Japan, there are few studies that have 
explored the social psychological and emotional factors that may be impeding 
Japanese rapprochement with China. This research, therefore, is the first to 
empirically examine Japanese willingness to acknowledge and accept inherited 
responsibility for the past war and its association with identity-based needs of the 
perpetrator group. 
 
Understanding what impedes perpetrator group descendants from accepting some 
degree of inherited responsibility and guilt for past acts of Japanese aggression is an 
important area of research for conflict resolution practitioners, political leaders and 
policymakers. It is particularly important for those political actors interested in 
generating more harmonious relationships between China and Japan. On a basis of 
the present research I would like to offer some normative recommendations that will 
advance these objectives. 
 
9.2.1  Recommendations 
 
1) Recommendation 1: Dealing with Perpetrator Group's Moral Identity Threat 
 
This study examined the impediments to Japanese lack of contrition, focusing on the 
perpetrator group’s need to defend its positive identity as a moral actor. The first 
significant finding of this research is that when Japanese feel that their moral status is 
threatened by accusations about their nation's past transgressions, they are less likely 
to accept collective responsibility. This finding is consistent with wider social 
identity theory which posits that individuals are motivated to maintain and defend the 
favourable image of their significant reference groups. Any challenge to the group's 
moral reputation, therefore, problematises Japanese personal and collective esteem. 
When confronted with harsh accusations of Japan's immoral past, the CRLow 
respondents reacted defensively. The interviewees reported strong negative emotions 
when criticised by China about Japan's imperial past. A frequent theme in the 
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discourse of the CRLow respondents is that they were annoyed and irritated by the 
vehemence and aggressiveness of Chinese criticisms. On the other hand, respondents 
who were willing to assume collective responsibility revealed that engaging in 
quality dialogue with the aggrieved out-group enabled them to discuss the 'history 
problem' in depth and transform their perspectives of Chinese in a positive direction. 
Any reconciliation must begin with acknowledgement in order to create ripe 
conditions for dialogue. Akemi represents the majority of the CRLow respondents' 
view that "if their demands were expressed in a different way, in a more rational and 
calm manner, I may feel differently. The fact that they are constantly stressing that 
they are victims in a pushy, aggressive way is just annoying." The normative 
conclusion, therefore, is that if the Sino-Japanese relationship is considered valuable 
to both parties then it is important that each side (particularly the victimised) make 
conciliatory gestures that will reduce the perpetrator group's psychological 'identity' 
threat. This is best done by enhancing communications which bolster rather than 
diminish the self-esteem and moral reputation of the perpetrators. Attacking the 
moral reputation of the Japanese will generate defensiveness, competitive 
victimhood and a desire to either revise or forget painful history. As outlined in 
Chapter 4, this phenomenon is clearly manifested currently in the efforts of the 
Japanese conservative politicians to revamp its identity and deny and/or rewrite 
Japanese history.   
 
Recommendation 2: Interventions to promote 'inclusive' victimhood mentality 
 
Another key finding was the salience of victim consciousness among post-war 
generations of Japanese. This study has shown that exclusive victim beliefs 
(Vollhardt, 2012) are an impediment to the perpetrator group's acceptance of 
collective responsibility. Scholarship on intractable conflicts reveals that when 
groups are engaged in making exclusive claims for their victimisation and promote   
'competitive victimhood,' they spend considerable time and effort on establishing that 
their in-group has suffered more than the other.  Because of this suffering there is an 
implicit expectation that they deserve empathy and compassion rather than criticism.  
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The majority of the respondents in this study revealed that Japan's formal education 
promotes a narrative of Japanese victimhood and diminishes narratives of Japan as 
an aggressive actor. These narratives were found to be a serious impediment to the 
perpetrator group's acceptance of collective responsibility for past transgressions. 
The study also revealed that respondents who were willing to accept collective 
responsibility were those who were exposed to information about Japan’s aggression 
and perpetrator status. In the light of this, programmes which foster higher levels of 
empathetic awareness and an 'inclusive victim mentality' [acknowledging that others 
have also suffered] (Vollhardt, 2012) should be introduced more widely in both 
China and Japan. One example that emerged from the CRHigh participants' responses 
was the impact of learning about the history of the other's victimization from 
[private] peace museums like the Oka Masaharu Memorial Museum in Nagasaki. 
This research's finding underscores the importance of peace education. Creating a 
common historical narrative between perpetrators and victims in a protracted conflict 
is extremely challenging (Bilali & Ross, 2012). Efforts should be made, however, to 
introduce more programmes which acknowledge the suffering of all sides during 
war. My interviews revealed that popular cultural products such as Studio Ghibli's 
'Grave of the Fireflies' played an important role in shaping contemporary Japanese 
perception of war victims. Similarly, showing films or animations focusing on the 
tragic and traumatic experiences of Chinese civilians may help Japanese post-war 
descendants to humanise the 'other' and empathise with the victims’ suffering. 
Perhaps the most important thing that China and Japan could do together would be to 
highlight the suffering of both sides during past wars while admitting and 
acknowledging the special role of Japan as the primary initiator of violent conflict 
before and during the Second World War. 
 
Recommendation 3: Interventions to promote cross-group friendship and 
dialogue 
 
The findings of this thesis have also confirmed the importance of intergroup contact 
more specifically, high quality contact which generates sustained friendships across 
ethnic and cultural lines. Research on intergroup contact and prejudice reveals that 
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affective dimensions are critical for reducing negative feelings towards out-groups. 
'Feelings of closeness' have been shown to strongly affect the group’s positive 
emotions toward the out-group. While intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice, 
it is most effective for reducing prejudice when it consists of close, high-quality 
intergroup relationships such as those generated by cross-group friendships 
(Pettigrew and Tropp, 2011, 117). It is therefore worrying that only 22 percent of 
Japanese participants engage in 'high quality contact' with Chinese while an 
overwhelming majority of almost 78 percent have little or no contact. This lack of 
contact diminishes opportunities for more personalized interaction and a deeper 
cognitive learning about the ‘other.’ Past research on the effects of contact have 
demonstrated that general knowledge about the out-group may not in itself be 
enough for contact to induce positive effects and reduce prejudice. For this reason, 
interventions and programmes which encourage extended and intimate contact will 
lay a solid basis for transformative dialogue and a deeper empathetic appreciation of 
the 'other.'   
 
Recommendation 4: Interactive problem-solving workshops among media 
professionals 
 
This empirical research has confirmed that Sino-Japanese conflict is an identity-
based conflict. Identity-based protracted conflicts are difficult to resolve with 
traditional interventions because of deeply held societal beliefs, competing collective 
memories about the conflict and a tendency to constantly demonise the out-group in 
society through time (Bar-Tal, 2007). It is evident from the thesis' survey data as well 
as qualitative responses that the media plays an important role in defining the 
Japanese perception of the Chinese and shaping their interpretation of the nation's 
war history. In this study, 92 percent of the survey respondents indicated that they 
rely on Japanese news media as a primary source of information about China and the 
Chinese. In the light of this, I propose that those interested in generating harmonious 
relationships between China and Japan explore a range of innovative intervention 
processes that might change perception and consciousness and generate creative 
ways of replacing mistrust with trust and nervousness with confidence in Sino-Japan 
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relationships.  One such process is the expansion of analytical, interactive problem-
solving workshops in the region.  These are normally with political influentials, and 
policymakers (Kelman, 1995, d'Estree, 2006). It may be beneficial to work with 
representatives of media organizations in these processes so that they might generate 
more conflict-sensitive journalism. Interactive problem-solving is a conflict 
intervention method that has been tried in many protracted conflicts such as the 
Middle East, Sri Lanka, Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Because the sources of 
protracted intergroup conflict are rooted in unmet human needs, past research on the 
benefits of interactive problem-solving have revealed that discussions focusing on 
underlying needs, threats and fears have increased empathy, enabled inclusive rather 
than exclusive perspectives, enhanced self-understanding, transformed thinking and 
behaviour and reduced prejudicial attitudes towards the other (Kelman, 2008b; 
Fisher, 1997; d'Estree, 2012). While it takes time for these processes to take effect, 
there is not doubt that problem-solving workshops and similar techniques are crucial 
first steps in the transformation of perceptions about the 'other.' 
 
Implications for Future Research 
 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to knowledge about collective 
responsibility and its relationship to collective guilt. Acknowledgement of in-group 
responsibility, however, can also be a trigger to emotions like shame (Branscombe & 
Doosje, 2004). This study did not explore the two related but different concepts of 
'shame' and 'guilt' amongst contemporary Japanese. The role of shame in conflict 
situations may be influenced by cultural context and deserves future investigation. 
The notion of shame is closely related to the concept of face saving in Asian cultures. 
Past studies have compared and contrasted Japan's wartime memories with those of 
Germany contending that Japan is a shame culture more than a guilt society.  
 
In guilt-driven cultures the main emphasis is on the action and its negative 
consequences whereas shame driven cultures are marked more by a focus on the self, 
and ways in which the behaviour generates reputational damage to the perpetrator 
(Lewis, 1971; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008, 75-76). Previous 
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research (Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney, & Dearing, 2002) has found that, compared 
to guilt, shame is typically experienced as more distressing and painful and therefore 
more strongly associated with depression, anger and externalization of blame. Shame 
is associated with a sense of worthlessness and guilt with a sense of responsibility. 
Guilt leads to constructive behaviour, motivating perpetrators to make restitution for 
the wrongdoing (Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Shame has been 
associated with decreased empathy toward others while guilt has been associated 
with increased empathy toward others (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). Although both 
emotions are aversive, guilt and shame were found to be associated with distinctive 
consequences. Because guilt is primarily focused on the individual’s misdeed and   
responsibility, it should be more likely to lead to positive actions to redeem the 
mistake such as apology and reparation. Conversely, shame has been found to be 
characterized by self-blame, and can therefore lead to defensive responses like 
withdrawal from and avoidance of the transgression, and even self-defensive 
aggression. However, research on the effects of collective shame on prosocial 
behaviour towards the victims have shown mixed empirical results in the past and 
requires further investigation in different cultural contexts including Asian societies. 
 
9.12 Transforming Sino-Japanese Relations 
 
Painful memories stemming from the traumatic experiences of the Japanese invasion 
of China are deeply engraved in the Chinese psyche and resurface in virulent public 
protests against Japan. While the Chinese people continue to feel bitter about their 
suffering and the lack of genuine Japanese atonement for the war, the findings of this 
study confirmed that the majority of Japanese people feel diminished inherited 
responsibility for their ancestors' mistakes and are frustrated with endless Chinese 
demands for apology and reparations. This thesis has demonstrated that the 
underlying drivers of protracted conflicts—need for positive identity and 
recognition—are the factors exacerbating tensions between China and Japan. 
 
Popular animosity, borne out of deep-rooted historical violence, cannot be easily 
eradicated by functional economic relationships. Incompatibility based on different 
perceptions of history, national stereotypes and rigid worldviews are as likely to 
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generate transnational conflict as clashes over territorial interests or sovereignty. 
Indeed these emotional factors can rapidly polarize otherwise negotiable disputes. 
Decisions made by political leaders in both China and Japan reflect strong nationalist 
public sentiments in both countries and the enduring power of traumatic memory. 
Popular nationalism deeply rooted in historical memories can exacerbate mutual 
threat perception, shape foreign policy decisions and become a catalyst for future 
conflict. Building peaceful relationships may require more than formal agreements 
between nations. In sum, I argue that the deeper psychological identity needs of both 
perpetrator and victim groups must be addressed for true reconciliation in East Asia 
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Appendix A: Information Sheet and Questionnaires   





From Fear to Friendship: Connectors and Dividers in Sino-Japanese Relations  
 
INFORMATION  SHEET  FOR   
PARTICIPANTS  
ONLINE SURVEY ON SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate 
we thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no disadvantage to you and 
we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
 
This project is undertaken as part of the requirements for a thesis research in peace 
and conflict studies at the University of Otago, under the supervision of Professor 
Kevin Clements. The purpose of this research is to explore how Chinese and 
Japanese people perceive the main drivers of conflict in Sino-Japanese relations. The 
data collected in this study will help identify future measures that can reduce the 
tension between the two countries. 
 
 
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
 
Approximately 100 Chinese and Japanese undergraduate and postgraduate students 
(age 20-30) from universities in both countries will be recruited to participate in an 
online survey on Sino-Japanese relations. Participants must be willing to share their 
views on the current tensions between China and Japan. In order to prevent potential 
selection bias, Chinese and Japanese students must be residing in their respective 
countries. Hence, Japanese students studying in China, and Chinese students 
studying in Japan will be excluded from the sample. Questionnaires are offered in 
Japanese and Chinese so the respondent can choose the language they feel most 
comfortable with. The survey URL will be emailed to you using a popular online 
medium called SurveyMonkey. Participants are therefore required to have access to 
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internet and email. There will not be any monetary compensation and your 
participation will be voluntary. You may refuse to participate or withdraw even after 
your initial consent.  
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? 
 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to complete an online 
survey that will be sent to you by email (linking to SurveyMonkey). Technical 
instructions on how to access and respond to the questionnaire will be provided 
together with the survey link in the email. The survey should take 30-60 minutes to 
complete.  
 
You will be asked to share your demographic information such as age, 
nationality/ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, and level of education. Since the 
aim of this study is to understand your perception of the “other” in Sino-Japanese 
relations, you will be asked about your perception of China/Japan, how you 
understand the history of World War II, your sentiments toward your country and 
your contacts with the people of China/Japan. 
 
Please note that you may decide not to take part at any time during the project 
without any disadvantage to yourself. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
The information collected through this online survey will be on your perception of 
the “other” in Sino-Japanese relations. Aside from the personal views presented in 
the answers to the questionnaire, this study will also obtain each participant’s basic 
demographic information such as age, ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, and 
level of education. (Please see the outline below). 
1) Demographics 
-age, gender, location, ethnicity, religious affiliation, level of education 
 
2) Perception of the other 
-Your impressions of China/Japan 
 
3) Contact with the other 
- Sources of information shaping the view of the other 
 
5) Memory of the war 
-How the history of World War II is remembered 
-Main sources of information that has shaped your understanding of World War II 
  
6) National identity 
-Level of your confidence and pride in your country 
 
7) Future of Sino-Japanese relations 
-Expectancy of future military conflict between the two countries 
 
Consequently, although the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee is aware 
of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has not been able 
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to review the precise questions to be used. In the event that the line of questioning 
does develop in such a way that you feel hesitant or uncomfortable, you are 
reminded of your right to decline to answer any particular question(s) and to 
withdraw from the project at any stage without disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
Personal information such as names and contact information will be viewed only by 
the researcher and used for the sole purpose of communicating with the participants. 
Participants will be allowed to access the data they offered and will be able to view 
the final analysis of the survey once presented in thesis format. The results of the 
project will be presented as part of a doctoral dissertation, may be published and will 
be available in the University of Otago Library (Dunedin, New Zealand) but every 
attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity. 
 
On the Consent Form you will be given options regarding your anonymity. Please be 
aware that should you wish we will make every attempt to preserve your anonymity. 
However, with your consent, there are some cases where it would be preferable to 
attribute contributions made to individual participants. It is absolutely up to you 
which of these options you prefer. 
 
The raw data collected will be securely stored in such a way that only the researcher 
will be able to gain access to it. Data obtained as a result of the research will be 
retained for at least 5 years in secure storage. Any personal information of the 
participants, such as contact details, will be destroyed at the completion of the 




Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What if Participants have any Questions? 
If you have any questions about our project, either now or in the future, please feel 
free to contact either: 
 
The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS) 
Ria Shibata and  Professor Kevin Clements 
NCPACS   NCPACS 
 +64 3 471 6462  +64  3 479 9468 
ria.shibata@postgrad.otago.ac.nz                              kevin.clements@otago.ac.nz 
   
 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. 
If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of the research you may contact 
the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph 03 479 8256 
or email gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence 
and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome. 
 
Survey on Sino-Japanese Relations
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey conducted by the University of Otago's National Centre for Peace and Conflict
Studies. The objective of this research is to better understand Japanese young people's perception of China and the Chinese people.
The questionnaire is anonymous and your answers will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you for your cooperation!
1. Please tell me which prefecture you are from?*
2. How old are you?*
3. What is your gender?*
Male
Female
4. Please indicate your nationality.*
Japanese
Non-Japanese
5. What is your major in university?*
1
6. Please tell us your family's income.*




Above 10 million yen
Not sure













Not important at all
2





















Don't trust at all
 Strongly agree Agree
Neither agree or
disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
Trustworthy
Aggressive
Do not follow rules
Self-centred
Friendly
11. How much do you agree or disagree with the following characterizations of the Chinese people?*
3



























2) China establishing its
ADIZ over Senkaku
Islands is unacceptable.
3) China's actions to
secure energy resources
seem selfish.
4) China's military build-



















1) As Japanese, I feel
annoyed every time
China demands Japan to
apologize for its past
actions.
2) I wish China would
stop criticizing that Japan
is unrepentant for its past
harmdoing.
3) I get annoyed when
the Chinese blame
Japan for making them
suffer during the war.
4) I feel irritated when
China attacks Japan for
not facing up to the past.
5) I think Japan deserves
to be criticized for its
wartime actions. [reverse
coded]
6) As a Japanese, I don't
want to hear about the
cruelties committed by
the Japanese soldiers in
the past.
15. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*
16. Which of the following best describes your contact with the Chinese people? (multiple choices)*
I have a close friend who is Chinese
I have a Chinese school/workmate whom I regularly see
I have no personal acquaintance who is Chinese (but I meet them in my immediate environment)
I have visited China before (i.e. tourism)
I have no contact with the Chinese
5








18. Next, we would like to ask you some questions about history of the war. When you think of the 'last




Air raids and bombing of Tokyo
Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Attack on Pearl Harbor
The Bataan death march
Unit 731 and biological warfare
Other (please explain)
6
19. How did you learn about Japan's history of the Pacific War? Please choose the top three sources of
information you can think of.
*
News programs






Stories of friends and families
Anime, Manga













1) Atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
was the most inhumane
and immoral act in
history.
2) The dropping of the





also suffered as victims
of the war.
4) As the only country in
the world that has ever
been atomic-bombed,
Japan must never forget
this history.
5) The magnitude of the
the destruction wrought
by the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima cannot be
compared to any other
tragic event of war.













1) Our generation should
not be held responsible
for Japan's military
actions during the last
war.
2) As Japanese, we
should feel remorse for
Japan's military actions
during the war.
3) We should not have to
feel responsible for the
actions of our forebears.
4) As Japanese, we
should accept
responsibility for Japan's
injustices in the last war.
5) I think as Japanese,
we are accountable for
what the other Japanese
did in the past.
6) Japan has apologised
enough for its military
actions during the last
war.
7) I am tired of hearing
endless demands from
China to apologise.
21. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*
22. Do you think the Pacific War was a war of aggression?
1) Yes, it was a war of aggression.
2) No, I don't think it was a war of aggression.
3) I don't know




Not aware at all
8
Other (please explain)
24. How did you come to learn about the Nanjing massacre?*
Conversations with the Chinese
Visited China
Japanese news






Things I heard from people 
Stories by friends/families
Don't know
 Strongly disagree Disagree
Neither agree nor
disagree Agree Strongly agree
1) I am glad to be a
Japanese.




3) The nation I belong to
is an important reflection
of who I am.
4) I am proud to be a
Japanese.
5) I am a
contributing/worthy
citizen of Japan.













1) I love this country of
Japan.
2) In view of Japanese
economic superiority, it is
only right that we should
have a bigger say in the
United Nations.
3) The Japanese people
are among the finest in
the world.
4) The remarkable
growth of Japan after the
war is mainly due to the
excellence of the people.
5) Japan is the best
country in the world.












1) We should revise the
Japanese Constitution
[Article 9] in the face of
future security threats.
2) Japan should bolster
its self-defence forces in
the face of future security
threats in Asia.
3) Whatever happens we
must avoid war with
China.
27. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.*







29. If there were to be a national election tomorrow, which party would you vote for? 
Liberal Democratic Party
















1) It would make me feel
good to be a person who
has these
characteristics.
2) Being someone who
has these characteristics




really important to me.
4) I want my country to
also have these
characteristics.
30. Here are some characteristics that might describe a person: caring, compassionate, fair, hardworking,
honest, responsible. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements.
*
31. Please indicate your name, university and email address in the box.*
11
32. Consent Form
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my questions
have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further information at any
stage.
I know that:
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary;
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without any disadvantage;
3. Personal identifying information such as names and contact information will be destroyed at the
conclusion of the project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in
secure storage for at least five years;
4. In the event that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable with the questions, I may decline to answer particular
question(s) and/or may withdraw from the project without any disadvantage of any kind;
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity.
For more information, please contact Ria Shibata  Email: ria.shibata@postgrad.otago.ac.nz
University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
*
I agree to participate in this research.































































































































































































































































































































































































University of Otago, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
*
同意します
同意しません
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